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PREFACE
Shape, Form, and Structure
Shape, Form, and Structure are some of the most elusive notions within diverse
disciplines ranging from humanities (literature, arts) to sciences (chemistry, bi-
ology, physics etc.) and within these from the formal (like mathematics) to the
empirical disciplines (such as engineering and cognitive science). Even within do-
mains such as computer science and artificial intelligence, these notions are re-
plete with commonsense meanings (think of everyday perception and communi-
cation), and formalisations of the semantics and reasoning about shape, form,
and structure are often ad hoc. Whereas several approaches have been proposed
within the aforementioned disciplines to study the notions of shape, form and
structure from di↵erent standpoints, a comprehensive formal treatment of these
notions is currently lacking and no real interdisciplinary perspective has been put
forward.
The workshop series SHAPES provides an interdisciplinary platform for the dis-
cussion of all topics connected to shape (broadly understood): perspectives from
psycho-linguistics, ontology, computer science, mathematics, aesthetics, and cog-
nitive science, amongst others, are welcome to contribute and participate in the
workshops. We seek to facilitate a discussion between researchers from all dis-
ciplines interested in representing shape and reasoning about it. This includes
formal, cognitive, linguistic, engineering and/or philosophical aspects of space, as
well as their application in the sciences and in the arts.
We also welcome contributions on the relationship of shape representations at
di↵erent levels of detail (e.g. 2D, 3D) and in di↵erent logics, and with respect
to di↵erent qualitative and quantitative dimensions, such as topology, distance,
symmetry, orientation, etc.
Form and Function in Natural and Artificial Systems
Within the philosophy and practice of design, the ontological notions of shape,
form and structure have a further role of constraining function, malfunction, and
behaviour of things. In this perspective, the decision-making process in design
is a trade-o↵ between physical, logical and cognitive laws and constraints that
intertwine shapes and functionalities. Here, the spatio-linguistic, conceptual, for-
mal, and computational modeling of shape serves as a crucial step towards the
realization of functional a↵ordances. This line of thought extends to several other
disciplines concerned not only with the design of technical systems, but also with
the understanding of biological as well as socio-technical systems. For instance,
in biochemistry the shape of molecular entities (proteins, small molecules) has a
direct e↵ect on their interactions which give rise to the capacities they can man-
ifest and, in turn, to the processes of life and death. Representing and reasoning
about the shapes and realizable functionalities of these entities is essential to un-
derstand basic biological processes. Of special importance, in this as well as other
contexts, is the understanding of shape complementarity, that is, categorising the
shapes of holes as well as the shapes of the entities that can fit into those holes,
which can either facilitate or block the functionality of the overall system.
The results of this workshop will stimulate and facilitate an active exchange on
interdisciplinary applications, ideas, approaches, and methods in the area of mod-
elling shape, form, pattern and function. The format of the workshop combined
invited speakers, peer-reviewed full contributions, as well as short position and
demo papers, and allowed ample time for open discussions amongst the partici-
pants. Topics covered included:
Linguistics / Philosophy shape and form in natural language; di↵erences between
shape, form, structure, and pattern; shape in natural and artificial objects.
Cognition shape perception and mental representation; gestalt vs. structuralist
understanding of shape cognition; perception and shape (e.g. identifying
objects from incomplete visual information); a↵ordances, dispositions, and
shape.
Logics, Spatial Representations formal characterisations of shape and form; log-
ics for shape: e.g. fuzzy, modal, intensional; logics for topology, symmetry,
shape similarity; design semantics, spatial semantics; shape and 3D space;
shape and space in cognitive assistance systems.
Ontology ontologies and classifications of shapes; ontological relations among
shape, objects and functions; patterns as shapes of processes; forms and
patterns in ontology.
Applications Biology & Chemistry : molecular shapes, shape in anatomy and phe-
notype definitions, shape complementarity between objects and holes, shape
in medical image analysis and annotation.
Visual Art and Aesthetics: shape in Film and Photography; shape in com-
putational creativity.
Naive Physics and Geography: e.g. qualitative classifications of shapes of
geographic objects.
Design & Architecture: shape grammars; CAD, symmetry and beauty in
architectural design.
Engineering: formal shape analysis in engineering processes.
The workshop SHAPES 2.0 followed a successful first event held at CONTEXT
2011 in Karlsruhe, Germany.1
SHAPES 2.0 grew significantly in its second installment2, running as a full two-
day workshop, and attracting a total of 23 contributed submissions of which
we selected 14 for presentation at the workshop, with an additional 5 invited
contributions. We thank all the speakers for their great presentations, and the
audience for generating very lively and fruitful discussions.
1See http://cindy.informatik.uni-bremen.de/cosy/events/shapes/ for the workshop website. The
proceedings have been published as Vol. 812 of the CEUR workshop proceedings, edited by
Janna Hastings, Oliver Kutz, Mehul Bhatt, and Stefano Borgo, see http://ceur-ws.org/Vol-812/.
2See http://cindy.informatik.uni-bremen.de/cosy/events/shapes2/ for the workshop website
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Knowledge of knots: shapes in action
Roberto Casati*
Institut Jean Nicod (CNRS-EHESS-ENS)
Keywords: Knots, shapes, topology, processes, action
Abstract: Logic is to natural language what knot theory is to natural, everyday knots. Logic is concerned with  
some cognitive performances; in particular, some natural language inferences are captured by various types of  
calculi  (propositional,  predicate,  modal,  deontic,  quantum,  probabilistic,  etc.),  which  in  turn  may generate  
inferences that are arguably beyond natural logic abilities, or non-well synchronized therewith (eg. ex falso  
quodlibet, material implication). Mathematical knot theory accounts for some abilities - such as recognizing  
sameness or differences of some knots, and in turn generates a formalism for distinctions that common sense is  
blind to. Logic has proven useful in linguistics and in accounting for some aspects of reasoning, but which  
knotting  performaces  are  there,  over  and  beyond  some  intuitive  discriminating  abilities,  that  may  require 
extensions or restrictions of the normative calculus of knots? Are they amenable to mathematical treatment?  
And what role is played in the game by mental representations? I shall draw from a corpus of techniques and 
practices to show to what extent compositionality, lexical and normative elements are present in natural knots,  
with the prospect of formally exploring an area of human competence that interfaces thought, perception and  
action in a complex fabric. 
Fig 1. Some of the items we are going to discuss in this paper, listed here to assist the reader.
*Roberto  Casati,  Institut  Nicod  CNRS-EHESS-ENS,  Ecole  Normale  Supérieure,  29  rue  d'Ulm,  75005  Paris,  France.  Phone:  +33  
144322695, E mail: casati@ehess.fr
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The  shoelace  knot  is  the  most  common  mildly 
complex knot everyone learns to tie. Most of us can 
tie it  with closed eyes; our fingers somewhat know 
what to do. 
I discovered recently that it can be tied in at least 
two more ways, over and above what I thought to be 
the canonical way. My youngest daughter was taught 
in school that one can tie a Plain Knot on two bights 
(“bunny ears”), and I found a number of tutorials on 
the web showing how to create half loops on your 
fingers to tie the knot in a single, swift movement – 
something  I  learned  to  do  myself  with  huge 
intellectual pleasure.
I also decided as of late that I was able to analyse 
the shoelace knot. It is, actually, a composed knot: a 
Plain Knot  followed by a  running Half Hitch  on a 
bight. These are semitechnical notions that I learned 
from  sailing  practice.  More  technically,  bordering 
topological notions, thus cautiously, we can say that 
the shoelace knot decomposes into here a sequence 
of a “genuine” knot and an “unknot”. 
Knowing  how  it  decomposes  made  me  a  bit 
ambitious. Can the shoelace knot be improved upon? 
I somewhat succeeded in getting rid of the Plain Knot 
(which  I  dislike,  like  many  sailors)  and  ensuring 
some stability by tiying two Half Hitches on the bight 
(the latter  one is  once more a  running Half  Hitch, 
which provides easy unfastening). 
The  improvement  is  intellectually  pleasant. 
Although  we  should  handle  matemathical  notions 
with care, I'd say that I managed to replace a hybrid 
of  a  knot  plus  an  unknot  with  something  that  is 
purely an unknot. 
I think most of us appreciate that there are at least 
two  action  atoms in  tying  shoelaces.  One  could 
produce  the  Plain  Knot  without  tying  the  running 
Half  Hitch,  and  conversely.  One  may  even 
understand something more – even if, I surmise, very 
few have ever tried this: tying first the Half Hitch, 
then the Plain Knot; i.e., execute the two steps of the 
shoelace knot  in  reverse order.  Now, I  predict  that 
you will be surprised by the outcome: pulling the two 
ends, you end up with the Plain Knot! Exactly as it 
would  happen when you  pull  the  two ends  of  the 
shoe's knot. In both cases, the unknot disappears, and 
the knot stays.
The lesson from this simple example is that even if 
you have some understanding of  the compositional 
structure of an action such as tying the shoe knot, you 
do not thereby have an access to the end result of just 
any knotting procedure that involves the elements of 
the  composition.  The  consequences  of  the  atomic 
actions you perform are not easy to predict; not even 
for experts. 
My  purpose  here  is  to  trace  the  perimeter  of  a 
small  research  program.  There  are  many  knotting 
performances that one might want to explain. People 
tie knots, even complex ones, learn to tie knots, talk 
about knots,  draw them, understand knot diagrams, 
teach  knots,  at  various  levels  of  expertise  and 
conscious  understanding.  There  is  a  rich  set  of 
explananda.  Moreover,  the  examples above suggest 
that some decomposition, some structure is available 
to knotters and guides their action. The main research 
question  is  thus:  what  is  the  structure  of  the 
underlying  competence  that  accounts  for  these 
performances? 
Knots in topology
As  we  search  for  structure,  we  note  that  the 
theoretical  landscape  is  not  empty.  Knots  are 
topologically interesting objects and a mathematical 
theory of knots has developed, providing descriptive 
and inferential tools to solve a number of problems. 
For our purposes, the main aspects of the topological 
account  of  knots  are  the  distinction  between knots 
and  the  unknot  (Fig.  2),  and  the  study  of  knot 
equivalencies. A further aspect of less concern is the 
peculiar  classification of  knots  that  is  delivered  by 
topology.  
Fig. 2. Topological knot and topological unknot. 
What use can be made of topological knot theory? 
Does  it  provide  the  appropriate  framework  for 
capturing the structure of competence? In topology, a 
knot is an equivalence class of knot representations, 
which  are  the  planar  projections  (the  shadows)  of 
closed  loops.  The  same  knot  can  have  countless 
representations;  even  when  one  reduces  drastically 
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the complexity of the representation (e.g. by limiting 
to a small integer <10 the number of crossings in the 
representation),  the  problem  of  identifying  the 
members  of  each  class  has  proven difficult  and  to 
date there is no algorithm that delivers a satisfactory 
classification [19]. 
Camps  and  Uriagereka  [6]  and  Balari  [3]  have 
linked the complexity in knotting to that of syntax. 
They  suggested  that  evidence  about  early  human 
knotting  practices  are  indirect  evidence  for  early 
language use, thus proposing a link between knotting 
and  linguistic  performance.  If  the  same 
computational  power  is  assumed  to  underlie  both 
knotting abilities and natural language, then evidence 
about knotting practice in the archeological record is 
evidence  for  at  least  the  presence  of  the 
computational  power  for  natural  language  in  the 
brains of those who left that record. A crucial point in 
the  argument  is  the  recourse  to  topological  knot 
theory  to  sustain  the  claim  that  knotting  abilities 
require  the  computational  power  necessary  for 
grammars, or that they share computational resources 
with language.  We may suspend our judgement on 
the goal of using evidence about knotting as evidence 
about  language  (see  the  critiques  by  Lobina  [15]; 
discussion in Balari et al [4], replies in Lobina and 
Brenchley  [16]).  At  the  same  time  we  are  still 
interested  in  explaining  knotting  competence.  I 
would  just  be  methodologically  flexible  as  to  the 
theoretical  instrument  we  should  employ.  Indeed, 
there  is  no  clear  reason  for  thinking  that  the 
underlying  competence  is  best  captured  by 
topological knot theory. There are both a generic and 
a specific reason for skepticism. The generic reason 
is  purely  cautionary:  We  have  a  long  list  of 
formalisms  that  somewhat  mimick  cognitive 
performances  but  in  the  end  turn  out  to  be  quite 
independent  from  the  latter  and  not  good  models 
thereof.  Logical  systems  are  both  under  and 
overshooting relative to people's inferential abilities. 
Queue theory models ideal queueing and not people's 
behaviour. Real-life buyers and sellers are not very 
well framed by rational choice theory. Coming to the 
point, topological classifications are misaligned with 
commonsense classifications [7]. 
Even closer to the point, the specific reason is that 
topological  knot  theory  is  concerned  with  knot 
equivalencies,  where  knots  are  defined  over  close 
loops  in  3d-space.  Ecological  knots,  on  the  other 
hand, are the result of transformations that take you 
from  a  situation  in  which  there  is  no  knot,  to  a 
situation  in  which  there  is  a  knot.  You  do  not  tie 
topological knots, because you cannot. 
An  intuitive  demonstration  of  the  gap  between 
ecological  knots  and  topological  knots  is  at  hand. 
You can take a close loop and tie a Plain Knot on it 
(Fig. 3)
Fig. 3. A closed loop, and a knot tied on it. Not a knot for 
topology.
Even  more  dramatic  are  examples  from  real 
practice, for instance the cases of the Half Hitch and 
of the Clove Hitch. These are two most used knots. 
The Half Hitch, the quickest  way to fix a piece of 
rope around  an object, is fundamental in tapestry and 
knitting.1 The Clove Hitch is a basic knot in sailing 
and  farming.  The  fact  is,  neither  is,  topologically 
speaking,  a  knot.2 If  we  resort  to  the  graphical 
convention of topology, we can represent them (Fig. 
4) as trivial twists in a closed loop.
Fig. 4. Half Hitch (left) and Clove Hitch (middle, right) are 
invisible to topology. 
The  Clove  Hitch's  advantage  is  precisely  in  the 
fact that it is not a topological knot. This means that 
you can tie it in the middle of a piece of rope, without 
having to manipulate the ends of the rope (Fig. 5). 
1 Tutorial received on Sep 18, 2011, at the Gobelins Tapestries 
in Paris.
2 A word of caution. If you tie a Half Hitch at the end of a loop, 
you end up with a Plain Knot ( a trefoil knot, which is different 
from  an  unknot).  Textbooks  of  knotting  practice  tend  not  to 
distinguish between “pure” Half Hitches and Plain Knots. But this 
is a terminological issue. The important thing is that a Half Hitch 
is part of a Plain Knot.
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Fig. 5. Tying a Clove Hitch on a pole.
Two further aspects are that you cannot use hitches  
as  stop  knots  and  that  you  need  an  object  around 
which  tying  them.  As  we  shall  see,  there  is  an 
important notion of dependency at work here. 
Our problem is thus pretty straightforward. If we 
find a sense  for  the  claim that  the  drawing on the 
right hand side of Fig. 5 represents a knot, and if we 
accept that this knot is invisible to topology, then we 
need to find an alternative,  non topological (or not 
only topological) account for our intution that a knot 
is represented here. 
The  point  of  contact  between  topological  and 
ecological  knots  concerns  a  small  subset  of 
explananda  that  have  to  do  with  recognition  and 
categorization. A very specific ecological task is that 
of checking if a certain knot is the correct one (did 
the shipboy execute the Bowline correctly?) In this 
case  one  categorizes  and  assesses  an  equivalence, 
much  in  the  same  way  in  which  topologists 
categorize  and  assess  equivalences  of  topological 
knots. But, as I mentioned, this is but one of the tasks 
to be explained.
The Camps and Uriagereka paper [2006] makes an 
interesting,  not  uncommon  assumption  about  the 
performance. It describes the execution of the Plain 
Knot in a way that mimicks the way the knot diagram 
is drawn, not the way the knot is normally tied. What 
is  the  difference?  The  “drawing”  style  consists  in 
taking the working end of the rope and make it travel 
about as if it was the engine of a moving train. In real 
life, on the other hand, one creates a small bight, and 
retrieves  the  working  end.  This  should  interest  us. 
What descriptions of knotting practice are to be used 
as  good  explananda?  I  concede  that  in  the  initial 
phases  of  learning  one  may  use  the  moving  train 
metaphor. But after a while some other gestures take 
over. 
To  sum  up,  the  central  set  of  problems  is  thus 
twofold:
What is the performance we want to explain?
What  is  the  structure  of  the  underlying 
competence?
The first part of what follows will be devoted to 
looking for interesting cases of performance, such as 
the understanding of knot equivalencies, description 
of  knotting  practice,  etc.  This  is  an  uncharted 
territory.1 The second part  of  the paper  proposes  a 
framework  for  dealing  with  the  explanation  of  the 
performances.  Having  rejected  mathematical 
topology as a model of competence, I shall draw on 
the  theory  of  Graphic  Schemes  [18]  in  order  to 
propose a two-step approach to knowledge of knots 
in  sensori-motor  terms,  and  plead  for  a  type  of 
mental  topological  representations that  are process-
sensitive.  Knots  are  living  memories  of  processes, 
and we need some concepts to explore their structure 
and  constituents.  We  are  after  mid-level 
conceptualizations:  close enough to common sense, 
to  ecological  knotting,  but  such  as  to  allow  for 
formalization. If we want to look beyond the formal 
toolkit of topology we do not have much of a choice. 
We  need  to  start  from  some  semi-intuitive,  semi-
technical  ideas.  Knots  from topological  theory will 
henceforth  be  called  'topological  knots'.  Ecological 
knots will be just knots. 
But  what  are  knots?  Let's  proceed  stepwise. 
Metaphysically,  we  consider  knots  as  physical 
configurations  of  rope  (be  they  construed  as 
individuals,  “disturbances”  [14]  or  properties).  Not 
all  configurations  of  rope  are  knots,  of  course. 
Besides, we take knots as configurations for which a 
certain relation to space is essential (if you travel in a 
tunnel, it does not matter for you if it is knotted or 
not), at least insofar as it allows for movement of the 
knot along the rope. Knots are stable configurations 
of rope that are gounded on friction, but not all such 
stable configurations of rope are knots. For instance, 
rope that is wrapped around a pole may be stable and 
grounded on friction, but it dies not constitute a knot. 
Some  stabilized crossing of rope must occur,  under 
contextual tension. On the opposite end, a large rope 
jam may not count as  knot for natural language: it is 
just a large jam. Finally, knots are what we may call 
active  shapes,  shapes  that  trap  some  energy.  The 
1 For this reason, I am a bit skeptical about the conclusions one may 
draw about cognition of knots from the results of experiments that measure 
certain responses of people to the perception of knots. We do not know yet 
what aspects of the performance are to be explained. Cf. [22 ,10]
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mental representation of knots would thus be that of 
shapes  that store an action.  We shall rely on some 
intuitive understanding of the notion in what follows, 
within the limits set by these examples.
  
What are the explananda?
We start from the explananda. The following is a 
mix of  platitudes,  personal reports,  and established 
evidence.
(1)  People  tie  knots.  This  is  our  starting  point. 
Knots  are  extremely  useful  artifacts.  They  have 
various  functions  that  rely  on  a  basic  principle, 
preventing  rope from slipping by exerting pressure 
on different parts of the rope and, if they involve an 
object,  of  the object  they may be tied on. Crowell 
[11] provides an informal digest of some of the few 
papers in knots physics up to 2011, in particular the 
seminal work of Bayman on hitches [5]. In order to 
work, knots must be tied in such a way as to create 
nips,  friction  points  between  parts  of  rope.  Some 
parts of rope should be made to pass in loops or over 
other  parts  so  that  nips  are  formed.  Typically  the 
standing  end  of  a  piece  of  rope  supports  a  load, 
which may serve the function of assuring a tension 
(this is the case with hitches). The working end of a 
piece of rope is in general used for tying the knot. 
(2)  People  can  untie  knots  –  and  know when a 
knot  is  so  jammed,  it  cannot  be  untied,  as  did 
Alexander the Great when, according to legend, he 
decided it was better to cut the Gordian Knot than to 
try and untie it. Some simple rules for untying are: 
Running knots are untied by pulling the working end. 
Non-running knots are tied by pulling a bight. 
Knowledge  about  knotting and knowledge about 
unknotting are not necessarily aligned. It looks as if 
one  will  be  able  to  untie  any  knot,  whereas  tying 
specific knots requires a certain amount of training. 
There is, of course, an asymmetry here, related to the 
complexity  of  the  task.  What  one  is  normally 
requested to create is a specific knot (say a Bowline, 
or  a  Cleat  Hitch,  or  a  Sheet  Bend).  One  is  not 
requested to create an unorganized knotted structure 
(which one may easily do by simply piling a number 
of  simple  knots  and  pulling  the  working  end 
randomly  through  whichever  loops  are  formed). 
Knotting and unknotting appear to require different 
algorithms.  However,  tying knowledge is  useful  in 
untying a knot. I remember that I can easily untie a 
Bowline;  I  know (but  we  shall  see  that  this  is  no 
trivial knowledge) that a Bend Sheet is a Bowline. I 
immediately find a way to untie a Bend sheet.
(3) We have normative intuitions about knots. In 
Ashley's apt words, “A knot is never 'nearly right'; it 
is either exactly right or it is hopelessly wrong, one 
or the other; there is nothing in between” [2, p.18].
(4)  There  is  an  understanding  of  the  distinction 
between permanent and transitory knots. In ordinary 
life many knots are  not permanent  (shoelace knots, 
mooring knots, knots for climbing) and must be so 
designed and executed that one be able to easily untie 
it. Other knots, such as knots for parcels, for tapistry, 
for  fisher  nets  and  weaving  are  designed  to  be 
permanent. Most natural knots that one must quickly 
dispose  of  are  unknots  (the  Clove  Hitch).  Most 
natural  knots  that  one  should  not  dispose  of  (stop 
knots)  are  topological  knots.  There  is  an 
understanding  of  what  kind  of  knot  is  suitable  for 
different  purposes,  and  thus  of  the  functional 
properties of each knot.
(5) People show clear degrees of expertise in tying 
knots.  This  point  is  less  trivial,  but  no less  true.  I 
acquired a certain expertise;  before  that,  I  admired 
other people's expertise. Expertise manifests itself in 
speed  and  accuracy  of  the  performance,  in 
recognitional/parsing abilities, in assessment of other 
people's performances,  in style of execution, in the 
ability of generalizing, in “parsing” knots one has not 
seen before.
(5.1) People with a limited knot repertoire face a 
number of knotting problems that they routinely fail 
to  solve.  A classical  example  is  the  tying  up  of  a 
parcel. Without  knowledge of appropriate knots and 
techniques one will  inevitably end up with a loose 
rope. Another example, concerning the understanding 
of rope properties, is the systematic kinking of water 
hoses when coiling them.
(5.2)  The  standard  knot  repertoire  of  the  large 
majority of adults who do not have a professional or 
leisurable interest in knots is very small, of two-three 
knots,  including  the  Plain  Knot  and  the  shoelace 
knot. (Personal poll, >20 individuals.) It appears that 
those who learn more knots are either professionals 
(sheperds, sailors) or people with a hobbystic interest 
(e.g. fishermen).
In general, knotters take pragmatic shortcuts. They 
ask, What is a knot good for?  In a real life scenario, 
instead of connecting two pieces of ropes through the 
Sheet  Bend,  that  handbooks  suggest  as  the 
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appropriate solution to this problem, people link two 
Bowlines. This is because one seldom connects two 
ropes, one knows how to tie a Bowline, one does not 
remember the Sheet Bend, and one needs to solve a 
problem on the spot. 
(5.3)  The  algorithm for  tying  difficult,  complex 
knots  may  be  forgotten  after  a  while.  (Personal 
observation of practice.)
(5.4) Knots appear to be cross cultural. There is a 
large record of knotting practices for many different 
purposes  over  and  above  tying  objects.  Knots  are 
used as marks for measuring on ropes (whence the 
measuring  unit  'knot').  The  archeological  record 
shows  probable  braids  in  the  hair  of  Cro-Magnon 
ivory  heads  (upper  Paleolithic,  -25000).  Knotted 
carpets date back to -3000. The Inca used since -4500 
and until +650 a positional number system (Quipu or 
Khipu, meaning 'knot'  in Quechua)  based on ropes 
and knots [23]. Different knots had different syntactic 
roles. Basically (but there are complications) a knot 
denotes  a  unit;  series  of  knots  represent  a  number 
between zero (no knot) to nine (nine knots). The end 
of a numeral was denoted by a Figure-of-Eight Knot. 
The value of a Many-Turn Long Knot was given by 
the number of turns. What matters for our purposes is 
the use of  different knots,  two of which  are pretty 
standard  (the  Plain  Knot  and  the  Figure  of  Eight 
Knot).  The  fact  that  the  same  knots  are  used  in 
different  and  distant  cultures  can  be  the  result  of 
cultural transmission, but more simply can be just a 
consequence  of  the  fact  that  the  space  of  possible 
solutions is not much populated at the “easy” end.
(5.5) Animals do not appear to be able to tie knots, 
with  the  remarkable  exception  of  great  apes  in 
captivity [13]. There is some reason to suppose that 
this  cultural  habit  is  imported  from  humans. 
“Takanoshi Kano, a bonobo specialist, notes: ‘‘. . . I 
wonder wild apes may meet need to make a knot, and 
also you should notice that knot-like objects for apes 
to untie do not exist in wild situations” (p. 626-627). 
Herzfeld and Lestel studied the behavior of Wattana, 
an  orangutan  at  the  Paris  Ménagerie  of  Jardin  des 
Plantes.  Using hands,  feet  and mouth Wattana  tied 
half-Hitches, simple knots and even shoelace knots, 
and created some assemblages.  “Her knots were not  
restricted to single ones; she also made double and  
triple knots. Some of them were even more complex,  
for she passed the ends back and forth through the  
loops already formed. She also sometimes wrapped a  
string around another string held between her two  
feet, passing the string back and forth, making loops  
and then passing one end of the string through one  
or another of the loops already made before pulling  
it taut. One might call this a sort of ‘‘interlacing’’, a  
form  of  weaving”  (p.  631)  Two  facts  are  worth 
mentioning. First, Wattana used knots as projectiles 
(they  increase  locally  the  mass  of  rope).  This 
indicates  that  there  are  practical,  noncognitive 
attractors in knot tying that may not be part of any 
planning. Arguably, Wattana has made, and made use 
of, an interesting discovery in naïve physics. Second, 
Tübo, a fellow young male, untied some of Wattana's 
knots (p. 643). Knotting acquired social relevance. 
(6) Children start  tying knots at age 3-4, have a 
long  learning  phase,  and  a  slow  performance  for 
some years (informal poll of kindergarten teachers). 
Strohecker [20] is a study of instruction of children in 
an experimental setting. 
(7)  Language.  People  teach  knots  by  showing 
them but also by accompanying the ostension with a 
description of the algorithm that  generates the knot 
(playing  at  the  interface  between  action  and  the 
conceptual system.) It is also possible to describe the 
knot,  i.e.  the  configuration  of  tied  up  rope,  the 
structure of the knot – both in a view-dependent and 
in  a  view-independent  way.  Incidentally,  when  a 
manual explains a knot, it  normally talks about the 
movement of the rope, not about the hand movement.
(8)  People  can  see  some  knot 
equivalencies/differences by just  visually inspecting 
knots. Topologists for that matter, are skilled at that. 
Expertise plays an important role here. In learning to 
solve graphical knot equivalencies, topologists make 
use of the Reidemeister moves (Fig. 6).
Fig. 6. The three Reidemeister moves. 
The configurations linked by double arrows in Fig. 
6  are  local  moves  that  do  not  change  the 
corresponding  topological  knot  and  can  be 
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interchanged in a graphic  representation  of  a  knot. 
Slightly more formally, the three Reidemeister moves 
are  sufficient  to  connect  any  two  diagrams  that 
represent the same type of knot (they are “shadows” 
of  3D movements  in  the  knots).  The  Reidemeister 
Theorem states that “If one knot can be transformed 
into  another  knot  by  continuous  manipulation  in 
space,  the  same  result  can  be  obtained  by  a 
manipulation whose projection consists uniquely of 
Reidemeister moves and trivial manipulations of the 
diagram  in  the  plane”  [19,  p.  41].  One  simple 
hypothesis is that after a learning phase topologists 
interiorize the Reidemeister  moves (a discussion of 
topological  knots  in  cognition  in  De  Toffoli  and 
Giardino [12]).
(9)  People  may  be  blind  to  some  knot 
equivalencies. I want to offer two cases concerning 
ecological knots. 
Fig. 7. The equivalence of Cleat Hitch and Clove Hitch.
The Cleat Hitch and the Clove Hitch are the same 
unknot (Fig. 7). The difference is in the fact that the 
Cleat Hitch takes advantage of the geometry of the 
cleat.   
Fig. 8.  The equivalence of Bowline and sheet  bend. (Left 
figure from Asher [1], who uses two different colors for the 
two ends of the rope in order to point the similarity).
The Bowline and the sheet bend are the same knot 
(Fig. 8).  The only difference is that  the Bowline is 
tied on a single piece of rope, whereas the sheet bend 
is used for tying together two disconnected pieces of 
rope. 
Although the knots involved are relatively simple, 
and  although  the  equivalences  have  been  noted  in 
some  texts  ([2],  [1]),  knotters  and  many  knot 
handbooks  are  largely  unfamiliar  with  these 
equivalencies. I was instructed by one of my knotting 
teachers  about  the  Cleat  Hitch/Clove  Hitch 
equivalence,  and  still  find  it  a  bit  surprising.  The 
Cleat/Clove Hitch equivalence is in a sense a purely 
topological equivalence; we all sense that the shape 
of the object has something to do with the difference. 
More about this later.
Some dimensions for measure could be tentatively 
introduced  here,  in  reference  to  the  population  of 
experienced  topologists.  Knots  can  be  graded 
according  to  intrinsic  complexity.  But  they  can  be 
graded  according  to  the  subjective  difficulty  in 
parsing  them  as  well.  Thus,  even  the  unknot  (by 
definition,  the  simplest  case)  can  be  presented  in 
ways that make it hard to parse (Fig. 9).
Fig. 9. Left, the unknot, under a difficult presentation. Right, 
two easy-to parse representations of the unknot.
Sossinsky [19] reports that only advanced algebraic 
techniques  made  it  possible  to  show  that  two 
particular knot representations, that were considered 
for more than a century to belong to different knots, 
turned out to be in the same equivalence class. 
Looking  beyond  knots,  people  have  some  sub-
personal  and  personal  access  to  topological 
equivalences presented visually [9]  (some caveats in 
[8]).  But  people  do  not  have  access  –  neither 
personal,  nor  subpersonal  –  to  relatively  simple 
topological  equivalences.  Casati  and  Varzi  [7] 
presented  a  number  of  cases  of  topologically 
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equivalent  objects  that  are  seen  as  having  quite 
different  holes  in  it,  even  pretty  simple  ones  (Fig. 
10).
Fig. 10. The two cubic items are topologically equivalent, 
but  they  do  not  appear  to  be  deformable  into  each other 
without cutting or gluing.
Topologists  must  train  themselves  to  assess 
topological equivalencies (in particular in the case of 
knots,  but  not  limited  to  that  case)  and  the 
Reidemeister  moves are meant to be an aid to pen 
and  pencil  reasoning.  They  so  do  by  providing  a 
framework to decompose any intuitive move and thus 
treat it mathematically.
(10)  As  a  particular  case  of  the  previous  point, 
expertise  can  be  context-bound.  Draftsmen  who 
specialize  on  faces  may  be  poor  at  drawing  trees 
[18]. Skilled knot topologists may overlook mistakes 
in  representations  of  sailors's  knots.  Fig  P1.e  of 
Sossinsky [19] wrongly represents a sheet bend – the 
“knot” will definitely untie if pulled (Fig. 11).
Fig.  11.  Reproduced  from Sossinsky  [19].  The  purported 
“sheet bend” represented in (e) will not hold.
(11) The same knot can be tied in different ways. 
There is the train-way (movement of the working end 
to create the whole knot structure) but often the tying 
does  not  require  pulling  of  the  working  end,  or 
requires it only partially. I gave at the beginning an 
example with the shoelace. Textbooks often present 
several  procedural  variants  for  the  most  common 
knots such as the Bowline and the Clove Hitch [2]. 
It is important to observe that these variants are not 
easily predictable, and realization of the equivalence 
in their result often comes as a surprise (or, if not, as 
an interesting theorem). 
(12)  Metric  knowledge.  Knotters  have  an 
understanding of how much rope is needed to tie a 
knot  (“Will  it  suffice?”,  “You  took  too  much/too 
little”)
(13) Handedness: Michel and Harkins [17] found 
that  “observational  learning  of  manual  skills  [knot 
tying] is significantly enhanced when the student and 
teacher are concordant in handedness”. Some video 
tutorials for knots present a subjective viewpoint on 
the hands, and those that do not may warn about the 
“mirror” effect created by looking at a video. 
(14) People make systematic mistakes or encounter 
systematic difficulties in tying certain types of knot 
(eg. turning the final loop in tying a Cleat Hitch.) 
(15) Generalizability. To some extent, once one has 
learned to tye a given knot,  one can generalize (to 
thicker ropes, to specular knots, to different supports, 
to constrained tying, e.g. with a single hand). There 
are  limits,  though  (once  more,  expertise  is  often 
context-bound). I learned a certain sequence for the 
Clove  Hitch  (“superpose  rings  in  a  “non  intuitive 
way”), but this only holds for a rope's standing end 
that is presented on the right hand-side of the right 
hand. It is difficult for me to do the same for the left  
hand. I learned how to tie a Bowline with two hands, 
but I  may need to do it  with only one hand.  I  am 
better at tying the Cleat Hitch on the starboard side 
than  on  the  port  side.  Under  constraints  (rain),  I 
happened to have to tie a sheet to the roof using a 
Clove Hitch: no visibility, wet glasses, only one hand 
available, use of teeth, “generalizing”, starting from 
the memorized sequence, no visual control. It helped 
that I had memorized the sequence eyes shut. Success 
in some of these performances would speak in favor 
of some generality in mental representation of knots. 
More often than not, success does not appear to be at 
hand, thus indicating rigidity of the representation. 
(16)  Retrievability:  We have  some understanding 
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of  the  knotting  sequence,  given  perception  of  the 
final result of the knot. At some point I realized that a 
Clove Hitch is the result of tying two Half Hitches 
(Fig. 12). 
Fig. 12. Tying two Half Hitches in a sequence produces a 
Clove Hitch. Functionally, it  is  not a simple addition:  the 
second step “closes” the Clove Hitch.
In the case at issue, the visual asymmetry of the 
final product masks the iteration within the sequence. 
We see the working end and the standing end “leave” 
in  two  different  directions.  But  if  we  follow  the 
movement of one of the two ends, we can appreciate 
the iteration. 
Topologists can appreciate the compositionality of 
knots; a standard task is the decomposition of a knot 
into  prime  knots,  i.e.  knots  that  cannot  be  further 
decomposed. Once more, it  is not obvious that this 
performance  has  an  ecological  counterpart.  A 
topological knot can be decomposed into two trefoil 
knots; but a sequence of two plain knots on the same 
piece  of  rope  does  not  automatically  count  as  one 
knot.
Some imperfect understanding of compositionality 
may  make  one  imagine  impossible  operations.  I 
dreamed for a while of an “inverse” knot of a given 
knot,  such  that  by  combining  the  two and  pulling 
ends I would end up with the unknot.
 (17.1) Graphical  competences 1. Drawing knots, 
given  knowledge  of  a  knot  and  of  the  knotting 
process (as opposed to copying a knot from life), is 
not  trivial.  Personal  experience  (Fig.  13)  suggests 
that the best way to draw a knot (without copying it 
from life)  is  to  retrace  the  movement  that  tied  it. 
(Draftsmen  who  prepare  drawings  for  manuals  are 
likely to copy tied knots.)
(17.2)  Graphical  competences  2:  deciphering 
diagrams.  Over  and  above  topological  diagrams, 
diagrams are widely used in knot textbooks.  Some 
diagrams appear to be more useful or more readable 
and effective than others. Although it is  difficult to 
provide a measure, we can point out some elements.
Fig. 13. Author's drawing of a Bowline from memory (left, 
preparatory sketch. 15.06.2012)
Fig. 14. The “little train” graphic method, based on the path 
followed by the working end.
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Fig.  15.  The  “grab  the  bight”  method.  Circles,  or  hooks, 
indicate what to hold and where to move it in the next step.
The  “little  train”  rendition  method  (Fig.  14) 
follows the topological construction of the knot and 
is in general of little assistance. The “grab the bight” 
rendition  method  (Fig.  15)  models  actual  motor 
shortcuts that create the knot structure. Thumb rules 
for diagrams are derived by general indications about 
how to avoid cluttering graphic rendition, applied to 
the specifics  of  knots  (Tufte  [21]).  Diagrams must 
represent  intersections  in  order  to  convey  the 
structure of the knot, thus intersection noise should 
be  avoided.  Tangents  suggest  intersections  and  are 
thus  forbidden;  information  about  intersections 
should be kept;  irrelevant intersections ought to be 
avoided  (Fig.  16).  Graphic  conventions  about 
intersections (rope is not “cut” at the intersection, but 
is seen to continue under it) rely on Gestalt factors, 
such as the law of good continuation (“What is the 
continuation  of  what?”)  which  also  underlies 
perception of physical knots .
Fig. 16. On the left hand side column are examples of poor 
graphical  renditions  for  knots.  Top,  an  irrelevant  loop  is 
drawn.  Middle,  intersections  are  ambiguous.  Bottom, 
tangents clog the image. Improvements appear in the right 
hand side column.
(18)  We  do  not  only  categorize  knots  and  have 
names for them; we also have names for knot parts. 
These are not only technical names such as 'bight', 
'loop', 'elbow'. (See Fig. 1.). People use terms such as 
'bunny ears' in teaching how to tie shoelaces (for a 
bight), or refer to the 'hole' or 'furrow' in describing a 
Bowline (for a loop). These terms, invented in order 
to  name the  parts  of  the  knot  or  of  the  rope  that 
contribute  to  knot  structure,  are  metaphorical  or 
analogical.  The  action  repertoire  for  knotting,  that 
includes complex interactions with rope and object, 
is  fine-grained,  and  the  scarcity  of  dedicated 
terminology  is  compensated  for  by  metaphorical 
introductions.1
As we have seen, there is a large set of different but 
partly  interdependent  recognitional,  practical  and 
linguistic performaces to be explained. What are the 
ingredients of the explanans?
Knotting competence
Tying  knots  is  a  sequential  action  that  uses 
repeated moves to create configurations of rope. Our 
first  goal  is  to spell  out the mental  lexicon for  the 
basic operations one performs on ropes when tying. 
Besides,  knots  are  a  wonderful  case  study  for 
embodied  and  object-dependent  cognition,  as  their 
realization  depends  on  continuous  object  and 
sensorimotor  feedback.  The  proper  representation 
may involve not only the structure of the knot on a 
piece of rope, but the structure of the complex that 
includes rope and object.
In  what follows I  rely  on Pignocchi  [18]  on  the 
organization of the learning sequence of draftsmen. 
In learning to draw, children – but also adults – move 
from  simple  scrawls,  the  results  of  motor 
experiments,  to  more  and  more  complex  skeletal 
representations, that they are then able to integrate in 
images with an articulate content ( Fig. 17).
Fig.  17.  Basic  scrawls  that  merge  into  more  and  more 
complex graphic schemes in learning
1 Semi-technical  knot  terminology  (“working  end/standing 
end”) appears to be recent; it is used by people who teach knots 
with words. As a contrast, the terminology of types of ropes used 
in sailing (mooring line, sheet, etc.) is probably older, as it is used 
to distinguish ropes with different functions.
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Mastery  of  Atomic  Graphic  Schemes  (AGS) 
controls  the  production  of  simple  scrawls.  Scrawls 
are represented as mentally undivided, accomplished 
in a single gesture. Once Atomic Graphic Schemes 
are  stabilized,  they  can  either  be  reused  in  more 
complex,  Molecular  Graphic  Schemes  (MGS),  that 
are chains of AGS, or be slightly modified to fulfill 
other  representational  purposes.  The  repeated 
execution of  MGS has in some cases  the effect  of 
making  them  to  some  extent  automatic,  thereby 
turning them into new, richer AGS. 
The  account  has  a  number  of  theoretical 
advantages. For instance, it explains the difficulty in 
generalizing and the topic-boundedness of expertise. 
Draftsmen specialize: those who are good at drawing 
flowers are not thereby good at drawing faces. The 
theory  also  explains  the  peculiar  stylistic  traits  of 
draftsmen,  which  depend  on  the  idiosyncracies  of 
AGS.  The  theory  keeps  “Darwinian”  and 
“Lamarckian”  aspects  of  creativity,  introduced  by 
Johnson-Laird,  in  balance.  Little  random variations 
in executing AGSs or MGSs may appear satisfactory 
and get stabilized by repetition (Darwininan aspect). 
General  constraints  on  how  to  hold  and  move  a 
pencil and on what counts as a representation control 
the  exploration  of  new  AGS  (Lamarckian  aspect). 
The  account  further  predicts  that  at  least  some 
gesture  that  produced the  drawing  are  perceptually 
retrievable.   
The  working  hypothesis  of  the  present  article  is 
that the theory of AGS provides a plausible model of 
knotting  competence  and  of  its  development. 
Accordingly, one would learn some Atomic Knotting 
Schemes  (AKS),  reuse  them  in  (compositional) 
Molecular  Knotting  Schemes  (MKS)  that,  with 
practice,  become  or  are  treated  like  new  atomic 
lexical entries. In learning an AKS, one associates a 
sequence  of  movements  and  a  visual  (or  visuo-
tactile)  result.  The  peculiarities  of  learning, 
innovation, generalization and transmission would be 
explained by using the resources of the AKS-MKS 
framework.  For instance,  random variation in AKS 
can get  stabilized by repetition;  general  constraints 
on how to tie knots control the search of new knots 
and  condition  the  consolidation  of  MKS  (balance 
between Darwinian and Lamarckian aspcts). Finally, 
gestures  behind  knot  production  would  be 
retrievable.
In developing AGS one relies on existing abilities. 
Holding an object like a pencil, or tracing a line in 
the  sand  with  one's  fingers,  are  proto-graphic 
activities. Likewise, in the creation of AKS one relies 
on pre-existing abilities. Whoever has used a piece of 
rope (say, to walk a dog) knows that coiling it twice 
around one's hand renders the grip firmer. When we 
pull  something,  we  often  take  advantage  of  fixed 
poles to reduce our effort. When coiling rope around 
a bar  (e.g. around a tree) we easily discover that a 
Half  Hitch  configuration  is  extremely  effective. 
These  are  proto-knotting  activities  and  knowledge 
that  get  integrated  in  the  simplest  AKS.  Creating 
MKS, on the other hand, involves the deployment of 
compositional abilities.
A side hypothesis is that one will, or will not, be 
able to tie an unknown knot by looking at the result, 
according to one's repertoire of AKS and MKS.
But what are the ingredients of AKS and MKS? In 
the  following  sections  we  describe  some  of  the 
hypothetical ingredients of the mental computations 
involving  AKS and  MKS.  Some of  these  are  sub-
atomic, such as the ability to generate and see certain 
relations  between  movements  of  the  hand  and 
configurations  of  rope.  Others  are  of  higher  level, 
such as the chaining of AKS in long sequences.
Parts of knots, of rope
Some parts of the rope become salient and are used 
as  beacons  for  orienting  the  knotting  process.  The 
corresponding concepts may be lexicalized, or may 
be activated by analogies.  In the traditional way to 
teach the Bowline, a segment is dubbed the “tree”, 
the working end is renamed “the rabbit”, and the loop 
is a “furrow” or a “rabbit's hole”.
“A  mnemonic  used  to  teach  the  tying  of  the  
bowline is to imagine the end of the rope as a rabbit,  
and where the knot will begin on the standing part, a  
tree trunk. First a loop is made near the end of the  
rope, which will  act  as the rabbit's  hole.  Then the  
"rabbit" comes up the hole, goes round the tree right  
to  left,  then  back  down  the  hole.  ”  (Bowline,  
Wikipedia entry, retrieved on 09.01.2012)
Terminology in knotting practices is semi-technical 
(Fig. 18). It is not to be assumed that knotters know 
it,  nor  that  it  lexicalizes  some  mental  concepts 
knotters  have.  Most  likely  it  has  been  fixed  by 
writers of knot books for teaching purposes. 
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Fig.  18.  From  left  to  right:  working  end,  bight,  loop, 
standing end.
 
Loops and torsions
Asher  [1]  brings  to  the  fore  some  important 
physico-geometrical  properties  of  twisted  rope.  If 
you  look  along  the  axis  of  a  piece  of  rope  while 
twisting it e.g. clockwise, you will see that the rope 
undergoes a torsion; call this a right-handed torsion. 
Right-handedness  is  here  an  intrisic,  viewpoint 
independent characteristic of the rope (if you look at 
the rope from the opposite direction, it will appear to 
you  right-handed  as  well.)  In  order  to  release  the 
torsion,  you can  do either  of  two things:  twist  the 
rope counterclockwise, or coil it counterclockwise. If 
you look at the coiled rope along the axis of the coil, 
you will see that moving away from you the coil is 
left-handed. 
Fig. 19. Two ways to create loops.
Thus, you can produce a loop
1) by shifting the working end (Fig. 19, top).
2) By passing the thumb over the index finger to 
induce a torsion of the rope (fig 19, bottom). 
A rope can be modeled as a series of rigid coaxial 
discs  with  a  limited  freedom of  movement  around 
their  axis.  The internal  circumference  of  a  loop  is 
shorter than its external circumference. Each disk is 
then asked to rotate a bit in order to find room for the 
matter  compressed in the internal  part  of  the loop. 
Conversely,  torsions  automatically  generate  loops 
(Fig. 20). 
Fig.20 Ropes  are  things such that  torsions generate  loops 
and conversely.
These  are  physico-geometric  properties  of  rope, 
that  can  be  machine  produced  and  machine 
measured.  Two invariants  surface:  the  right-handed 
torsion, that generates a left-handed coil, and the left-
handed-torsion,  that  generates  a  right-handed  coil 
(and conversely). As a consequence, the global shape 
of a part of the knot (of the coil) stores some implicit  
information about the potential torsion of the rope. 
When  learning  to  tie  knots,  a  person  performs 
twisting and coiling; these invariants are associated 
with sensorimotor primitives. Twisting rope provides 
haptic feedback. One  feels the torsion, i.e. one feels 
that the rope tries to get back to its original shape. 
The  tension  at  the  tip  of  your  fingers  is  released 
when a coil is formed. To form the coil, you just have 
to move your hands close to each other. Conversely, 
at  the  end  of  one  coil,  one  realizes  that  one  has 
generated  a  torsion,  which  can  be  eliminated  by 
untwisting  the  rope.  (Neglect  of  this  operation  has 
produced many a kinked water hose.) 
To sum up, the basic rules are:
Twisting and joining causes coiling
Coiling and separating produces twists.
14
The basic knowledge of any knotter concerns the 
interaction of the physical and geometrical properties 
of rope. But although a knotter may implicitly know 
(feel)  the  torsion-to-loop  interaction,  she  may  be 
blind to the converse interaction. Beginners must be 
told that when coiling rope, for each loop they have 
to produce a torsion, otherwise loops will mess up.
Knowledge of knots is first and foremost storage in 
memory  of  these  elementary  sensorimotor 
regularities.  The  final  visual shape  of  the  coil  is 
associated with a certain movement that produces or 
releases a torsion.1
A  number  of  ecological  knots  are  created  by 
generating coils and making them interact. The Clove 
Hitch,  when  constructed  in  the  middle  of  rope, 
without using the working end, is  the result  of the 
superposition  of  two  coils.  Creating  coils  is  a 
prerequisite for executing these knots in an efficient 
way. We have seen that some most commmon knots 
are unknots, topologically speaking: the Clove Hitch, 
the Half Hitch. Let me add one more, less common 
knot  to  the  lot,  the  Sheepshank  (Fig.  21).  The 
Sheepshank is the result of the pairwise intersection 
of three coils.  
Fig.  21.  The  Sheepshank  is  actually  an unknot,  that  only 
survives because of tensions. 
These (un)knots,  incidentally,  have the advantage 
that they can be tied in the middle of rope, without 
access to the ends of the rope, by simple interaction 
1The different ways of tying the shoelace knot desribed at the 
beginning generate different torsions, thus store energy in different 
ways  in  each  knot.  Accordingly,  the  generated  knots  are  only 
superficially equivalent.
of loops. On top of loops/coils, one produces bights 
when  executing  a  knot  (by  holding  running  and 
standing  ends,  each  in  one  hand,  and  having  the 
hands get closer to each other.) 
Pass-through
If some (un)knots require no access to the working 
end,  “real” knots are in general  tied by having the 
working end pass through a loop. A basic principle 
governs knot production.
Working-end-and-loop axiom.  You can only tie  a 
(real, i.e. non-unknot) knot by having the the working 
end pass through a loop. 
This  is  a  necessary  but  in  no  way  sufficient 
condition, as you can tie unknots that way (e.g. the 
Clove Hitch, that can be tied directly on the standing 
end.) 
The role of visual crossing
Intuitively, no matter how many times you coil a 
piece of rope around a pole, you won't thereby have a 
knot. But coil once and cross over, and you'll have a 
Half  Hitch.  Crossing  is  related  to  twisting  and 
coiling.  The  structure  of  knots  involves  a  passage 
through a loop, whereby the principle that:
the 2d projection of any knot will always involve a  
crossing. 
Thus  perceptual  crossing  (the  presence  of  an  x-
junction in the image) is  a  necessary condition for 
being  recognized  as  a  knot  (it  is  not  a  sufficient 
condition, as the unknot can present crossings)
Crossing is  in  general  an important  condition  in 
assessing  topological  equivalencies.  The  “tied” 
double  donaught  is  topologically  equivalent  to  the 
“untied”  double  donaught,  notwithstanding  their 
visual  difference,  that  suggests  a  topological 
distinction. The perceived difference is an x-junction. 
Knowledge  of  the  sidedness  of  a  loop: 
guaranteeing stability
Another piece of intuitive knowledge concerns the 
interaction  between  the  intrinsic  orientation  of  the 
loop and the side of the loop from where the working 
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end  must  enter  if  one  wants  to  get  a  stable  knot 
structure (i.e. the knot will form and not collapse into 
the  unknot.)  When  starting  the  Bowline  or  the 
Sheepshank  or  the  Plain  Knot,  I  know  that  the 
working end must enter from one, and not the other, 
side of the loop; or that a bight must pass on one, and 
not the other, side of the loop. I immediately see that 
the wrong side will not provide a stable structure. I 
know  whether  I  am  creating  a  “building  step”  or, 
sadly, an “empty step”. One has intuitions about what 
will work.
In tying a Bowline, one can compute the correct 
sidedness at each step. Knowing that the working end 
should exit the loop where it entered the loop, one 
must first determine the correct way to enter the loop, 
and consequently the correct  way to create a bight 
around the standing end (Fig. 22). 
Fig.  22.  Only  the  right  bottom  interaction  of  each  case 
stabilizes the tension stored in the loop.  (The stabilizer can 
be an external object, or a piece of the same rope used for 
the loop.)
Knot and object: external dependency
Many  knots  are  used  to  create  ties  between 
objects,  or  to  fix  rope  on  an  object.  This  invites 
discussion  of  a  complex  set  of  invariances  and, 
consequently,  of  sensorimotor  contingencies.  The 
first, basic principle concerns unknots:
Unknot dependency:  An unknot can be tied only  
on an object.
Clove  Hitches,  Cleat  Hitches,  Half  Hitches  are 
unknots whose survival depends upon the existence 
of an object they are tied around. They are dependent  
knots. 
There are seeming counterxamples: you can tie a 
Clove Hitch on a portion of the very same rope you 
are  using  for  the  hitch.  Now,  although  the  “local” 
movements are those for creating a Clove Hitch, the 
end  result  is  a  Plain  Knot.  The  seeming 
counterexample allows us to distinguish two senses 
of dependency:
self-dependency (e.g. you can tie a Clove Hitch on 
the standing end) and 
other-dependency (e.g. you tie the Clove Hitch on 
an object that is not the rope itself.) 
Two-object topologies
This  introduces  the  theme  of  two-object 
topologies.1 The  formal  counterpart  of  two-object 
topologies involving knots is the study of links. Once 
more,  the  descriptive  gap  between link  theory  and 
ecological links is as wide as the gap between knot 
theories  and  an  account  of  ecological  knots.  The 
arguments are the same that we used for topological 
knots.  For  instance,  topological  links  are  not  the 
result of tying, whereas ecological links are tied.
We should distinguish the metaphysical properties 
of  self/other-dependency  from  the  functional 
properties  of  self-reference.  Some  knots  are  self 
referential:  they are only used to store ropes, or to 
reduce the volume or length of rope.
Fig. 23. A notoriously slippery knot, the Cow Hitch is used 
to “serve the rope”, fixing it so as not to create a mess, and 
allowing for quick untying. 
Self-dependency and self-reference are orthogonal 
to  each  other.  The  Cow  Hitch  (Fig.  23)  and  the 
Sheepshank are self-referential in that they are used 
to change the properties of the rope and not for fixing 
anything.  But  the  Cow  Hitch  is  other-dependent, 
whilst  the  Sheepshank  is  self-dependent. 
(Functionally, the Sheepshank is used to shorten the 
1 Two-object topologies were used by Casati and Varzi [7] in 
order to account for some classificatory performances related to 
holed  objects.  Considering  holes  as  completely  filled,  the 
topological properties of the contact surface between the host and 
the filler correlates fairly well with most commonsense categories 
of holes.
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available  portion  of  rope,  or  to  use  rope  with  a 
damaged portion.)
Object-based functional lexicon
We have seen that the lexicon for knots introduces 
terms to characterize parts of the rope and elements 
of knots. The part of rope, or the external object that 
stabilizes the loop (see again Fig. 22) is a stabilizer. 
Whether a part of rope or an external obejct can act 
as a stabilizer depends on its capability to counter the 
tension created by the loop. In the case of rope, this 
may in turn depend on the stabilizer part's tension, or 
on its weight (for instance, if the standing end is long 
enough).
In view of the importance  of  external objects  in 
tying  knots,  we  need  some  semi-technical 
terminology for supports (Fig. 24). 
Fig. 24. Handlebody; pole; bar; cleat. Dashed lines indicate 
that the object's bounds are not within reach; the object is to 
be considered endless for knotting purposes (rope will not be 
allowed to slip out  from there.)  The cleat  is topologically 
equivalent  to  the  bar,  but  its  shape  conditions  the  knot. 
Starting from this simple taxonomy, endless compositional 
variations are available.  
As  we  noticed,  geometric  features  of  knots  are 
related to their causal properties (stop knots,  stable 
knots,  etc.)  There  is  further  an  interaction  of 
geometrical features of knots and physical properties 
of both ropes and things tied. For instance, one can 
create a figure-of-eight stop knot that is large enough 
so as not run through the handlebody. The elementary 
morphologies of Fig. 23 provide a lexicon of basic 
shapes. There is no upper bound to the complexity of 
object shapes one can use to create links. The basic 
lexicon  helps  characterizing  the  elementary 
interactions  between rope and object.  Tying a knot 
through  a  handlebody  takes  advantage  of  the 
topology  of  the  handlebody  to  constrain  the 
movement  of  the  rope,  and  at  the  same  time  the 
handlebody  requires  that  the  working  end  passes 
through the hole in it. The pole is less constraining 
and at the same time allows for knotting procedures 
that do not involve the working end. Another relevant 
aspect of two-object  interaction, in the case of knots, 
is  that  one  of  the  two  objects  is  in  the  norm 
underformable.  This  means  that  one  can  take 
advantage  of  its  rigidity  in  the  execution  of  the 
knotting  sequence.  A final  object  feature  knotting 
takes advantage of is the permanence of the topology 
of the object. We do rely on the fact that objects (as 
opposed to rope) do not change their topology. (And 
indeed,  we  are  susprised  when  this  happens,  for 
instance  when  topological  properties  of  the  object 
can  migrate  to  the  rope.  If  I  tie  up  my  arms  by 
crossing them, and then grasp two ends of a piece of 
rope with my hands, and then open up my arms, I end 
up with a Plain Knot on the rope, and no knot on my 
arms. The knot has moved from my arms to the rope.) 
The  features  in  question  defy  classification; 
geometry is intertwined with function. Topologically 
there is no difference between the pole and the cleat, 
and  although  there  is  no  topological  difference 
between Clove and Cleat Hitch, as the execution is 
controlled  by  the  object,  it  results  in  two  utterly 
different  procedures.  Or,  cosider  ring  and  bar  (an 
example of a bar would be a tall tree, around whose 
trunk  one  ties  a  knot).  Functionally  they  could  be 
considered  equivalent:  their  end  segments  do  not 
exist or are not accessible, so that the tying procedure 
requires a use of the working end. But the ring has 
the further property of keeping the knot in a certain 
place. 
Knowledge of knots, the original loop, and the 
fundamental role of the Half Hitch
Half Hitches are ubiquitous components of knots 
(cf. once more Fig. 12, showing that the Clove Hitch 
is the result of tying two Half Hitches in sequence. 
Now, the Half Hitch is an unknot: it is a simple loop. 
According to Unknot Dependency, it can be tied only 
on an object.  The object  acts as  a  stabilizer  of the 
loop.  This  object  –  according  to  Self-Dependency, 
can be be another part of the same rope. This has in 
general the consequence of turning an unknot into a 
knot. The Half Hitch then “becomes” a Plain Knot. 
This  elementary  dynamics  is  at  the  basis  of  most 
knotting.  The  Half  Hitch  stabilizes  the  tension 
generated in the creation of the loop. Knowledge of 
knot is thus mastering of operations that orchestrate 
the  management  of  the  energy  stored  with  the 
creation of the original loop.
(Provisional) conclusions
We  have  seen  that  some  ecological  knots  are, 
mathematically speaking, unknots, and thus that the 
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topological theory of knots is at best a partial account 
of  knotting abilities.  We have further  seen that  the 
mental  representation  of  knots  should  allow  for 
limited  generalization,  understanding  of  knot 
equivalences and compositionality. Even if you have 
some understanding of the compositional structure of 
tying  a  simpe  knot,  you  do  not  thereby  have  an 
access to the end result of just any knotting procedure 
that  involves  the elements  of  the composition.  The 
consequences of the atomic actions you perform are 
not easy to predict; not even for experts. As knotting 
involves  external  objects  essentially,  the  feedback 
loop that unites perception and action is essential for 
our understanding of them; knotting provides an ideal 
case  for  situated  cognition and  externalized mental 
procedures.  It  is  early  to  provide  a  formal 
characterization of the principles at play – an algebra 
of knotting and knot understanding, as if it were, as 
opposed  to  an  algebra  of  knots.  Some  existing 
models  accounting  for  motor-perceptual 
performances  (e.g.  models  for  drawing)  can  be 
reused in the case  of  knotting,  thus allowing us  to 
distinguish  an  atomic  level,  with  sub-atomic  parts, 
and a molecular level. We were able to enlist some 
principles  at  the  atomic  or  subatomic  level,  all 
involving sensorimotor representations: the relevance 
of parts of rope and their lexicalization; the duality of 
twisting and coiling and the contribution of both to 
the  storing  of  action  into  the  configuration  of  the 
knot;  the  interaction  of  loops  and  ends  to  create 
stable structure (good and bad 'sides' of the loop) and 
the consequence for the visual aspect of the knot, that 
must  include  x-junctions;  the  interactions  of  rope 
with  object  shape  and  topology  and  the  lexical 
saliency of functional object features; the necessity of 
dealing with two-object  representations;  the object-
dependency of unknots; the distinction between self-
dependency and self-reference; and the fundamental 
role of loop stabilization in half hitches, that turns out 
to  be  the  most  important  subatomic  elements  of 
knots.
The present article pleads for the investigation of 
process  topology  as  opposed  to  static  topology. 
Shapes  are  usually  considered  as  static  properties. 
But in the case of ecological knots, their features bear 
a trace of the process that led to them, that included 
planning, motor execution, and perceptual control, in 
the service of the management of the energy stored in 
the shape of a rope to create stable structures. 
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Abstract. Structural pattern recognition plays a central role in many applications.
Recent advances include new theoretical results, methods and successful applica-
tions. In the present talk, some recent graph-based methods for shape analysis will
be shown. The presented methods include a new representation for graph-matching-
based interactive segmentation and models for the analysis of spatial relations be-
tween objects. Applications will be presented and discussed.
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Figure 1. Two poems produced by The Painting Fool.
25
Figure 2. Artwork produced by The Painting Fool where an individual shape is highlighted by text.
26
Figure 3. Artwork produced by The Painting Fool with a set of text shapes producing a portrait.
27
Figure 4. The Malevolent Ghost shape poem by The Painting Fool. Sentences from Twitter.
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Abstract. Influenced by the four-category ontology of Aristotle, many
modern ontologies treat shapes as accidental particulars which (a) are
specifically dependent on the substantial particulars which act as their
bearers, and (b) instantiate accidental universals which are exemplified
by those bearers. It is also common to distinguish between, on the one
hand, these physical shapes which form part of the empirical world and,
on the other, ideal geometrical shapes which belong to the abstract
realm of mathematics. Shapes of the former kind are often said to ap-
proximate, but never to exactly instantiate, shapes of the latter kind.
Following a suggestion of Frege, ideal mathematical shapes can be given
precise definitions as equivalence classes under the relation of geometri-
cal similarity. One might, analogously, attempt to define physical shape
universals as equivalence classes under a relation of physical similarity,
but this fails because physical similarity is not an equivalence relation. In
this talk I will examine the implications of this for the ontology of shape
and in particular for the relationship between mathematical shapes and
the shapes we attribute to physical objects.
Keywords. shape ontology; mathematical vs physical shape; intrinsic vs
embedded shape
1. Introduction
What are shapes, and how are shapes related to things which are not shapes? Are
there indeed such things as shapes at all, entities of some sort that have a place
in an inventory of the world’s contents? Or can we explain talk about shapes in
terms of an ontology in which shapes do not feature as entities of any kind?
There seem to be two distinct kinds of shapes: physical shapes, which we en-
counter in the physical world as the shapes of entities that exist in space, and
mathematical shapes, which we encounter in geometry, the shapes of abstract
mathematically-defined constructions. In both cases it seems evident that shapes
are ontologically dependent on the objects whose shapes they are (their bearers),
but the relationship between the two kinds of shape is not necessarily straight-
forward. I shall defer till later a discussion of mathematical shapes, and for the
moment concentrate on physical shapes, the shapes of physical objects.
Granted, then, that physical shapes are always shapes of things, what kinds
of things have shapes in this sense? A brief catalogue might be as follows:
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1. Material objects, including chunks of matter (e.g., a pebble), organisms
(e.g., a penguin), and assemblies (e.g., a bicycle).
2. Non-material physical objects such as holes, faces, and edges.
3. Aggregates such as a flock of birds or a cluster of buildings.
The boundary between material objects and aggregates is not sharp, since even
a chunk of matter is, at submicroscopic resolution, an aggregate of atoms. With
aggregates it is often not easy to determine an exact boundary, or therefore an
exact shape [5], and to the extent that objects may be similarly indeterminate,
it may likewise be impossible to assign exact shapes to them. I shall take this
issue up later in the discussion of shape approximation. We should not assume
uncritically that all material objects have shapes; Stroll [13] suggests that not all
material objects have surfaces, and possession of a surface seems to be strongly
associated with possession of a shape, even if not a necessary condition for it.
Phrases of the form “the shape of X” and “X has such-and-such a shape”
attest to the intimate relation between an object and its shape, characterised as
an ontological dependence of the latter on the former. Other key elements of the
object–shape relationship, to be accounted for in an ontology of shape, include
two objects having the same shape, and an object changing shape, expressed using
the sentence forms:
(1) x and y have the same shape at time t
(2) x changed shape between times t1 and t2
In what follows, we will pay careful attention to these notions.
2. The dependency of shape upon objects
Shape-words in language typically come both as nouns and adjectives: in English
we have, alongside nouns such as “circle”, “triangle”, “sphere”, and “cylinder”,
the respective adjectives “circular”, “triangular”, “spherical”, and “cylindrical”.
Cases in which the nominal and the adjectival functions are borne by the same
word—e.g., “square” and “oblong”—are the exception rather than the rule. We
also freely form compound adjectives such as “pear-shaped” and “heart-shaped”,
and in some cases the noun forming the first part of the compound refers, not
to the physical object which it normally designates, but to some mathematical
shape conventionally abstracted from it—e.g., the “heart” symbol ~ only very
approximately resembles the complex three-dimensional shape of an anatomical
heart.
Shape adjectives point to the notion of shape as a property of objects, whereas
shape nouns point to shapes as entities in their own right. Which of these two
pictures enjoys logical or ontological primacy over the other, and how are the two
pictures related?
Ontological parsimony suggests that shape-as-property should take priority
over shape-as-entity. Looking around us, we see physical objects, each with its
own shape, but to suggest that we see the shapes as well as the objects smacks
of ontological over-abundance. It is more natural, when in a parsimonious mood,
to say that each object is shaped in such-and-such a way, where this notion is
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expressed using a shape adjective. Thus we can say that the table is square, rather
than that it stands in some relation to a shape entity which is a square.
A logical analysis of this view will invoke shape predicates, leading to pred-
ications of the form Square(x) or Circular(y)—or rather, allowing for the fact
that objects can change shape, Square(x, t), etc. A major disadvantage lurks be-
hind the attractive simplicity of this scheme: if we want to generalise over shapes,
we have to quantify over predicates, and this requires the use of second-order
logic, with all the di culties that that brings in its wake. Thus to express the
sentence-forms (1) and (2) we would have to write something like
(1a) 8 (ShapeProperty( )! ( (x, t)$  (y, t))),
(2a) 9 19 2(ShapeProperty( 1) ^ ShapeProperty( 2) ^
 1(x, t1) ^  2(x, t2) ^ ¬ 1(x, t2) ^ ¬ 2(x, t1)).
A standard way of reducing such second-order predications to first-order form
is by reifying the properties expressed by the predicates which are being quan-
tified over [4]. By this means we introduce terms designating shape entities, and
introduce a first-order HasShape predicate to relate objects to the shapes that
they have: thus instead of Square(x), say, we would write HasShape(x, square).
In e↵ect, this is to accord priority to shape-nouns over shape-adjectives. Our
sentences (1) and (2) can now be expressed in first-order form as
(1b) 8s(HasShape(x, s, t)$ HasShape(y, s, t)),
(2b) 9s19s2(HasShape(x, s1, t1) ^ HasShape(x, s2, t2) ^
¬HasShape(x, s2, t1) ^ ¬HasShape(x, s1, t2))
On this view, it is natural to regard shapes—that is, the entities designated by
the s variables in (1b) and (2b)—as generically dependent entities. They are
dependent, since a shape only exists insofar as it has bearers, and this dependence
is generic because a shape is not dependent on the existence of a unique bearer
but can be multiply realised in di↵erent bearers having the same shape.
Modern information systems ontologies such as BFO [7] and DOLCE [9] do
not take this line; instead, they treat an object’s shape as specifically dependent
on that object, meaning that the shape belongs uniquely to that object and
cannot be shared with any other. In DOLCE, shapes, along with such things as
colours, volumes, weights, and densities, are classified as qualities. The identity
of an object’s shape is tied to the identity of the object itself: the shape comes
into existence when the object comes into existence, and endures for as long as
the object does. This does not mean that an object cannot change shape, though;
what happens, according to DOLCE, is not that the object assumes a di↵erent
shape, but that the object’s shape assumes a di↵erent value. The values that
may be assumed by a quality are entities of another kind, called qualia, which
collectively constitute a domain known as a quality space—in the case of shape,
we could speak of shape qualia in shape space. These quality spaces are similar to
the conceptual spaces of Ga¨rdenfors [6].
On this picture, variability of shape shows up as a time-dependency, not of the
shape on its bearer, but of the value of the shape on the shape. Writing shape(o)
to refer to the shape which uniquely inheres in the object o, we have the rule
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shape(x) = shape(y)! x = y,
and our formulae now come out as:
(1c) value(shape(x), t) = value(shape(y), t)
(2c) value(shape(x), t1) 6= value(shape(x), t2)
The shape-as-quality view embraced by DOLCE has a solid pedigree in the
Aristotelian four-category ontology that is encapsulated in the ontological square
[8,12], which presents a cross-classification of the entities of an ontology along the
dimensions of universal vs particular (distinguishing types from their instances)
and substance vs accident (distinguishing independent from dependent entities).
Thus the roundness of this ball is an accidental particular inhering in (and thus
dependent on) the substantial particular this ball ; and these two particular entities
are instances of the accidental universal roundness and the substantial universal
ball respectively. The ball itself is said to exemplify roundness.
The roundness of this ball is not quite the same as the shape of the ball
conceived as a quality in DOLCE. The former is a trope, i.e., a specific instance
of a property inhering in an object. In DOLCE terms, the “property” in question
is not just a quality but a quality’s having a particular value. Thus a trope could
be regarded as a quality/value pair. If the quality changes value (e.g., an object
changes shape), then the previous trope is superseded by a new one. When the
value of some quality changes continuously, there is a continuous succession of
di↵erent tropes.
3. The primacy of “same shape” over “shape”
The reified analyses discussed above are predicated on the assumption that there
are such things as shapes, whether universals or particulars, with a bona fide exis-
tence that must be accounted for by according them a place within our ontology.
This can, however, be questioned. Consider again the two main ways in which we
describe the shape of an object:
1. Using a descriptive adjective such as “square”, “round”, or a combination
of adjectives such as “long and thin”;
2. By means of a comparison with some other object whose shape is assumed
known, e.g., “heart-shaped”, “hourglass-shaped”.
In neither of these cases is there an explicit reference to shapes per se: we can
understand “square” as a descriptive adjective without having to postulate any
entity that is a square shape distinct from the square object we are talking about;
and in saying that something is heart-shaped we are not saying that its shape is
a heart, but rather that it is similarly-shaped to a heart. We do, of course, use
the expression “it has the same shape as a heart”, which seems to suppose the
existence of the shape as something distinct from the heart, but it may be argued
that this too is a misunderstanding, the locution “has the same shape as” being
more correctly paraphrased as “is shaped the same as”.
This way of arguing has venerable roots. It presents shape as one of a group
of concepts X for which the notion of X itself is logically dependent on a prior
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notion which, once we have the concept X at our disposal, it is natural to express
using the words “has the same X as”. This latter notion is an equivalence relation
which can be defined without any reference to the concept X itself. This idea is
due to Frege [2], who noted that the concepts of number, direction, and shape can
all be derived in this way.
In the case of (cardinal) number, the relevant relation is defined as follows:
• Set X has the same number as set Y if and only if there is a bijection (i.e.,
an exhaustive one-to-one correspondence) between the elements of X and
the elements of Y .
Notice that bijections can be defined without reference to number; but on the
other hand, according to Frege’s argument, number cannot be defined without
having the prior notion of “same number” to establish an identity criterion for the
new concept. Thus “same number” is shown to be logically prior to “number”.
Instead of “has the same number as”, we can use the term “equipollent”.1 We
now define number in terms of equipollence as follows: The number of set X (i.e.,
the number of its elements, its cardinality) is the set of all sets equipollent to
X.2 This set is what we would now recognise as an equivalence class under the
equipollence relation.3
Similarly, “direction” is logically dependent on the relation “has the same
direction as”—which we routinely express as “is parallel to”—, and “shape” is
logically dependent on “has the same shape as”, i.e., is geometrically similar
to. In particular, the shape of an object can be defined as the equivalence class
comprising all objects which have the same shape as it. This definition works well
so long as (a) a domain of “objects” is established for the relation to be defined
on, and (b) within this domain “same shape” can be defined as an equivalence
relation. In the next section I consider as candidate domains, first, geometrical
constructions, and second, physical objects; I then go on to consider what it means
to say that a physical object has the same shape as a geometrical construction.
4. Definition of the “same shape” relation
At the end of the previous section I glossed the relation “has the same shape as”
as “is geometrically similar to”. The latter relation, however, is first and foremost
defined as a relation on geometrical objects—which, for the moment, we may
understand, in standard mathematical fashion, as subsets of Rn, for some n 2 Z+.
We therefore need to ask in what way this relation can be applied to the very
di↵erent domain of physical objects: very di↵erent because physical space is not
a set of real-number triples, the usefulness of R3 as a model for physical space
1Frege’s term was gleichzahlig i.e., “equal-numbered”.
2Frege did not himself formulate this in terms of sets: he spoke of the number which belongs to
the concept F (die Anzahl, welche dem Begri↵e F zukommt) and equated this to the extension
of the concept “equipollent to the concept F” (der Umfang des Begri↵es “gleichzahlig dem
Begri↵e F”).
3This is not unproblematic: What set is this relation defined on? Frege supposed this could be
the set of all sets, but as Russell pointed out to him, this notion leads inexorably to devastating
paradoxes. An adequate discussion of this point would take us well out of scope of this paper.
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being rather that it a↵ords constructions which capture at least some parts of the
abstract essence of phenomena in physical space that we wish to model.
4.1. Similarity of geometrical objects
Considering first the notion of geometrical similarity as it applies to objects in
geometrical space, the key notion is that of distance, which serves as a measure
of the separation between two points. Writing  (p, q) for the distance between
points p, q 2 Rn, defined by the usual Pythagorean rule, we have:
Definition of geometric similarity between figures in Euclidean space.4 Two subsets
X and Y of Rn are geometrically similar if and only if there is a bijection   from the
points of X to the points of Y such that, for some constant  2 R+, the following
relation holds:
8x, x0 2 X. ( (x), (x0)) =  (x, x0).
In other words, distances between points in X are multiplied by a constant factor
 when the points are mapped by   into their images in Y . This is straightforward
and familiar. It is of particular importance to note that the relation thereby
defined is an equivalence relation, and it is this that enables the Fregean move
by which the shape of a figure can be identified with the equivalence class of all
figures having the same shape as it.
4.2. Similarity of physical objects
When we turn from Rn to the physical world, things are less straightforward.
Whereas distance in Rn can be defined mathematically, in physical space the
notion of distance is inextricably tied up with that of measurement, and the key
fact about measurement here is that all measurement has finite precision. This
means that whereas in Rn, since distances can be arbitrary non-negative real
numbers, the space of possible distances is simply R+[{0}, the space of measured
distances in physical space cannot take this form. To see this, note that we cannot
meaningfully ask whether the length of a rod in metres is rational or irrational.
Given that in physical space we can only characterise distances in terms of
measurement, and that measurement always has a finite precision, corresponding
to the resolving power of the measuring instrument, it follows that geometrical
similarity for physical objects can only be defined relative to a specified level of
resolution. Consider two objects whose shapes we wish to compare, say P and
Q, where Q is at least as big as P . Suppose the volume of P is v and that the
resolving power of our measuring instrument is such that the smallest distance
we can distinguish is h (I shall describe this as “resolution h”). Then in principle,
within the physical space occupied by P we can distinguish, say, n ⇡ v/h3 points,
4Here I am only dealing with Euclidean space—complications arise when we turn to non-
Euclidean spaces. For example, on the surface of the sphere, figures cannot be similar without
also being congruent. This is because, in this space, the sum of the interior angles of a triangle
exceed 2⇡ by an amount that is proportional to the area of the triangle, and hence no figure
can be expanded or contracted without changing shape. Thus only in Euclidean space is shape
completely independent of size.
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and to each pair x, y of these points we can assign a distance  h(x, y) that is
some multiple kh of the minimum discernible distance.5 Let Sh(P ) be this set of n
discernible points in P ; we may think of them, if we wish, as “blobs” of diameter
h, though this is not really how they seem to us as observers.
To say that objects P and Q have the same shape is to say that the points
we can discern in P at resolution h can be mapped onto some set of points we
can discern in Q at that resolution, such that, first, the distances between pairs
of the latter set of points are not discernibly di↵erent, at resolution h, from some
constant multiple of the distances between the pairs of points from the former
set to which they correspond under the mapping; and second, every point in Q
discernible at resolution h is “su ciently near” one of the points corresponding
to a discernible point in P . In other words:
Definition of “same shape” for physical objects. Physical objects P and Q (where Q
is at least as big as P ) have the same shape, at resolution h, if, for some constant
   1, the set Sh(P ) of points discernible in P at resolution h can be mapped into
the set Sh(Q) of such points of Q by means of an injective mapping  , such that
the following relations hold:
1. 8x, y 2 Sh(P ). | h( (x), (y))   h(x, y)|  12h
2. 8x 2 Sh(Q). 9y 2 Sh(P ). h(x, (y))  12h
This is perhaps as near as we can come to the notion of geometric similarity in a
physical setting, in which the idea of “exact distance” gains no purchase.
An immediate consequence of this is that a pair of objects which come out
as having the same shape at one level of resolution may have di↵erent shapes
at a finer level of resolution. For physical objects, the concept of “same shape”
is inescapably tied to the level of resolution at which the objects are examined;
and since, according to the Fregean argument, the concept of “shape” is logically
dependent on the concept of “same shape”, it follows that the notion of shape is
also tied to levels of resolution. This is, of course, a familiar idea in Computer
Science, where the notion of resolution, which we handled in a very crude manner
here, has been considerably refined, e.g., in the technique of multiscale represen-
tation in which by convolving an original image with Gaussian kernels of di↵erent
variances we obtain a series of images at di↵erent resolution levels (see [1, Ch.7]).
Unfortunately, the Fregean construction cannot be achieved in this instance,
because the “same shape” relation on physical objects, as defined above, is not
an equivalence relation. It is perfectly possible to have three objects A, B, and
C, such that, at some resolution h, A has the same shape as B and B has the
same shape as C, but A does not have the same shape as C. This is essentially
because the “same shape” relation, as here defined, is not capturing a notion of
identical shape so much as a notion of indiscernible (at resolution h) shape; and
it is a familiar fact that unlike identity relations, indiscernibility relations are
not transitive. The crucial implication of this, for us, is that there is no coherent
5This is somewhat oversimplified since in practice the resolution of our observations will not
harmonise with the levels of resolution available in the system of units used for recording them—
e.g., given resolving power (for lengths) of 0.03mm, recording to 1 decimal place is too coarse
and recording to two decimal places is too fine. For an attempt to deal with this issue in an
ontological framework, see [10].
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notion of “exact shape” for a physical object, only that of objects being more or
less approximately the same shape as other objects.
4.3. Similarity between physical and geometrical objects
It is often said that the shapes of physical objects can also approximate to the
shapes of ideal geometrical objects (compare [11]). Thus there are many approxi-
mate spheres in the physical world, but no geometrically exact spheres, the exact
sphere being an inhabitant of mathematical, not physical space. This is true so
far as it goes, but we can explain what is being said here more carefully using
resolution-based shape comparison. An explanation is needed since on the face
of it there is something paradoxical about comparing something physical with
an abstract mathematical construction: the two seem to belong to such entirely
di↵erent realms that any notion of comparison ought to be out of the question.
If we are to compare the shapes of, say, a sheet P of A4 paper and a certain
rectangle R defined in R2, then we need some way of matching up points in the
former with points in the latter. There are, at least on the orthodox view, un-
countably many points in R, but there does not seem to be any meaningful sense
in which we can attribute uncountably many points to P . There is already some-
thing dubious about the notion of attributing infinitely many points to P , since
as noted earlier, P can only be observed at all at some finite level of resolution,
and at any such level only finitely many points can be distinguished within it.
One might, of course, entertain the notion that, if there is no limit to how fine the
resolution level can be, then there is no limit to how many points we can discern
in P , so that the number of points in P , if not actually infinite, is at least poten-
tially infinite. But it is far from clear that, in the physical world, resolution could
be made indefinitely fine. For example, in the state of our current understanding
of physics, the Planck length (approximately 1.6⇥10 35 m) is believed to provide
a lower bound for the resolution of any possible technique of measurement.
But there is another problem we need to face, which is that while the physical
piece of paper P does have an actual (albeit indeterminate) size, the mathematical
rectangle R does not. How wide is the rectangle whose corners are at the points
(0, 0), (0, 1), (
p
2, 0), (
p
2, 1)? That’s easy: it’s
p
2! But
p
2 is a number, not a
length. Well, then, it’s
p
2 units. But what is a unit? How does a unit compare with
a millimetre or an inch? It is a meaningless question: Objects in the mathematical
world do not have actual sizes that can be compared directly to those of physical
objects.
In fact this is not as serious a problem as it may seem at first sight, since
in assessing geometric similarity we are only interested in relative length, not
absolute length. The scale factor  can take care of di↵erences in absolute length,
so long as the relative lengths remain unchanged. Thus in the ideal geometric
rectangle, considered as a set of points in R2, we can follow the usual practice of
recording the width as
p
2 units and the height as 1 unit, even though “unit” does
not designate any actual physical length, since what matters for our purposes
is only the ratio between the width and the height. And clearly all geometric
rectangles with sides in the ratio 1 :
p
2 are geometrically similar to one another.
What, then, does it mean to say that a piece of paper, considered at resolution
h, has the shape of a rectangle with sides in a given ratio? We cannot use the
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definition of strict geometric similarity for geometric figures here, nor can we use
the definition of “same shape at resolution h” for physical objects. Instead, we
modify the criterion by combining elements from the two definitions as follows:
Definition of a physical object having the “same shape” as a geometrical object. At
resolution h, a physical object P has the same shape as a geometrical object Q if
there is an injective mapping   from the set of points Sh(P ) discernible in P at
resolution h into the set of points in Q such that, for some constant  > 0:
1. 8x, y 2 Sh(P ). ( (x), (y)) =  h(x, y)
2. 8x 2 Q. 9y 2 Sh(P ). (x, (y))  12h.
The point here is that the objects in the pure geometric world, being given to us
by thought rather than by observation, can be specified with infinite precision: in
particular, the distances between points can be arbitrary real numbers and are
not constrained to being multiples of some minimal discernible distance.
5. Intrinsic vs Embedded Shape
Up to this point in our discussion, there has been an implicit assumption that
the shape of an object can be identified with the shape of the portion of space, or
region, which is occupied by that object. This fits in with a general presumption
that the spatial properties of objects are nothing other than the properties of the
portions of space they occupy. For many purposes this is not an unreasonable
presumption, and has the advantage that all such properties can then be handled
purely within a theory of space itself, without our having to worry about other
physical properties of the objects.
In the case of shape, this does not always accord with our everyday ways of
thinking. A rectangular sheet of paper, for example, is still, essentially, a rectan-
gular piece of paper if it is folded along a diagonal, or screwed into a ball. A single
long strand of wool retains this character whether it is coiled into in a skein or
knitted into a scarf. A tall, thin person is still a tall thin person whatever posture
he adopts; and more generally, the shape of a human body might be understood
to be “something which is invariant across all the various postures that the body
is capable of assuming” [3, p.201]. In such cases, we cannot identify the shape of
the object with the shape of the space it occupies, since the shape, understood
in this more general sense, may remain unchanged even as the object occupies a
succession of di↵erently-shaped spatial regions.
Let us distinguish between, on the one hand, the intrinsic shape of an object—
which is the more general, abstract notion of shape described in the previous
paragraph—and, on the other, its embedded shape, which is the shape of the region
of space that it currently occupies. The idea is that the embedded shape of an
object may change while its intrinsic shape remains constant. If we consider a
square sheet of paper, and all the myriad origami figures which it can be folded
into without tearing, we can say that across this range of figures the paper retains
its intrinsic shape (i.e., square) but assumes di↵erent embedded shapes.
Like embedded shape, the notion of intrinsic shape is logically dependent
on a prior notion of same shape: same embedded shape or same intrinsic shape
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respectively. Both of these notions can be defined in terms of the distances be-
tween points in the respective objects. The di↵erence is that whereas with “same
embedded shape” the distances are measured with reference to the space within
which the objects are embedded, with “same intrinsic shape” they must be mea-
sured within the object itself. Given a physical object P , I define the P -intrinsic
distance between two points x and y in P , written  P (x, y), as the length of the
shortest path between x and y which lies wholly within P . I contrast this with the
embedded distance  (x, y) used previously. Note that, for points within a convex
object, the intrinsic and embedded distances are the same.
We can now give a rough definition of “same intrinsic shape” as the existence
of a bijective mapping   between the points of P and the points of Q such that,
for any pair of points x and x0 in P we have  Q( (x), (x0)) =  P (x, x0), for
some constant  2 R+. This is only a rough definition because, since we are here
dealing with physical objects, we have to take into account the resolution of the
distance measurements, just as we did in the embedded case. When a person
adopts di↵erent bodily postures, although their intrinsic shape remains approxi-
mately the same, we will always find, if measuring su ciently precisely, that there
are di↵erences resulting from muscular contractions and extensions which distort
the shapes of individual parts of the body. Similarly, when a piece of paper is
folded, at the fold there will be minute tears or stretches which disrupt the exact
relationships between the intrinsic distances. But by measuring at a su ciently
coarse resolution these small-scale disruptions will disappear from view, so that
intrinsic shape, at that resolution level, remains constant.
For a more exact definition, then, we need to introduce the notation P,h(x, y)
to mean the P -intrinsic distance between x and y at resolution h. We then have:
Definition of “same intrinsic shape” for physical objects. Physical objects P and Q
(where Q is at least as big as P ) have the same intrinsic shape, at resolution h, if,
for some constant    1, the set Sh(P ) of points discernible in P at resolution h
can be mapped into the set Sh(Q) of such points of Q by means of an injection  ,
such that the following relations hold:
1. 8x, y 2 Sh(P ). | Q,h( (x), (y))   P,h(x, y)|  12h
2. 8x 2 Sh(Q). 9y 2 Sh(P ). Q,h(x, (y))  12h
What this definition does not tell us is how widely applicable the notion
of intrinsic shape is. The only examples I have given so far concern sheets of
paper, strands of wool, and human bodies, but for many objects the notion of an
underlying shape which is retained even as the object occupies di↵erently-shaped
regions of space does not seem to apply. We can arrive at a rough characterisation
of the kinds of object for which the notion of intrinsic shape can do useful work
by considering what kinds of transformations can change the embedded shape of
an object while retaining its intrinsic shape.
Rigid motions—rotations, translations, and reflections—preserve both intrin-
sic and embedded shape. For rigid bodies, therefore, intrinsic shape does not con-
vey any information beyond embedded shape. The same applies to magnification;
we can see this, at least approximately, in the case of a spherical rubber ball that
is being inflated; as it gets bigger, all the inter-point distances, whether measured
across the embedding space or within the material of the ball itself, expand at
the same rate, thus preserving both embedded and intrinsic shape.
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All these transformations preserve the topology of the object, and it is cer-
tainly true that transformations that alter the topology, such as tearing or frac-
turing, will also alter the intrinsic shape—thus two sheets of A4 paper lying flat
on the table, one of which is intact and the other has a razor-thin slit in the middle
(making it topologically a torus), exhibit the same embedded shape but di↵erent
intrinsic shapes. However, topological equivalence is a much coarser relation than
having the same intrinsic shape: in general stretching and compression disrupt in-
trinsic shape while preserving topology. As noted above, transformations such as
folding or “reposturing” always involve some such disruptive transformations, but
because these are small compared with the objects in which they occur, intrinsic
shape can be preserved even under reasonably fine resolution.
Can we characterise exactly those types of object which typically undergo
transformations of a kind that result in changes of embedded shape while pre-
serving intrinsic shape at an appropriate level of resolution? Because notions such
as “typically” and “appropriate” are inherently inexact, we will never find such
an exact characterisation; but it would be interesting at any rate to find a more
exact characterisation than we have at present.
6. Conclusion
As with number and direction, the ontological status of shape is problematic
because of its dependent character: shapes do not exist “in their own right”,
but only as qualities of objects. As Frege observed, for the shapes of geometrical
figures characterised mathematically as subsets of Rn, the relation of geometrical
similarity provides a robust criterion of identity which, by establishing the notion
of “same shape” as an equivalence relation, can support the notion of shapes as
entities that could be included within an ontology.
By contrast, the “same shape” relation for physical objects, since it can only
be defined relative to some finite resolution level, fails to be an equivalence re-
lation, and therefore cannot provide a criterion of identity for a notion of phys-
ical shape. This casts doubt on the ontological integrity of the notion of shape,
and we are left with the intransitive “same shape at resolution h” relation as the
primary vehicle for shape-attribution to physical objects. This is reflected in the
fact that, in practice, when we ascribe a shape to an object or object part it is al-
ways by comparison with something else —either another object or a geometrical
figure—and relative to some (often implicit) level of resolution.
As a final observation, it should be noted that since “same shape” relations
are founded on the comparison of distances amongst the points within the objects
to be compared, it follows that a notion of shape should be, in principle, available
in any domain where some notion of “distance” is applicable.
The notion of intrinsic, as opposed to embedded shape arises as a result of
reinterpreting what is meant by distance: instead of distances measured across
the space in which the objects under consideration are embedded, we measure
distance along paths which are constrained to lie within the objects themselves.
In this case “distance” is still essentially spatial, but by extending this term
to measures of separation along non-spatial dimensions we obtain metaphorical
extensions to the notion of shape.
39
One example is in the temporal domain, where we often speak of the profile of
a process, meaning by this its temporal “shape”—typically rendered visible in the
form of the spatial shape of some graphical representation of the process in which
time is the independent variable and the dependent variables measure one or more
qualities whose values are modified by the process. If we consider the process itself
rather than its graphical representation, we are faced with the problem that the
time dimension is not commensurable with the dimensions along which the other
variables are measured: thus, for example, given a scale model of a railway train,
where the non-temporal dimensions are spatial, there is no determinate answer
to the question how fast the model should be run to preserve the spatio-temporal
“shape” of the process in order to secure maximum verisimilitude.
An interesting extension of this is the idea of the “shape” of a musical phrase.
In music, there are two dimensions that can provide analogues of distance, namely
time and pitch.6 Since these have di↵erent measurement scales, distances along
these dimensions cannot be compared with each other, and this means that we
can reasonably regard, e.g., augmentations or compressions along either the time
axis or the pitch axis as in some sense shape-preserving. An examination of music
from many di↵erent styles will furnish numerous examples of composers exploiting
the expressive potential of such phenomena.
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Abstract. Lines are mysterious. They are drawn by the hand, they are seen by the 
eye, they appear in the world. Lines are what the hands draw, what the eyes see, 
and what the page represents. Lines form forms. Simple regular visual/spatial 
forms like dots, lines, and containers, have meanings that are readily apparent in 
context. They are used in the service of clear communication, to self and others, 
notably in diagrams and gesture.  They are used to organize, indeed to diagram, the 
world. Other, messy sketchy lines are used for exploration and discovery.  
Keywords. diagrams, sketches, visual communication, cognitive artifacts, 
abstraction, creativity, design 
Introduction  
We see lines everywhere. We see them even where they aren’t there at all, 
courtesy of Kanizsa: 
  
 
The eye generates them by connecting the dots, creating the continuous contours 
that allow us to discern objects in the camouflage of shadows and occlusion. The 
natural world provides them, the plane of the earth as it meets the sky and the 
perpendiculars of the things that grow from it. The hand draws them on paper and in 
the air to represent other things, concrete and abstract. The designer constructs them, 
connecting buildings and towns along streets, books and dishes on shelves.  We travel 
on them as we go from place to place. Are all these lines, real or virtual, in the world or 
in the mind, connected? 
                                                            
1 E-mail: btversky@stanford.edu 
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Creating Meaning: Orderly Lines 
 
Lines on paper. Let’s begin with the abstract, with lines that represent, lines that 
flow from the pen held by the hand. The simplest line is just a dot, a point, hardly there 
at all. Next, a line, a point extended in one dimension. After that, lines with bends and 
turns, zig-zags and swirls, arrows and writing. Lines that catch their tails, that close, 
form shapes, simple forms like circles and squares and more complex forms like 
contours of animals or trees. Lines create meaning by creating recognizable forms like 
ducks and rabbits, wives and mothers-in-law. They also create meaning by forming 
shadows, words, sketches, and diagrams.  
Diagrams are constructed from lines. Typically, diagrams are meant to simplify a 
more complex state of affairs to inform or influence or instruct. A frequent kind of 
diagram is based in forms that bear physical resemblance to what they are intended to 
represent. Maps are a prototype for this kind of diagram, but also other diagrams, for 
example, those designed to show the crucial parts of the heart or an engine, to show 
how the heart pumps or an engine works, to show how to assemble a heart or an engine. 
Yet, such depictions in diagrams are not typically designed to be realistic renderings 
but rather diagrammatic renderings; that is, they may omit or exaggerate or reorganize 
physical appearance and structure, and they may add information, verbal, symbolic, 
and visual in the service of informing or instructing. Part of what makes them diagrams 
and not simple depictions is the addition of simple forms, notably, dots, lines, and 
arrows that organize, label, integrate, explain, extend, and otherwise add to the 
depictive information about appearances of parts and wholes. Other frequent kinds of 
diagrams, notably charts and graphs, don’t generally bear physical similarities to what 
they are meant to represent, relying primarily on simple visual forms and spatial 
relations, and of course language and symbols, to show data and relationships. 
Commonly, these simple visual forms, dots, lines, and blobs, and spatial relations, 
center, up/down, left/right, carry meanings that are readily understood in context. The 
meanings seem to derive from their geometric and gestalt properties (e. g., Tversky, 
2011 a, b). Consider networks, arguably the simplest diagram, in its most rudimentary 
form, two dots and a line. Networks are constructed from dots and lines; the dots are 
nodes, the lines, edges. Abstractly, the dots are idea or entities, the lines, the relations 
between them. Variations of networks are used to represent myriad concepts: the 
network of roads on the ground, or airline routes in the air, of computers on the net, of 
concepts in a semantic net. Varieties of networks can represent the phylogenetic tree, a 
family tree, a corporate organization, a set of social connections, the transmission of 
ideas over time, data points along a dimension. What is shared is that the nodes 
represent entities and the lines represent the links among them. Why are dots 
understood as concepts, places, people, computers, roles, functions and more and lines 
understood as relations among them? River boat navigators who do not read and have 
not seen maps when asked to sketch a map of their travels draw settlements on the river 
as dots and the river routes that connect them as lines, pearls on a string (Woodward 
and Lewis, 1998), just as typical sketch maps (e.g., Tversky and Lee, 1998; 1999). 
Notably, the links form straight lines, despite the geographic irregularities of the river 
and the dots are the same size despite variations in size and extent. That information, 
the exact forms of the river and the communities, is not relevant for showing the route. 
What matters is the ordering and connection of the locations. For these ends, the 
communities are conceived of as points of zero dimensionality, the river as a line of a 
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single dimension. Language (at least English) makes a similar distinction (Talmy, 
1983): the journey began at the Capitol and continued to the White House; any two 
locations could be substituted for those venerable ones.  
Journeys can be one-way, relationships can be asymmetric. For that, asymmetric 
lines are needed, and arrows serve that need nicely. Arrows are asymmetric lines, and 
have a basis in the experienced world: arrows shot from a bow fly in the direction 
indicated; arrows form in the mud in the direction of erosion. Arrows change the 
meaning of lines. When asked to describe a diagram of a mechanical system without 
arrows, people give structural descriptions; they list the parts and their spatial relations. 
When asked to describe a diagram of the same systems with arrows, people provide 
functional descriptions; they give a step-by-step description of behavior, process, 
causality of the system (Heiser and Tversky, 2006).  
Often a broader perspective is needed, two dimensions, not a single one. Not at or 
to, but in. Not simple dots, but containers. The cells of tables or the bars in graphs or 
circles on graphs or maps contain and represent many entities, those that hold the 
properties defined by the cells: the cars manufactured in India in 1998, the number of 
spectators at soccer games in Brazil in 2004. The variations that characterize each of 
the cars and each of the spectators is irrelevant; all that matters is their numbers; 
similarly, their exact locations and the exact time of the year are irrelevant. They are 
represented as featureless numbers by simple containers, cells, bars, and circles. This 
third distinction, container, is also made in language, signified by the preposition in 
(Talmy, 1983).  
Why these regular, almost perfect forms; why not blobs of uncertain shape? After 
all, we don’t know the exact shapes, so why is a perfect idealized shape used to 
represent a shape that might actually be known?  Just as “red” represents a range of 
shades of red including magenta whereas “magenta” is a more specific shade of red, a 
purplish red (e. g., Rosch, 1978) and “noon” represents a range of times from about 
11:50 to 12:15 whereas 12:02 is a specific minute—but not a specific second within 
that minute—circles and rectangles and squares represent a range of shapes.  Just as red 
and noon are prototypic linguistic categories that contain and represent a set of values, 
dots, circles, and lines are prototypic spatial categories that contain and represent a set 
of values. Just as on average, the myriad shades of red contained in the category would 
average to the prototypic red, the myriad shapes that are contained in the visual 
categories points, lines, and containers would average to the prototypic values.  
Again like linguistic categories, these spatial categories allow inferences, and the 
convergences of those inferences are evidence for their meanings, converging with 
their geometric and gestalt properties. People interpret bars in graphs as discrete 
comparisons, lines as trends; similarly, they produce bars to represent discrete 
comparisons and lines to represent trends (Zacks and Tversky, 1999). People invent 
boxes to represent categorical relations and lines of various thicknesses to represent 
continuous ones; their inferences follow the same patterns (Tversky, Corter, Yu, Mason, 
and Nickerson, 2012). Graphs of people, place, and time that connect the people with 
lines encourage inferences about movement of people in time whereas tables of the 
same information encourage a broader range and number of inferences (Kessell and 
Tversky, 2011).  
Diagrams, maps, charts, and graphs select relevant information and omit irrelevant 
information. They may exaggerate, even distort, the relevant information for emphasis, 
for readability. Overall, their goal is clear and unambiguous communication. These 
simple spatial forms, and others like them, are their units of meaning, like morphemes, 
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of a visual/spatial vocabulary for communication. They can be combined 
systematically, like rules of syntax, to form genres of diagrams, sketch maps, circuit 
diagrams, architectural plans.  
Finding Meaning: Messy Lines 
Sketches are a very different case of lines on paper. They use lines, the lines may form 
shapes, but they are typically uncertain, tentative, unclear. They represent ideas, but 
amorphous ideas, ideas that are not yet fully formed. Their very lack of certainty 
creates ambiguity, allowing many interpretations, not a single clear one. Perhaps for 
that reason, messy lines in sketches encourage exploration and discovery, they promote 
new ideas. Messy sketches are used productively by artists, designers, and architects, 
especially experienced ones, to explore a domain with impunity, and to generate new 
ideas (Goldschmidt, 1994; Kantrowitz, in preparation; Schon, 1983; Suwa and Tversky, 
1996; Suwa and Tversky, 2001; Suwa and Tversky, 2003; Suwa, Tversky, Gero, and 
Purcell, 2001; Tversky and Chou, 2010, Tversky and Suwa, 2008). Experienced 
architects, artists, and designers use their sketches in deliberate ways to get new ideas, 
a process we have called Constructive Perception (Suwa and Tversky, 2003; Tversky 
and Suwa, 2008). One common strategy adopted by experienced architects and 
designers is to deliberately reconfigure their sketches, to reorganize the parts and 
wholes. The reconfigured perceptual array suggests new objects, encourages new 
interpretations, even ah-ha experiences. Reconfiguration is one of several strategies that 
promote constructive perception in the service of new ideas. Interspersing other tasks 
that expose thinkers to other perceptual and conceptual ideas help (Tversky and Chou, 
2010). Prompted hints help, especially top-down hints, thinking of other domains 
(Tversky and Chou, in progress). Talent helps, two talents actually, a perceptual talent, 
measured by the ability to see elemental complex figures embedded in more complex 
ones (Gottschaldt, 1926) and a cognitive talent, the ability to make remote associations 
among ideas (Mednick and Mednick, 1967) (Suwa and Tversky, 2003). These talents 
capture the two aspects of constructive perception, perceptual reconfiguration and 
conceptual interpretations.  
Now the caveats. Of course, messy lines aren’t always ambiguous, and ambiguity isn’t 
always productive. Similarly, orderly lines do not always convey a clear message.   
 
Lines in the World, Lines in the Brain, Lines on the Page 
 
Lines are what the hand draws and what the eye sees, a magical convergence. The 
world on the retina is pixels, dots, representing light of varying brightness and hue. The 
brain connects the dots, forming lines and shapes that constitute the uncountable 
number of things we recognize. Designers sketch lines, first messy tentative ones that 
allow interpretation and reinterpretation, evolving into orderly forceful lines that can 
convey myriad ideas with clarity.  
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Abstract. Sketches are shapes that represent objects, scenes, or ideas
by depicting relevant parts and their spatial arrangements. While hu-
mans are quite e cient in understanding and using sketch drawings,
those are largely inaccessible to computers. We argue that this is due to
a specific shape based representation by humans and hence the use of
cognitively inspired representation and reasoning techniques could lead
to more proficient sketch processing. We also propose a three-level ar-
chitecture for sketch learning and recognition that builds on concepts
from cognitive science, especially from analogy research, to map and
generalize sketches.
Keywords. Sketch, Shape, Learning, Analogy
1. Introduction
Sketches can be considered as an intermediate level of abstraction between raw
sub-symbolic streams of sensory input on the one side and icons on the other. In
contrast to a drawing, a sketch only captures the conceptually relevant parts of the
displayed object or situation as well as the spatial relations between these parts,
making their treatment substantially di↵erent from classical image processing.
The pertinence of sketches for future information technology applications and
services can hardly be overestimated. Especially the spread of tablet computers
and devices equipped with touch screens paves the way for new human computer
interfaces, in which sketches can play an essential role. Future applications can be
search services for large knowledge bases utilizing input sketches, support services
in software systems for shortening the path through complex menus, automatic
sketch generation for manuals and assembly instructions, a bridging approach
between computer vision and conceptual reasoning, or creative usage of sketches
in e-learning contexts.
In this paper, we present ideas on modeling the human ability to operate
with sketches. We focus on a competence model for recognition, classification,
memorization and retrieval of sketches guided by cognitive principles. In a first
step, the envisaged system acquires basic knowledge on how to sketch a given
1Authors are listed in alphabetical order.
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object. The essential and optional components as well as their spatial arrange-
ment are learned by comparing di↵erent sketches of the same type of object pro-
vided to the system as training data. In the next step, after elementary types
have been learned in this bootstrapping process, the system will generate more
abstract categories by cross-type comparison, establishing a hierarchical index of
sketch schemata and shapes. This index will then support the recognition ca-
pacity: new sketches will be compared to the abstract descriptions in the sketch
database to find structurally matching sketches in memory. We argue in favor of
a symbolic approach because the structure of a sketch can be captured explicitly
in such a representation, and changes in the conceptualization can be performed
by automatic inference techniques.
The paper is structured as follows. We start with discussing requirements
for a representation language for sketches in section 2. The description of the
proposed system is given in section 3, which constitutes the main part of this
paper. We then provide links to related work in section 4, before concluding with
some remarks and future work in section 5.
2. Sketch Representation and Re-representation
Sketches are assumed to be given as a collection of dots and lines, possibly an-
notated with an order of drawing. Multiple relational representations can thus
be constructed based on psychological principles, which take into account that
human cognition of spatial environments is qualitative in nature. Humans do not
perceive absolute locations and quantitative relations between spatial objects,
but rather relative locations and qualitative relations [1,2,3,4]. By observing a
geometric figure, the unstructured information is transformed into a structured
representation of coherent shapes and patterns [5,6]. Perception tends to follow a
set of Gestalt principles: stimuli are experienced as a possibly good Gestalt, i.e.
as regular, simplistic, ordered, and symmetrical as possible. Gestalt psychology
argues that human perception is holistic: instead of collecting every single element
of a spatial object and afterwards composing all parts into one integrated picture,
people experience things as an integral, meaningful whole. The whole contains an
internal structure described by relationships among the individual elements.
We argue that qualitative spatial relations play a major role during sketch
recognition and hence sketches should be described on a qualitative level by a
symbolic language. The spatial representation language has to meet two major
requirements: it must describe all elements of a spatial object with respect to
the aspects relevant in human perception, and it must also describe the spatial
characteristics that are important in recognizing spatial objects. To reflect hu-
man perception, the language must comprise significant perceptual vocabulary to
specify visual structures. The geometry in a sketch, i.e. of its elements and their
spatial relations, has to be represented in a way that allows for cognitively plausi-
ble reasoning. The language can be based on psychological theories for perception
and pattern recognition, such as Gestalt Theory [7,8,5,6], Marr’s theory of vision
[9] and Biedermann’s Geons [10], and on research specifically directed towards
the sketch mapping task such as the CogSketch [11] approach.
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Figure 1. Visual ambiguity exemplified by di↵erent representations of a sketch relative to a given
context in a proportional analogy, according to [12].
The potential ambiguity of sketches, e.g. caused by di↵erent groupings of
elements or di↵erent interpretations, is an essential point to be considered. In-
durkhya [12] has demonstrated the e↵ects of visual ambiguity in proportional geo-
metric analogies and has argued for a mechanism that can change representations.
The importance of re-representation is exemplified in Figure 1, where structural
commonalities between representations can be detected only if suitable represen-
tations for the geometric figure are available. The Star of David in the top row of
Figure 1 should be represented as two overlapping triangles, whereas the one in
the middle row should be represented as six triangles plus a central hexagon, and
that in the bottom row should be represented as three overlapping rhombuses.
Re-representation in this case means changing from one of these representations
to another one which suits better to the given problem.
Re-representation, in the domain of sketches, means spatial re-organization
and re-structuring of the elements within a spatial object, and can be formalized
as a deduction task: from a given description of a sketch an alternative description
has to be derived, that represents the same visual scene. It therefore requires spa-
tial reasoning capabilities and existing qualitative spatial reasoners can be used
to support this task (such as the SparQ toolbox [13] or General Qualitative Rea-
soner (GQR) [14]). Furthermore, to reflect human strategies of re-representation,
appropriate heuristics are needed to guide the re-representation process.
3. A System for Analogy-Based Sketch Learning
Human learning is not a one-step action but a continuous, incremental process
of acquiring new and revising old knowledge, where knowledge is learned at dif-
ferent levels of abstraction. Such observations about human learning motivate us
to develop a three-level architecture for learning perceptual categories based on
sketches. Perceptual categories in this context refer to structured representations
of graphical elements that are common to a class of sketch drawings, represented
as structured descriptions with respect to relevant topological, directional, and
geometrical properties. The two main mechanisms for learning are learning via
transfer and learning by abstraction. The former refers to the transfer of facts
from the source to the target domain, while the latter denotes the generalization
process that is essential to derive abstract concept definitions. Existing classical
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learning approaches usually require large sets of data samples to create general-
izations, though humans can already generalize over a small set of samples.
Our proposed system applies analogical comparison to discover structural
commonalities and combines them with inductive refinement to extract the es-
sential characteristics defining a perceptual category. Analogy-making, as a non-
standard reasoning technique, is combined with classical deductive and inductive
reasoning to compare di↵erent sketch drawings for commonalities and generalize
a common underlying perceptual category. For all tasks involving comparison of
sketches, analogical mapping is used to align two stimuli based on structural sim-
ilarities. Such a mapping is essentially shape based, i.e. it is performed on visual
descriptions only, and does not rely on functional, intensional, or usage-based
information. There are two central requirements that need to be realized. The
system needs, first, to be able to incrementally add newly learned categories, and,
secondly, to be adaptive in the sense that a computed generalization is modifiable
if new stimuli require a relaxation of the imposed constraints. Knowledge learned
from training examples can be used to recognize and classify new sketches.
The model presented in this section is inspired by [15], where first ideas for
an incremental learning theory were proposed. In that paper, we used a multi-
layered model based on analogies to explain how abstract physical principles such
as the law of energy conservation and the concept of an equilibrium of forces can
be learned. These ideas are revived here and applied to the domain of sketches
yielding a three-level architecture. The first level refers to the computation of
analogical generalizations between a pair of sketches (section 3.1). The second
level is the inductive refinement of the computed generalizations based on a re-
representation process that adapts representations to make it compatible to fur-
ther sketches (section 3.2). The third level focuses on learning through a revision
process when comparing abstract generalizations to new domains (section 3.3).
Finally, we discuss how the aquired knowledge can be used for sketch recognition
(section 3.4).
3.1. Level 1: Analogical Generalization
At the lowest level, two sketches are taken as input, and an analogy between
them is computed based on structural commonalities (cf. Figure 2). The relational
structure of the description of the sketches is thus crucial. The analogical mapping
may be partial, i.e. it allows parts of one sketch that have no counter-parts in
Figure 2. A flat description of a sketch is mapped to a structural representation
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the other sketch. The mapping will give rise to a generalization, i.e. an abstract
description of the common parts of both sketches.
Heuristic-driven theory projection (HDTP) is a logic-based framework for
analogy making, presented in [16], where domains are described by logical theories
and are represented by a finite set of axioms. An analogy is established by mapping
axioms of two domains, based on a generalization computed via anti-unification
(cf. [17]). HDTP allows re-representation of input domains: If the axiomatizations
provided for the domains do not exhibit su cient common structure to establish
a good analogy, formulas from the domain theory, which can be derived from the
axioms by logical deduction, are considered for mapping (cf. [18]).
The framework uses a set of heuristics to compute an analogical mapping
that can be adapted to fit the special needs in the sketch domain. Essential com-
plexity measures and heuristics are applied on di↵erent levels to guide the align-
ment process and to evaluate possible mappings in the sketch mapping scenario.
Heuristics are used to (1) determine the order in which axioms are selected and in-
cluded in the mapping process: psychologically motivated (and syntactic) heuris-
tics can proof useful, where perceptually significant elements in human percep-
tion are likely to influence the analogy-making process more than non-significant
elements (axioms should be selected therefore in the order of perceptual signifi-
cance); (2) guide the re-representation: heuristics should reflect human strategies
of re-representation, and the spatial language, particularly the re-representation
rules, influences the development of the heuristics; and (3) determine when an
analogy contains su cient analogous structures such that a new sketch stimulus
can be classified as a certain object. The approach has to bridge the gap between
largest possible mappings – the more analogical structures are identified, the bet-
ter the analogy – and di↵erences in the sketches that should not be part of the
analogy.
3.2. Level 2: Inductive Refinement
Inductive refinement is motivated by transferring ideas of concept formation to
perceptual category learning. By comparing di↵erent sketches of objects, which
should fall under the same category, the system should be able to construct a
description of this category in terms of the relevant visual features. The inductive
refinement proposed here combines a generalization of classified sketches as well
as a clustering of subsets of the classified objects.
Figure 3 illustrates an example: four sketches of stoves are compared. All of
them have a cubic shape and share significant elements of stoves such as hot-
Figure 3. A structural comparison of sketches reveals commonalities that all sketches share.
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Figure 4. Hierarchical structure of categories learned from sketches.
plates and temperature regulators. Given a pair of sketches, the first level of the
proposed system detects the analogous structure and constructs a generalization
containing the commonalities as a by-product. This generalization represents the
first step towards the perceptual category stove at an abstract level. Iterating this
process with additional input stimuli and computing generalizations of already
computed generalization candidates will elaborate this category. More generally,
provided a set of sketches is given, the exemplified brute force approach would be
to compute for each pair of sketches a generalization. These generalizations func-
tion as candidates for new perceptual categories, and can be ordered according to
their generalization complexity (e.g. substitution lengths in HDTP: The smaller
the substitution lengths in the anti-unification process, the more plausible it is
to assume that the two input sketches belong to the generated candidate for a
perceptual category). The ordered set of candidate generalizations can be used for
further structural comparison via anti-unification in order to find commonalities
between more than two sketches. Applying clustering techniques may possibly
identify optional elements of sketches that appear in many but not all objects
(e.g. water vapor over the cups in Figure 3).
3.3. Level 3: Creating a Perceptual Category Hierarchy
Analogies are not only iteratively applied among instances of the same category
(drawings of cups), but also between sketch drawings of di↵erent categories such
as cups, mugs, buckets etc., so that a hierarchy of perceptual categories is at-
tempted to be built (cf. Figure 4). Generated perceptual categories from Level 2
will constitute the leaves of the hierarchy. By analogical comparison of pairs of
perceptual categories, generalizations are computed that can represent candidates
of new, more abstract perceptual categories. These candidates can be ordered
according to the complexity of the underlying analogical mapping and only those
candidates constitute new categories that are maximally similar to each other.
The generalizations successively reach an abstraction level such that the highest
level of generalizations contains elementary geometric shapes.
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3.4. The Recognition Task
The recognition task refers to the problem of determining whether a given sketch
corresponds to an object from the system’s knowledge base. It can also be treated
as an analogy problem, in which the source domain consists of the system’s knowl-
edge on how to sketch a certain object, and has to be mapped to the unstructured
graphical input (target) presented to the system as a flat collection of lines and
dots. The structural commonality between the flat representation of the target
and the structured representation of the source is initially not obvious. To suc-
cessfully classify a new stimulus, an analogous structure has to be created for the
target stimulus. During the analogy-based mapping process the target must be
re-represented such that common structures may become visible.
The hierarchical memory structure built by the system (cf. Figure 4) is used
as a starting point for the retrieval. The search algorithm will try to map abstract
categories from that hierarchy to the search item, by computing appropriate sub-
stitutions to prove that the search item is a suitable instance of that abstract
category. Hence, the retrieval is organized as a top-down search: starting from the
most abstract category, all sub-categories are analogically mapped to the query
sketch. Good matches are those categories where the aligned elements reach max-
imal coverage of the stored descriptions as well as maximal coverage of the search
item. Matching items are all those sketches which are classified below a suitable
category in the hierarchy. Suitable categories need to exhibit a su ciently high
coverage of the search item and the category itself. The result of a retrieval process
ranks all matching items according to their relevance. We suggest the following
criteria to determine the degree of relevance:
1. Depth of the matching database category: The higher a matching category
in the hierarchy, the more abstract it is.
2. Coverage of the analogy: We assume that the higher the coverage of the
search item, the better is the match.
3. The analogical relation between the search and the database items should
be a coherent and connected match. This indicates that not only single
elements align, but at least a certain part of the sketch aligns coherently.
In a ranking heuristics that combines the di↵erent aspects, the coverage has to
be considered with respect to the abstractness of the database category.
4. Related Work
The ideas presented here build on two research fields: spatial analogies and cate-
gory learning with analogies. Spatial analogies have a rather long history in arti-
ficial intelligence, whereas analogy-based learning is far less developed. The first
analogy system, ANALOGY [19], was dedicated to solving proportional geometric
analogy problems. O’Hara & Indurkhya [20,21] proposed InterAct, an algebraic
analogy model for geometric proportional analogies between line drawings. Das-
tani [22] developed a formal language for this analogy model to describe elements
in geometric figures and compute automatically a structural, Gestalt-based rep-
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resentation. Forbus et al. [11] developed a general architecture for sketch under-
standing, CogSketch, which is domain independent and takes freehand sketches
as input [23]. Each freehand sketch drawing consists of several primitive elements
called glyphs. CogSketch interprets the primitive elements via their ontological
description and via their shapes, and computes spatial relations between primi-
tive elements based on the convex hull of glyphs. Copycat is a non-deterministic
analogy model for proportional analogies in the string domain [24]. Tabletop [25]
is a computational program based on Copycat that was developed to detect anal-
ogous spatial arrangements in a micro-world such as a well-laid table. Like Copy-
cat, Tabletop combines representation-building and correspondence-finding into
one integrated process. Davies and colleagues examine visual analogies in archi-
tectural design. They showed in experiments [26] that humans use visuospatial
representations for the analogical mapping and transfer: participants used visual
and spatial knowledge, mostly the topology of objects, to align a given architec-
tural design with an architectural design problem and construct a solution via
analogical transfer. Davies et al. developed the analogy model Galatea, an imple-
mentation of the constructive adaptive visual analogy theory [27,28], to compute
visuospatial analogies.
Analogy-based learning di↵ers from the enormous number of proposed classes
of learning methods and methodologies in classical artificial intelligence research,
as for example, instance-based learning, exemplar-based learning, case-based
learning in the area of lazy learning and version space learning, decision tree
learning, inductive learning, neural learning, and probabilistic learning in the area
of eager learning. Many of these approaches require a relatively large sample of
examples in order to learn reasonable generalizations. Although there may be cer-
tain approaches that attempt to incorporate structure of the generalization space
into the learning process, in order to facilitate learning from small training data
samples – similar to analogical learning – there are significant di↵erences between
these approaches and analogy-based learning. Only a rather limited number of
positive examples are required for learning due to the conceptually guided way of
establishing analogical generalizations, which are the source for new knowledge.
An explicit generalization is necessary to capture new categories, re-use learned
knowledge, and refine knowledge over learning steps. It is worth pointing out that
one can find quite often references to analogical learning [29], but no spelled-out
theory of analogical learning has been proposed so far. Inductive Logic Program-
ming (ILP) [30] and Relational Learning [31] could be mentioned as a modern
probabilistic version of frameworks where structure plays an important role in
the learning approach. But compared to these most prominent approaches, the
computation of an analogical relation does not incorporate probabilities, nor does
it require that examples are taken from the same domain. However, the computa-
tion of an analogical relation is a complex process including aspects like retrieval,
transfer, re-representation, refinement etc. Closest in spirit to analogy-making,
may be the approach originally proposed by Plotkin [17], who computed least
general generalizations for facilitating learning.
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5. Summary and Future Work
We have outlined ideas for a system to model sketch learning and recognition.
The setup is motivated by psychological findings emphasizing that human recog-
nition capabilities are not only data-driven, but crucially governed by cognitive
mechanisms and principles such as analogical reasoning and Gestalt principles.
This contrasts with most work in the context of image retrieval, which use low-
level features and does not guarantee that the resulting model reflects the human
competence in recognition processes, as many of the used features are possibly
not accessible by humans. One of the rare exceptions is [32] who propose to view
image retrieval as a knowledge representation problem, where structured objects
are retrieved such that syntactic and semantic aspects play an important role.
Even though the work presented here is currently purely conceptual, we have
explained in detail how the envisaged system can make use of existing technolo-
gies, especially from the field of spatial and analogical reasoning. We have ar-
gued in favour of a symbolic representation of visual scenes and have proposed
to use HDTP as a framework for analogy making. For our system, HDTP has to
be extended to make use of spatial reasoners, e.g. from the SparQ toolbox [13],
for re-representation during the analogical mapping. A prototype implementation
may be applied to a set of test sketches, allowing to compare di↵erent heuris-
tics. A primary concern is the development of a suitable language for describing
shapes and sketches. Here we can build on a plethora of existing semiformal and
formal approaches, like Dastani’s languages of perception [22]. Central objectives
for such a language are, that it allows for cognitively plausible representation and
supports the manipulations required by our system.
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Abstract.We propose a human-centred model for abstraction, modelling and com-
puting in function-driven spatial design for architecture. The primitive entities of
our design conception ontology and computing framework are driven by classic no-
tions of structure, function, and a↵ordance in design, and are directly based on the
fundamental human perceptual and analytical modalities of visual and locomotive
exploration of space. With an emphasis on design semantics, our model for spa-
tial design marks a fundamental shift from contemporary modelling and computa-
tional foundations underlying engineering- centred computer aided design systems.
We demonstrate the application of our model within a system for human-centred
compu- tational design analysis and simulation. We also illustrate the manner in
which our design modelling and computing framework seamlessly builds on con-
temporary industry data modelling standards within the architecture and construc-
tion informatics communities.
Keywords. architectural CAAD, cognitive systems, ontologies (artificial intelligence),
declarative languages, knowledge representation and reasoning, geometric and
spatial representation and reasoning, computational geometry
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Abstract. Several studies in cognitive sciences have highlighted the existence of 
privileged and universal psychological associations between shape attributes, such 
as angularity, and auditory dimensions, such as pitch. These results add a new 
puzzle to the list of arbitrary-looking crossmodal matching tendencies whose 
origin is hard to explain. The puzzle is all the more general in the case of shape 
that the shapes-sounds correspondences have a wide set of documented effects on 
perception and behaviour: Sounds can for instance influence the way a certain 
shape is perceived (Sweeny et al., 2012). In this talk, we suggest that the study of 
these crossmodal correspondences can be related to the more classical cases of 
crossmodal transfer of shape between vision and touch documented as part of 
Molyneux’s question, and reveal the role that movement plays as an amodal 
invariant in explaining the variety of multimodal associations around shape. 
Keywords. Crossmodal correspondences, Audition, Touch; Molyneux’s problem; 
Amodal invariants 
Introduction: A contemporary version of Molyneux’s problem  
How do shapes sound? The question does not seem to make sense metaphysically: 
Shapes are not endowed with auditory properties. In addition, similarities or differences 
in shapes do not directly correlate with differences in sounds, given that crucial 
elements such as density, size, and material properties will make similarly shaped 
objects sound very differently when they are similarly struck. For instance, a small 
dense sphere might have the same sound as a bigger and less dense cylinder when both 
are struck in a similar way; and the rich repertoire of drums should convince us that 
shape is not all that matters  to determine how objects sound. 
If the question ‘how do shapes sound?’ needs to be dismissed then, a milder 
version of the question might be more resistant: Supposing that shapes have sounds, 
what would their sound be? Surprisingly, several studies in cognitive sciences have 
highlighted convergent and stable responses to this question, and they have shown the 
existence of privileged psychological associations between shape attributes and 
auditory dimensions, such as pitch. When asked which of two shapes, one rounded and 
the other one angular, should be called ‘Takete’ and which one should be called 
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‘Maluma’, most participants answer that the angular shape should be ‘Takete’ and the 
rounded one, ‘Maluma’ (Kohler, 1929, 1947; see also Ramanchandran & Hubbard, 
2001a and figure 1). 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Three examples of crossmodal correspondences, documented between (a) 
sounds and size by Sapir (1929); (b) sounds and shape (angularity) by Köhler (1929, 
1947) and Ramachandran & Hubbard (2001); and (c) sounds and shape (aspect ratio) 
by Sweeny et al. (2012). 
 
This crossmodal association between shapes and sounds might look surprising at 
first, but a series of evidence shows it to be present across cultures (Bremner et 
al.,2013) and from an early age (i.e., four months, see Orztuck et al., 2012, see also 
Maurer et al., 2006, for evidence in 2 to 2,5 years old). While neurological 
investigation starts to unveil a specific pattern of neurological activity in the superior / 
intraparietal regions as well as in frontal areas corresponding to the shape-sound 
associations (Kovic et al., 2009; Peiffer-Smadja, 2010; see also Bien et al., 2012 for a 
EEG/ TMS study and Sadaghiani et al., 2009, for a fMRI study of related arbitrary 
audio-visual correspondences), associations between shapes and sounds is absent in 
individuals with damage to the angular gyrus (Ramachandran & Hubbard, 2001b), 
suggesting that this is a robust neuropsychological phenomenon. 
What’s more, shapes-sounds correspondences have recently been shown to have 
behavioural consequences, as the visual perception of briefly presented shapes can be 
affected by certain types of sounds (Sweeny et al., 2012; see also Spence & Deroy, 
2012a for a discussion). Sweeny and his colleagues have indeed shown that oval shapes, 
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whose aspect ratio (relating width to height) varied on a trial-by-trial basis, were rated 
as looking wider when a /woo/ sound was presented at the same time, and as looking 
taller when a /wee/ sound was presented instead. By contrast, the perceived shape was 
not affected by other natural sounds such as birds or engine sounds, showing that a 
specific crossmodal effect was at stake between these sounds and these shapes. On the 
one hand, these findings add to a growing body of evidence demonstrating that audio-
visual correspondences can have perceptual (as well as decisional) effects (see Parise & 
Spence, 2012; Deroy & Spence, 2013, for a review). On the other hand, the results 
concerning sound-shape correspondences add a new puzzle to the list of arbitrary-
looking crossmodal matching tendencies whose origin is hard to explain.  
The puzzle is all the more general in the case of shape that the shape-sound  
correspondences have a wide set of documented effects and applications. Besides the 
aforementioned bias in shape perception, they are shown to facilitate language learning  
(Imai et al., 2008) and to be exploited in various audio-visual mapping technologies 
such as music visualization software representing sounds as shapes or sensory 
substitution devices encoding shapes as sounds (see Deroy & Auvray, 2012). 
In the present paper, we suggest that the study of these multimodal associations 
surrounding shape can be related to the more classical cases of crossmodal transfer of 
shape between vision and touch documented as part of Molyneux’s question (part 2). 
We review the dominant explanations offered to explain shape-sound correspondences, 
in terms of conceptual mediation (part 3) and innate hyper-connectivity which is not 
eliminated by perceptual learning (part 4), before arguing that the hypotheses of 
associative learning and common neurological representations, proposed to explain the 
tactile-visual Molyneux’s shape transfer can also explain the shape-sound crossmodal 
matchings. In conclusion, we stress that the hypotheses currently investigated for shape 
matchings in touch and vision benefit from being extended to the more arbitrary-
looking cases of matchings shapes between audition and vision, thereby stressing the 
multimodal dimension of shape. 
 
1.  A new Molyneux problem 
 
Arbitrary-looking crossmodal matchings, as they are called (Maurer & Mondloch, 
2005; Spence & Deroy, 2012b), can be defined as tendencies to associate distinct 
sensory features that do not obviously co-occur in experience or in the environment. 
For instance, moving away from sound-shape pairings for a moment, the tendency to 
pair higher-pitched sounds with brighter visual surfaces is also shown to be present in 
adults (Marks, 1974) and in infants (Maurer et al., 2006). So is the tendency to match 
higher frequency sounds with higher visual locations (e.g. Evans & Treisman, 2010; 
Spence, 2011 for a review). These pairings occur although brighter objects and animals 
do not (at least straightforwardly) emit higher pitched sounds than their darker 
counterparts, and although higher pitched sounds do not regularly come from higher 
locations in space. The same lack of environmental grounding holds for the 
correspondence between shapes and sounds: Unless it should turn out that angular 
objects give rise to sounds that are relevantly different from rounded objects when, for 
example, they are explored haptically (e.g. Guzman-Martinez et al., 2012), there seems 
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to be no straightforward environmental correlation between shapes and sounds of 
objects either. 
Crossmodal correspondences between sounds and shapes (or between pitch, 
brightness and elevation) are difficult to square with the currently popular view that 
crossmodal associations need to be learned out of the natural multisensory statistics of 
the environment (see Spence, 2011). Their origin therefore prompts a series of 
questions. How do such crossmodal correspondences come to be present in humans and 
other animals? Do they have any ecological value? Determining here whether these 
sound-shape associations are innate (Ludwig et al., 2011; Maurer & Mondloch, 2005; 
Maurer et al., 2012) or acquired; and in this case, determining how they are acquired 
(see Martino & Marks, 1999; Spence, 2011; Walker et al., in press) raise, as we shall 
see, a new Molyneux’s problem, which teaches us new lessons on the multimodal 
aspect of shapes. 
The core of Molyneux’s problem, raised initially by Molyneux back in the 17th 
century, in the heat of the rationalist-empiricist controversies (Locke, 1690; see also 
Morgan, 1977) is still very much relevant today (e.g., Held et al., 2011, Streri, 2012). 
The question is to determine whether the crossmodal matching observed between felt 
and seen shapes at a very early age is acquired through exposure and associative 
learning, or whether it pre-exists exposure instead. To put it in a philosophical way, the 
question consists in deciding whether the crossmodal matching of shapes is a priori or 
a posteriori. To put it in a psychological way: is the tactile-visual connection for shapes 
innate / hardwired or acquired? 
All past and current replies to Molyneux’s problem have been framed on the basis 
that the matching between tactile and visual shapes targets one and the same 
environmental property (that is , shape is viewed as an objective or primary quality. 
Note that Berkeley (1948) is one of the rare philosophers who seems to have accepted 
that tactile shapes and visual shapes can constitute different objective properties). This 
objective grounding is what gives the crossmodal matching of tactile shapes and visual 
shapes a form of necessity and rationality of interest to philosophers. 
Now, necessity, rationality and objectivity are what become problematic when we 
turn to arbitrary crossmodal matchings between sounds and shapes; as they obviously 
do not target one and the same environmental feature. Certain shapes do not necessarily 
go with certain sounds. For instance, associating the sound ‘Bouba’ to a rounded rather 
than to an angular shape looks irrational and this association does not seem to inform 
us about an objective regularity. So why would we pair sounds to shapes? Due to these 
key differences, the mainstream proposals developed for the Molyneux-type of 
crossmodal associations have not been thought to be relevant to address this question. 
The very fact that the crossmodal corespondences between shapes and sounds is 
called arbitrary comes from the fact that scientists have had a hard time pinning down a 
regular environmental correlation between the property of being of a certain shape and 
the property of emitting a certain sound’s pitch. Even harder to explain are crossmodal 
correspondences between shapes and flavours (Deroy & Valentin, 2011) or between 
symbolic shapes and smells (Seo et al., 2010) which also do not receive a 
straightforward explanation as internalised statistics of the environments. These other 
matchings might deserve a separate treatment, but they stress the crux of the problem: 
If shapes and the other properties are not necessarily or regularly correlated, how could 
these matchings be learned by association? And if they are not learned by exposure, 
how could one make sense of the fact that we have evolved to have hard-wired or a 
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priori connections between the representations of shapes and these apparently 
unrelated properties in our mind / brain? 
The competing options that have been recently proposed to explain arbitrary 
crossmodal matchings between shapes and sounds, as we shall see below, recycle the 
ones that were once proposed for Molyneux’s case but that were subsequently rejected. 
On the one hand, the idea, initially proposed for Molyneux’s cases (see Locke, 1690; or 
Morgan, 1977 for a review) is that matchings across sensory modalities take place 
through an association made at the level of ideas or concepts and, on the other hand, 
the idea, that they are fully present at birth (i.e. that they are a priori, see Kant, 1998). 
 
2. Sounds-shapes correspondences as conceptually mediated 
 
The idea that crossmodal matchings require a conceptual mediation is very much 
the way Molyneux’s cases were discussed at the times of Locke and Berkeley, when 
the connection was supposed to be established between the ‘idea’ of shape prompted by 
vision and the ‘idea’ of shape prompted by touch. The idea of a conceptual mediation is 
however no longer considered appropriate in order to explain early crossmodal 
matchings of visual and tactile shapes. However, in the case of arbitrary crossmodal 
matchings, this hypothesis is pursued by a growing number of researchers: 
Correspondences between pitch, brightness, and angularity, for instance, have been 
explained by the cognitive capacity that observers have to represent various sensory 
features, or dimensions, on a common scale (Martino & Marks, 1999; Walker et al., 
2012), to metaphorically map one conceptual domain onto another (Shen, 1997 ; Shen 
& Eisemann, 2008; Williams, 1976) or to reason analogically (Premack & Premack, 
2003; see also Deroy & Spence, 2013; Spence, 2011, for a discussion). Now, the main 
problem for these conceptual solutions comes from explaining the presence of 
crossmodal matchings at a very early age (e.g., as early as 4 months, for shapes and 
sounds, see Orztuck et al., 2012) and the difference between the neurological 
activations noticed for crossmodal correspondences and semantic or analogical 
reasoning (Sadhigani et al., 2009). 
 
3. Shape-sound correspondences as remnants of non-functional innate connections 
 
The nativist idea that crossmodal matchings could be present from birth has been 
eliminated – at least in the case of non-arbitrary matchings –for a long time in favour of 
the less radically nativist claim that they come from innate learning mechanisms guided 
by amodal or redundant representations of time, space, and intensity in the brain (see 
Bahrick & Lickiter, 2012, for a review). The strong nativist option is however still very 
much present when it comes to explaining arbitrary crossmodal correspondences as 
shown by the growing popularity of what is called the ‘neonatal synaesthesia 
hypothesis’ (see Maurer et al., 2012, for a review). The idea here is that these 
correspondences come from a lack of differentiation of the infant’s perceptual 
apparatus, and persist into adulthood due to of a lack of pruning or inhibitory feedback 
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of some of these non-functional connections (Maurer & Mondloch, 1995; Maurer et al., 
2012).  
Now, there are good reasons not to go back to strong nativist hypotheses, even to 
explain the arbitrary crossmodal matchings evidenced in infants. The putative 
functional role of arbitrary crossmodal matchings as coupling priors in multisensory 
learning (Ernst, 2007; Spence, 2011) and multisensory integration (Parise & Spence, 
2012), or as a kind of crossmodal Gestalt grouping principle (namely, a kind of 
crossmodal grouping by similarity; see Spence, submitted), together with neurological 
differences (Sadaghiani et al., 2009; Spence & Parise, in press), are sufficient to 
distinguish them from non-functional associations that can exist in synaesthetes (no 
matter whether they are adults or children; see Ward, 2012). This adds to the fact that 
nativist explanations in general are now hard to support in face of the demand that 
innate traits are traced back to their genetic encoding (a demand which is not easy to 
meet for most nativist hypotheses, see Lewkowicz, 2011). 
 
 
4. Updating the associative learning and common coding hypotheses to explain 
sound-shape correspondences. 
In this section, we want to argue that the alternative to explain arbitrary 
crossmodal correspondences either by late conceptual mediation or as being innate is 
wrongly limited. A first step here consists in stressing that explanations in terms of 
statistical learning and/or common neural coding have been too swiftly excluded. 
The assumption that pairings – between, for instance, angularity and high-pitched 
sounds – are not regularly experienced by infants is more of an ungrounded assumption. 
It rather appears to be the default conclusion once one cannot come up with a plausible 
environmental source for the correlation. It should be more thoroughly investigated by 
taking into account precise measurements of exposure. Audiovisual correspondences 
between shapes and sounds might also come from a specific domain, namely speech. 
The mouth movements observed when someone utters speech sounds like ‘Takete’ or 
‘wee’ are more stretched (angular / narrow) than the wider rounded movements 
observed when one utters ‘Maluma‘ or ‘woo’; suggesting a regular correlation between 
pitch and shapes. This restores the plausibility of an associative learning account, 
especially compatible with the idea that infants are particularly attentive to face / voice 
or mouth / sounds in the first months of their life (see the perceptual narrowing 
hypothesis, Lewkowicz, 2002). 
The second assumption that the neurological representation of visual brightness 
and auditory pitch cannot have anything in common also appears to rely on a 
predetermined view of what the legitimate common amodal representations in the brain 
are (i.e., space, time – plus or minus number / magnitude and quantity / intensity; see 
Marks, 1978). This assumption does not consider other possibilities which are getting 
investigated in recent work in cognitive neurosciences, that movement (Held et al., 
2011) and embodiment could act as common sensibles (note that movement was 
considered as such by Aristole and Locke). 
Once related to speech, the correspondences between sound and shape can also be 
explained not merely in terms of audiovisual associations, but also in terms of audio-
motor associations, linking the sounds that one hears to the automatic articulatory 
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movements generated when listening to speech (Galantucci, Fowler, & Turvey, 2006). 
If the latter account were to be correct, this crossmodal correspondence would then 
become embodied (Pezzulo et al., 2011), grounded in sensorimotor associations, rather 
than being based on an external association between two sensory experiences, whose 
resemblance would be processed in an amodal manner. 
One way to distinguish between the statistical and embodied accounts here would 
be to test whether this correspondence exists only in cases or in species where the 
vocalising follows the takete-sharp mouth movements rule. Note that this can be 
contrasted with the correspondence between the sound-size of the source which can be 
found across species, independently of their rules of vocalization (see Ludwig et al., 
2011). 
It will further be interesting to determine whether the sound-shape and sound-size 
crossmodal correspondences are related, and whether the latter has multiple origins 
(perhaps originating both in external and embodied underlying factors). Understanding 
the role of embodied vs. external associations would certainly help to link Sweeny et 
al.'s (2012) results to others showing that the shapes we see - and respond to - can also 
influence the pitch (or fundamental frequency) of the speech sounds we utter (Parise & 
Pavani, 2011) or that making a mouth movement (consistent with ‘ba’ or ‘da’) can give 
rise to a McGurk effect (McGurk & MacDonald, 1976) when listening to 
speech sounds, just as when actually viewing someone else’s mouth movements 
uttering those sounds (see Sams, Mottonen, & Sihvonen, 2005). 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
In this concluding section, we want to insist on the importance of focusing on 
shape-sound correspondences when thinking about shapes, especially in a multi-
disciplinary approach. From a global / philosophical perspective, these 
correspondences encourage a broadening of the investigation of Molyneux’s problem, 
initially focused on tactile and visual shapes, to more contingent associations which can 
come to matter as much for linguistic and perceptual behaviour. Interestingly, the 
associative and commonality hypotheses framed here to account for correspondences 
between shapes and auditory attributes are also at the moment pursued for ‘non-
arbitrary’ matchings of visual and tactile shapes, raising important questions as to how 
these two shapes might interact, and how situations of single vs. distinct properties can 
come to differ. 
From a more specific and empirical perspective, crossmodal correspondences 
between shapes and sounds have a role in language acquisition and linguistic intuitions 
(Imai et al., 2008). They can also explain the use of crossmodal adjectives to talk about 
sounds (e.g., sharp sounds). But mostly, as we want to highlight, they show all their 
importance when thinking about the optimization of auditory-visual translations, be it 
the ‘auditory’ translation of visual shapes – as in sensory substitution through devices 
which aim at compensating the loss of sight through a coding / decoding device, such 
as the vOICe (Meijer, 1992) or the Vibe (Hanneton et al., 2010; see also Auvray & 
Myin, 2009, for a review) or the visual translation of sounds; for instance as in musical 
composition software. 
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Abstract. Much of the discussion about shape representation during the
last two decades was fundamentally related to questions about the rep-
resentation of parts. Inspired by the cognitive processes governing how
people represent and think about parts, we give a brief summary of
our framework for representing part structures. In particular, we are
interested in the role of similarity and prototype e↵ects in this context.
Keywords. Part-whole relations, similarity, conceptual spaces
Introduction
Humans seem to be prone to divide the complex shape of objects into parts.
In seeing a cat, we divide its overall shape in some more-or-less well defined
parts, such as the head, trunk, tail and legs. We can then use this information
to recognize and think about cats. It seems that structure is intrinsically related
to our everyday notion of shape. That leads us to a broader question: what are
the cognitive phenomena that allow us to represent and think about parts of
object as a whole, and not just parts of their shapes? In this paper, we introduce
a novel way to represent the relation between parts and wholes that takes into
consideration some of these phenomena.
In an influential work, Farah [4] carried out a meta-study about di↵erent
kinds of agnosia in humans and proposed that two processes participate in object
recognition. Object recognition can be structural, where recognition is achieved
by the identification of parts of the object and its internal structure. On the
other side, recognition can be holistic, based on the global characteristics of the
object, such as overall shape. According to Farah, both processes work together in
recognitions of broad categories of entities (e.g. faces, objects and written words).
It is important to note that, as pointed by Peissig and Tarr [7], the structural
versus holism problem is correlated, but independent of the recurrent question
whether object (shape) recognition is model- or view-based (i.e. [2,3]).
If we assume that holistic and structural processes are necessary for object
recognition, therefore it is reasonable to expect that both require an underly-
ing conceptual structure conveying holistic and structural information. When it
1Corresponding Author: Sandro Fiorini, Institute of Informatics, UFRGS, P.O. Box 15064,
CEP 91501-970, Porto Alegre-RS, Brazil; E-mail: srfiorini@inf.ufrgs.br. We thank CAPES and
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comes to conceptual structures for object recognition, similarity e↵ects seem to
play a fundamental role (c.f. [3,1]). The general notion is that recognition could
be reduced to judgements of similarity between perceptual input and internal
representations. The question we are trying to answer is how a holistic/structural
representation framework that supports similarity judgements should look like.
We base our e↵orts on the Theory of Conceptual Spaces [5], a representation
framework that embeds the notions of concept similarity and prototypes. Our
general approach is to extend conceptual spaces so that it becomes more suitable
for the representing holistic and, specially, structural information about concepts
and objects. It should provide the grounds for novel computational approaches
to concept representation based on holistic and structural similarity.
1. Conceptual Spaces
Ga¨rdenfors’ Theory of Conceptual Spaces [5] puts forward a new way for repre-
senting concepts using geometrical and topological structures, which complements
symbolic and connexionist approaches. Given the available space, we present just
a brief introduction, but it is enough to say that the Theory is based on the
notions of concept similarity and prototypes. Put it simple, a conceptual space
is a space in the mathematical sense, where objects are points and concepts are
regions or sets of regions. If this space has a well-defined metric, then it is possible
to tell the similarity between objects (and concepts) by measuring the distance
between them: further objects are apart, less similar they are. The dimensions of
a conceptual space have a special meaning: they denote the features — or qual-
ities — through which entities can be compared and are frequently grounded in
perception. Good examples are hue, mass, height, etc. Certain quality dimensions
always co-occur, forming subspaces called quality domains. Examples of quality
domains are colour, shape, taste, etc. Complex concepts are defined as set of re-
gions in many quality domains. For instance, the concept of apple can be defined
as a combination of the regions green and red in the colour domain, plus the
cycloid regions in the shape domain, plus the sweet and acid regions in the taste
domain and so on. An individual apple is represented by a single point (or vector)
in the multi-dimensional space formed by all quality domains of apple and that
is close (similar) enough to the regions that form the concept of apple. A type of
apple is formed by subregions of apple.
2. Structure Spaces
We are interested in using conceptual spaces to represent holistic and structural
information about concepts and objects. The holistic portion of an entity can be
seen as its usual features: colour, shape, weight, etc. These can be readily repre-
sented as regions in quality domains. However, representing structural informa-
tion is far from trivial. In doing so, we are fundamentally interested in describing
the partonomic relations between parts and wholes. The Theory of Conceptual
Spaces does not provide a complete solution for representing relations in general;
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it simply suggests that they could be represented by a (Cartesian) product be-
tween the relata. We take this basic notion and develop it further to account for
structural information.
Structural information can be represented in conceptual spaces through what
we call structure spaces. A concept are represented as regions in a conceptual
space; a structure space is a subspace of it, where part structures are described.
A vector in a structure space denotes a particular configuration of parts of an
individual. That is, a single vector encode the information about what parts
compose a whole and also about how these parts are related to whole. Similar
configurations of parts are close together in this space. For a single vector to
convey all this information, much of it is naturally allocated to the dimensions.
Given a concept C and a set of concepts P1, . . . , Pn denoting parts of C, then we
can generally define the structure space containing C as the product space of the
quality domains of P1, . . . , Pn and n quality domains denoting specific structure
information about each part Pi. We call these domains structure domains; they
represent information such as the displacement of the part in the whole, part
quantification and so on. The actual structure space of C is the product space
of the regions that define P1, . . . , Pn, plus regions in the structure domains. For
instance, the structure space of Apple could be formed by the product of Core,
Flesh, Seed and Stein, plus regions denoting the general positioning each part in
an object-centred coordinate system. A vector in the structure space of C denotes
a particular apple-structure: a combination of individual parts, each with a specific
value for colour, shape, taste and so on. Close points in this space represent
similar apple-structures. The combination of regions of each part in the product
restricts what are the valid individual components of an apple. More importantly,
the structure space can be further divided into specific regions defining types of
apple-structures; e.g., the concept of an apple with acid flesh and short stein.
This basic formulation of our framework might raise questions, such as prob-
lem of co-determination between holistic and part qualities; the role of parts in
taxonomies (c.f. Tversky [8]), the representation of the many kinds of partonomic
relations; the question about dependent and essential parts; computational fea-
sibility and so on. To all of those we have at least partial answers, but due to
the limited space, we shall touch upon the issue we consider most critical: the
problem of transitivity.
Wholes have parts, which can also have parts and so on. This might become
an issue when we define a whole as a product of parts: given parts also can
have parts, complex wholes could soon become multidimensional monsters; the
structure space of the concept Universe would be impossible to describe fully.
In more formal terms, we could say that the structure space of a whole might
become the transitive closure of its parts. In order to solve this problem, we first
assume that the part relation is not essentially transitive. This position contrast
with formal theories of parts, such as Classical Mereology, but it has becoming
increasingly common in recent years (c.f. [6]). Instead, we take a more cognitive
stance; experience and perception are the sole determinants of which parts directly
compose a whole. For instance, what determines that the person’s heart is not
part of the company where she works in is the fact that there is no use for
such conceptualization in the actual context. However, if there is a change in
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context (e.g. parts of employee body becoming property of the company), we
can easily adapt our conceptualization. We do not assume any hard a priori
ontological distinction on parts and wholes, for it might hinder the plasticity of
the representation. Instead, we provide a way in such plasticity could operate in
our framework, by improving the definition of structure spaces. We introduce the
notion of dimensional filter. A dimensional filter is a conceptual operator that
projects a subset of the quality domains of a concept onto a smaller subset; it
“selects” relevant domains of another concept. We can then redefine a concept
as a product space of filtered parts, were just the relevant domains are selected
to compose the structure space of the whole. The filtering (i.e. projection) is
controlled by processes like attention and context. For instance, a combustion
engine can be part of a car or part of an electricity generator. The quality domains
of the engine that are relevant for car are related to its characteristics as a car
mover. So, the projection of combustion engine into the structure spaces of car
carries only some of its more relevant domains. This scheme solves the dimensional
explosion by providing a way in such the transitive closure can be avoided; parts
of parts that are not relevant for the whole can be filtered out.
3. Final Remarks
We are now developing a mathematical formulation of structure spaces based on
metric spaces. This should pave the way for computational applications. We are
also investigating the use of structure spaces in robotics and geology. Some auto-
localization algorithms for robots employ similarity reasoning to compare its sur-
roundings with its internal map. This comparison could benefit from a represen-
tation that allows structural similarity matching. In petroleum geology, an anal-
ogous problem of structural similarity exists in the task of matching geological
structures in di↵erent exploration wells, to which no satisfactory computational
solution yet exists. In the same way, structure spaces could help solve this problem
by providing a principled way in which sequences of features can be compared.
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Abstract 
 
Abstract. When we describe the shape of certain entities, like a vase or a river, we refer to their qualities in 
different ways. A river has usually a definite length, but its width varies with the distance from the source, 
typically getting higher towards the end. Similarly, a vase has a definite height, but its width may vary, 
reflecting a certain pattern that often marks a particular style. So, at least for certain entities, quality kinds 
such as length, height and width don’t behave in the same way: length or height just inhere to these objects 
with no need of further qualification, while width requires a spatial localization in order to be determined. 
In this paper I would like to explore the way qualities of things behave with respect to the parts of such 
things. Building on the notion of individual quality introduced in the DOLCE ontology, I will introduce the 
new notions of local quality, quality field and quality pattern, stressing their cognitive role in many practical 
situations.  I will argue that an expression like “the river’s width” or “the depth of the sea” actually refers to a 
quality field, and not to an individual quality. Quality fields will be used to introduce the further notion of  
quality pattern, and to analyze the distinction between variation and change. 
 
Keywords.  Ontology, quality, local quality, global quality, property, field, pattern 
 
1. Introduction 
 
When we describe the shape of certain entities, like a vase or a river, we refer to their 
qualities in different ways. A river has (more or less) a definite length, but its width 
varies with the distance from the source, typically getting higher towards the end. 
Similarly, a vase has a definite height, but its width may vary, reflecting a certain 
pattern that often marks a particular style. So, at least for certain entities, quality kinds 
such as length, height and width don’t behave in the same way: length or height just 
inhere to these objects with no need of further qualification, while width requires a 
spatial localization in order to be determined.  
We shall say that length and height, in these examples, behave as global qualities, 
while width behaves as a local quality. A local quality of a certain object is a quality 
which actually inheres to a part of that object, but, despite this fact, is somehow 
considered, from the cognitive point of view, as a quality of the whole object: so, we 
rarely say “the width of this river stretch is 100 meters”, but we prefer to say “the 
river’s width is 100 meters here”. Analogously, we say “the depth of the Adriatic Sea 
is much higher along the Croatian coast than along the Italian coast”, referring to “the 
river’s width” or “the sea’s depth” as one single entity, although, so to speak, spread 
out in space. Indeed, in many simple cases, we describe the qualitative shape of a 
certain object in terms of the behavior of a local spatial quality along a certain 
dimension.  
Of course, the distinction between global and local qualities is very general, and 
goes much beyond purely spatial qualities: consider for instance the mass or volume of 
a physical object vs. its density or its temperature, or the duration of a rain vs. its 
intensity. In all these cases, we observe different ways qualities of things behave with 
respect to the parts of such things. The main purpose of this paper is to explore this 
phenomenon, which I will call mereological behavior of qualities (or, more in general,  
of properties, as we shall see), providing a formal account of local qualities and 
analyzing its practical implications. 
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2. Inclusive and exclusive properties 
 
Looking at the philosophical literature, the phenomenon we have described appears to 
be connected to a more general one, concerning the mereological behavior of 
properties. A classic distinction in this respect is that between homoeomerous and 
anomoeomerous properties, based on whether or not a property holding for a whole 
also holds for all its parts, and discussed in particular by Armstrong [1]. Ingvar 
Johansson [2] builds on this work in the light of the Johnson’s distinction between 
determinates and determinables [3], focusing his attention to the case of determinate 
properties belonging to the same determinable, and to the ontological nature of patterns 
like for instance a distribution of colored areas on a surface [4]. This is, at least in my 
knowledge, one of the few works addressing in some detail the mereological behavior 
of what I call qualities1 (i.e. colors, lengths, temperatures), and not just that of generic 
properties, so I think it is a good starting point in our analysis2. Johansson proposes the 
following distinction among determinates: 
 
(1) A determinate property is inclusive if and only if each possible part of its 
instances instantiates some other property under the same determinable.  
(2) A determinate property is exclusive if and only if each possible part of its 
instances instantiates this very same property (under the same determinable). 
 
As an example of inclusive property, Johansson brings a volume-determinate: if an 
object has a volume of 100 cm3, then all its (proper) parts must have a different 
volume. So every instance of an inclusive determinate necessarily includes other 
(different) determinates for its parts3. On the contrary, he notes that a color-determinate 
is exclusive: if an object is (homogeneously) red, different determinates (under the 
same determinable) are excluded.   
In my view, the homogeneity proviso in the latter example is illuminating, since it 
gives evidence of a peculiarity of some determinables (like color, density, or 
temperature): they are prone to have their determinates arbitrarily distributed in the 
region they are defined. They have therefore a local behavior. This makes it difficult to 
understand the meaning of simple statements like this car is red, or the room’s 
temperature is 20 °C, so that, in many cases, the ascription of such determinates to an 
extended object is the result of an implicit convention (the car color is the body’s color) 
or an average operation, and very rarely results from an homogeneous distribution.  
To account for possible non-homogeneous distributions of determinates under the 
same determinable, Johansson introduces a variant to (2): 
 
(3) A determinate property is semi-exclusive if and only if some possible part of its 
instances instantiates this very same property (under the same determinable). 
 
So, if we admit that the red determinate is semi-exclusive, then an object can be 
globally red (as a result of some convention) if it just has one red part while being 
locally yellow somewhere else, or it may be also the case that it has multiple local 
colors with no definite global color. We can conjecture therefore that semi-exclusivity 
is a formal property which is associated with local behavior. 
                                                
1 Note however that Johansson’s notion of quality is different from mine, as will be clear in the following, 
since he adopts a realist ontology according to which qualities are conceived as universals, and include both 
substances and properties. 
2 To complete the picture, we should also consider the distinction between extensive and intensive properties, 
which has many variants in the literature. I will discuss it in the next section, since I believe that Johansson’s 
work helps to understand it. 
3 For the sake of simplicity, I will assume there are no atoms in the domain, so every object has some proper 
parts. 
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Consider now the width of a river. Like for the color case, we can have a river 
stretch whose width is homogeneous, or another whose width is not definite, since it 
varies along the river flow. So width-determinates are semi-exclusive. However, 
differently from colors, we can’t say that widths can distribute freely for all the parts of 
the river stretch, since the longitudinal parts are constrained to have a width lower than 
that of the river stretch. Indeed, besides being semi-exclusive, according to Johansson 
widths are also semi-inclusive: 
 
(4) A determinate property is semi-inclusive if and only if some possible part of its 
instances instantiates some other property under the same determinable. 
 
This means that, in practice, there is a direction (across the river flow) according to 
which each part contributes to the width of the whole, but there is another direction 
(along the flow) according to which there is no such contribution. As we shall see, this 
observation will be useful to define the notion of local quality. For the time being, 
however, we must say that semi-exclusivity, alone, is not enough to fully capture the 
intuition behind the notion of local behavior, mainly because, according to the 
definitions above, semi-inclusivity and semi-exclusivity are not disjoint. 
  
3. Extensive and intensive properties 
In physics and chemistry, an extensive property (like having a certain volume) is such 
that, if it holds for a whole, every single part necessarily contributes to this fact, while 
an intensive property (like having a certain temperature or color) is not necessarily 
affected by the parts of its instances. In his book, Johansson uses the terms ‘extensive’ 
and ‘intensive’ in a different sense, based on Kant’s distinction between extensive and 
intensive magnitudes. He observers that for Kant ‘extensive’ is synonymous of 
‘inclusive’, but ‘intensive’ means just quantifiable, so that it is not opposite to 
‘extensive’4. I don’t think this understanding of ‘intensive’ is useful for our purposes, 
so I will stick to the previous (still informal) definition. 
I will rather suggest the following definition: 
 
(5) A determinate property is extensive if and only if it is necessarily semi-
inclusive. A property is intensive otherwise. 
 
Under this definition, an intensive property is just a property which does not 
impose any inclusivity constraints on its mereological behavior. All exclusive 
properties turn out to be intensive, as well as all semi-exclusive properties which are 
not also semi-inclusive5. An important aspect of this definition is its modal nature. A 
property is extensive or intensive depending on whether or not, because of its very 
nature, it forces the proper parts of its instances to be different. To me, this definition 
of intensivity finally captures our intuitions concerning the local behavior of a 
determinable: only intensive determinables (i.e., all of whose determinates are 
intensive) can admit arbitrary distributions within the parts of a given object. 
As a final note, someone may observe that (5) is neutral with respect to an aspect 
usually considered as characteristic of extensive properties, namely additivity. 
Additivity however only concerns quantifiable properties, and I agree with Johanssson 
that the basic distinction we are aiming at should be more general. In particular, 
                                                
4 In other words, on one hand ‘intensive’ is understood as opposite to ‘extensive’, while on the other hand it 
is understood as ‘capable of having an intension’. 
5 In addition, a property like mean temperature of 20° C, which is neither semi-exclusive nor semi-inclusive 
(since it can hold both when all the proper parts of its instances have the same temperature and when no 
proper part has the same temperature), turns out to be intensive.  
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Johansson makes a very interesting example of a semi-inclusive determinable, namely 
shape, which is not additive but still would count as extensive under our definition. 
 
4. Local qualities 
 
Let us now shift from determinates and determinables to individual qualities and 
quality kinds. Independently from any deep metaphysical commitments, I think that 
this move is pragmatically useful not only to provide an analysis consistent with the 
DOLCE ontology [5], [6], but also to better clarify our intuitions concerning local 
qualities. In DOLCE we distinguish between individual qualities, which inhere to 
specific individuals, and qualia, which are abstract entities representing what exactly 
resembling individual qualities have in common. Qualia resulting from comparable 
individual qualities are organized in quality spaces. We refer to individual qualities 
with expressions such as the color of my car, while we refer to qualia with simple 
terms like red. So the color of my car is different from the color of your car, even if 
they have exactly the same shade of red, i.e., they have the same quale6. If I paint my 
car in blue, the term the color of my car still denotes the same quality, but its quale is 
now different. So, in general, the relationship between qualities and qualia is 
temporalized. 
From now on, I shall simply use the term quality to refer to an individual quality. In 
DOLCE, qualities are organized in quality kinds, i.e. maximal classes of comparable 
qualities. Color and volume are examples of quality kinds. Their instances are 
individual colors or individual volumes. The objects to which such qualities inhere are 
instances, respectively, of the has-color and has-volume determinables. So there is a 
correspondence between determinables and quality kinds, but quality kinds are not 
determinables. Similarly, there is a correspondence between determinates and qualia, in 
the sense that the objects whose qualities have the same quale inhere are instances of 
the same determinate. 
In terms of individual qualities and quality kinds, (1) can be reformulated as 
follows7: 
 
(6) A quality q of kind Q with quale ql inhering to an object x is inclusive iff every 
proper part y of x has a quality q’ of kind Q with quale ql’ different from ql.  
 
The definitions (2)-(4) above can be reformulated analogously, and will be omitted 
here for the sake of brevity. (5) however makes little sense at the level of individual 
qualities, and much more sense at the level of quality kinds, or, more in general, to 
classes of qualities belonging to the same kind: 
 
(7) A quality kind (or a class o qualities belonging to the same kind) is extensive iff, 
necessarily, all its instances (i.e., its individual qualities) are semi-inclusive. It is 
intensive otherwise. 
 
Let us now go back to our initial question: what is a local quality? A first conjecture 
we can make is that a local quality is an instance of an intensive quality kind. So, 
looking back at our original example, the color of each part of the vase, being an 
instance of an intensive quality kind (color), appears to be a local quality. 
                                                
6 I must say I have no clear understanding about the best way to name the relationship existing between 
individual qualities and their qualia. In this paper I will simply use “has”. Probably a more informative name 
would be “manifests as”. 
7 For the sake of conciseness, I will abstract from time in these definitions, since time is not relevant to 
understand their rationale. Extending them to the temporal version is however a simple matter, taking into 
account that in DOLCE the part-of and the has-quale relation are temporalized when they concern endurants. 
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However, things are not so simple, since we want also to account for the local 
behavior of a river’s width, and width is not an intensive quality kind, since it is semi-
inclusive. Moreover, a fundamental question arises: local to what? Given a particular 
object, how can we tell what are its local qualities? For instance, think of our river 
example. Arguably, the river has many local widths, each inhering to a particular river 
stretch. But also each possible longitudinal part of the river has a width. Is that width a 
local quality of the river, or just of a strange part of it? From the cognitive point of 
view, I say it is not a local width of the river. Think of another example, perhaps more 
vivid: a vase with a handle. The vase has many local widths (at the top, at the bottom, 
in the middle…), as well as the handle has many local widths, but none of the local 
widths of the handle is a local width of the vase, despite the fact that the handle is a 
part of the vase.  
To address this issue, let us first clarify that each local quality of an object inheres to 
some proper part of the object, but not to the object itself. So, when we say that a vase 
has many local widths, this is because of an indirect inherence relation, similar to the 
one holding in DOLCE between an event and the spatial location of its participants. 
The point now is that this indirect relation existing between the quality of a part and the 
whole doesn’t hold for all parts: as we have seen, not every width of a part of the vase 
is a local width of the vase. I think there is a simple cognitive mechanism that explains 
this situation. When we consider a (non-inclusive) quality kind such as width as applied 
to a river, we implicitly introduce a set of canonical parts (namely those cut across the 
river flow, corresponding to river stretches) whose width counts as a local width of the 
river. Because of the way canonical parts are constructed, the class of all local widths 
of a river turns out to be intensive, despite the quality kind ‘width’ is not.  
Similarly, when we apply ‘width’ to a vase, we consider as canonical parts those 
concerning the internal cavity, excluding the handle. Finally, when we apply ‘color’ to 
a car, we only consider the external parts of the body as canonical parts, while when we 
apply it to the vase we may consider as canonical all the (external) parts of the vase, 
including those of the handle. 
In sum, we can conclude that local qualities are instances of quality classes, 
constructed ad hoc with the cognitive mechanism described above as a specialization of 
non-inclusive quality kinds. In general, such classes are not rigid, using OntoClean’s 
terminology: the color of a part of the vase will keep its identity when the part is 
removed, although it will not be a local color of the vase any more. Local qualities 
don’t form a new ontological category. Locality, for qualities, is just a special way to 
describe a whole (especially its shape) with reference to the qualities of its parts.  
 
5. Quality fields and quality patterns 
 
Consider now all local qualities of a certain kind that a certain object has, at a given 
time. For instance, think of all the local depths of the Adriatic Sea. I say that the 
mereological sum of these local qualities is a quality field. While a single local depth 
does not inhere to the whole Adriatic Sea, the whole depth field does, it inheres to it. 
Quality fields form therefore a new ontological category in the vast class of dependent 
entities. We are able to define them thanks to the introduction of the notion of local 
quality.  
Once we introduce quality fields, we can give an exact denotation to expressions 
like “the river’s width” or “the depth of the sea” which don’t usually refer to an 
individual quality, unless we conventionally pick up a specific individual quality (say 
the maximal depth). I will say that these expressions denote a quality field. Indeed, on 
the basis of our previous analysis, we can safely assume that an expression of the form  
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“the Q of X” denotes a quality field if Q is not an extensive quality kind, unless a 
special convention is introduced for certain kinds of X. 
Let us bring time into account, using the notion of quality field to analyse the 
distinction between variation and change. Synchronically, at a specific time, we can 
observe variations in the Adriatic Sea’s depth field when shifting our focus of attention 
from one part (e.g., the depth of the Italian side) to an other (e.g., the depth of the 
Croatian side). The whole quality field can also genuinely change in time, keeping its 
identity, when some of its individual qualities change their qualia. This is what 
happened in the last 2000 years, since the depth of the Italian coast is much lower than 
it used to be in the Roman age. 
Consider now the Adriatic Sea’s depth field at the Roman age. It exhibits an 
individual spatial pattern, which is different from the pattern we can observe today. 
Such pattern reflects the specific qualia distribution of the individual qualities forming 
the depth field at that time. I define a individual pattern as an emerging entity 
constituted by (a part of) a quality field. It differs from a quality field since the actual 
qualia distribution is an essential property of the pattern, and is not essential to the 
quality field (whose qualia distribution can change in time). So individual patterns are 
frozen, they don’t change, although they can exhibit variations. Note that I am insisting 
using the term individual pattern to make it clear they are not abstract entities: two 
things may have exactly resembling, although distinct, individual patterns. In this case, 
I say that they will have the same shape, but this is another story.  
Let us finally shift the attention to perdurants. They can have both global and local 
qualities, inhering to each temporal part. The duration of a rain is a global quality, 
while its intensity is a quality field. When we say “the rain intensity is high now” we 
are referring to the whole intensity field, whose value happens to be low in the present 
time interval, exactly like the width of the river happens to be high in a certain place.  
So, the introduction of local qualities and fields can help understanding apparent 
“changes” in events and processes, like those described in [7], without the need of 
introducing a new entity which is the subject of such change: a speed variation during a 
run or an increase in the river flow will be simply considered as a variation of a local 
quality (the run speed or the water flow) along the temporal dimension. This move may 
also eliminate (at least for these examples) the need to introduce so-called relators [8] 
in addition to events exemplifying a binary relation like marriage: a change in the 
peacefulness of the marriage will be simply described as a variation of a local quality 
of the marriage itself, with no need to introduce a separate relating entity.  
In conclusion, the introduction of local qualities, fields and patterns seems to be a 
simple and powerful extension to the Dolce’s notion of quality, which allows us to 
formally account for the way we deal with spatial and temporal quality distributions. 
This is still not enough to fully account for the different shapes such distributions may 
exhibit, but I believe it contributes to understand what shapes are. 
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Abstract. Organic chemists make extensive use of a diagrammatic language for
designing, exchanging and analysing the features of chemicals. In this language,
chemicals are represented on a flat (2D) plane following standard stylistic conven-
tions. In the search for novel drugs and therapeutic agents, vast quantities of chem-
ical data are generated and subjected to virtual screening procedures that harness
algorithmic features and complex statistical models. However, in silico approaches
do not yet compare to the abilities of experienced chemists in detecting more subtle
features relevant for evaluating how likely a molecule is to be suitable to a given
purpose. Our hypothesis is that one reason for this discrepancy is that human per-
ceptual capabilities, particularly that of ‘gestalt’ shape perception, make additional
information available to our reasoning processes that are not available to in silico
processes. This contribution investigates this hypothesis.
Algorithmic and logic-based approaches to representation and automated rea-
soning with chemical structures are able to efficiently compute certain features,
such as detecting presence of specific functional groups. To investigate the specific
differences between human and machine capabilities, we focus here on those tasks
and chemicals for which humans reliably outperform computers: the detection of
the overall shape and parts with specific diagrammatic features, in molecules that
are large and composed of relatively homogeneous part types with many cycles. We
conduct a study in which we vary the diagrammatic representation from the canon-
ical diagrammatic standard of the chemicals, and evaluate speed of human determi-
nation of chemical class. We find that human performance varies with the quality
of the pictorial representation, rather than the size of the molecule. This can be con-
trasted with the fact that machine performance varies with the size of the molecule,
and is of course impervious to the quality of diagrammatic representation.
This result has implications for the design of hybrid algorithms that take features
of the overall diagrammatic aspects of the molecule as input into the feature de-
tection and automated reasoning over chemical structure. It also has the potential
to inform the design of interactive systems at the interface between human experts
and machines.
Keywords. ontology, shape perception, cognition, spatial reasoning, logical
reasoning, molecular graph
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Introduction
“A mind that has the ability to choose how it will represent a particular problem it needs to
solve, choosing from a repertoire of representational capacities that include more analogical
and more symbolic notations is more flexible, hence more ‘intelligent’ ” [32]
Organic chemists make extensive use of chemical diagrams for designing, exchang-
ing and analysing the features of chemicals. In this language, chemicals are represented
on a flat (2D) plane following standard stylistic conventions [12]. The use of diagram-
matic languages to concisely convey information for humans to process is an essential
component of many sciences. In biology, pathway diagrams convey information about
biological processes [14]. A good visualization of scientific information facilitates rapid
understanding and can thereby lead to novel insights not otherwise possible [19]. One
such example is Category Theory in mathematics, in which the use of diagrams is essen-
tial for representing mathematical properties and proofs [30].
In the search for novel drugs and therapeutic agents, large quantities of chemical data
are generated. Interacting with these data and sifting a relevant subset (for a given prob-
lem) from the sizeable background is an ongoing challenge. Tools such as the molecule
cloud can give an overview of a chemical dataset by showing common scaffolds sized
for how often they appear in the dataset [9]. Many features of chemical entities have
relevance on whether a given molecule is suited to a given purpose. Algorithmic and
logic-based approaches are able to efficiently compute certain of these features, such as
the presence of specific atoms or functional groups, overall mass and charge [18]2. Al-
gorithmic approaches can also gauge the overall shape of a molecule (at least in terms
of delineating the outline of the three-dimensional space it fills) and calculate the math-
ematical similarity of that shape to that of other molecules or the reciprocity to poten-
tial binding sites [40,2,20]. Yet, many problems in chemical informatics remain diffi-
cult to efficiently automate over large molecular collections (e.g. finding maximal shared
components between a set of molecular graphs [31], detecting all the cycles in a given
molecule [3]).
In what follows, we focus on a class of problems that are known to be challenging
for algorithmic solutions (in terms of efficiency), and yet are apparently straightforward
for human chemists: detecting the overall shape and class of a presented molecule, in
molecules that are large and composed of relatively homogeneous parts interconnected
in cycles (such as the class of fullerene molecules [23]). As discussed in [18], determi-
nation of overall shape and chemical class for these classes of molecules is particularly
challenging since the dense interconnection of the atoms in multiple fused cycles and
the homogeneity of the atom environments. We hypothesise that a contributing factor in
this performance discrepancy is that the use of a visual language in chemistry enables
humans to directly harness the ‘gestalt’ or shape-detecting features of their visual per-
ceptual machinery, seeing the whole molecule at once through the diagrammatic depic-
tion, and therefore not needing to do the same sorts of computations that our algorithms
need to do. If this line of thinking is correct, we should observe that the ability of hu-
mans to perform these tasks is affected by perturbances in the diagrammatic depiction
more than in the size of the molecule. We conducted a study in which we time experi-
2As discussed in [18], we ignore statistical ‘black box’ approaches since they do not allow for explanations
of their deductions and are not provably correct.
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enced chemists performing a classification task on molecular diagrams with varied (a)
diagrammatic faithfulness, and (b) size of the chemicals. We then evaluated the speed
and accuracy of the chemists’ performance given these variances.
The remainder of this document is organised as follows. In the next section, we give
our experimental design in the context of some background information about chemical
diagrams and the class of chemical problems that we will use as a case study. Thereafter,
we present our results and discussion. With only three participants and only 30 diagrams
included in our experiment, our results can be considered a pilot study rather than a
conclusive investigation. However, we consider these preliminary findings suggestive of
future research directions, and we go on to further speculate about the implications for
the use of artificial intelligence in chemistry applications.
1. Methods
1.1. The diagrammatic language of chemistry
Molecular entities are commonly represented visually as connected graphs, in which
the vertices represent atoms (or groups) and the edges chemical bonds [39]. Chemin-
formatics software use the underlying graph as chemical data structure that serves as
input to algorithmic calculations of features of the chemicals. Logic-based approaches
also use a graph-based underlying representation as input to automated reasoning pro-
cesses [26]. For human consumption, however, the underlying graph is projected onto a
two-dimensional plane for visual interpretation. This diagrammatic depiction is a core
offering of almost all chemical databases, and professional chemists develop an aptitude
at discerning molecular features via such representations. Some examples of chemical
diagrams are illustrated in Figure 1.
Figure 1. Some examples of chemical diagrams.
Chemical diagrams serve an invaluable purpose for chemists: they enable rapid eval-
uation of the overall chemistry of a given molecule, detection of errors or problems in
the chemical structure being represented (e.g. infeasibility or chemical instability), and
assessment of the properties or classifications that are relevant for the given molecule.
Chemical diagrams, like maps, represent spatial information. We have earlier re-
ferred to such spatial representations such as street maps, chemical diagrams, and en-
gineering design models as structural diagrams [12], and they were called analogical
representations in [36]. Here, we will focus not on the structural associations that we
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highlighted before, but on the features of the overall shape and layout of chemicals that
are available in chemical diagrams.
Molecular flexibility is also very important for molecular shape [13], as one 2D de-
piction can, through flexibility, yield many different 3D conformers that have vastly dif-
ferent properties in vitro. Such flexibility is not explicitly represented in 2D illustrations
of molecules, but can be inferred from such representations given appropriate chemical
knowledge.
1.2. Chemical shape perception task
For our experiment, we have deliberately chosen classes of molecule that are known to
be challenging to represent with logic-based automated reasoning approaches. Earlier,
we have conducted an evaluation of the capabilities of algorithmic and logic-based ap-
proaches to reasoning tasks with molecular structures in [18]. The classes we selected
for use in this task are:
1. Macrocyclic molecules, including calixarenes;
2. Polycyclic cages, including several differently sized fullerenes;
3. Shape-characterised molecules such as the catenanes and molecular knots;
4. Molecules that were not members of the above three classes as ‘controls’.
Macrocyclic molecules are molecules that form a large cyclic structure composed of
linkages of smaller functional groups. Polycyclic cages are molecules that are composed
entirely of cycles that are fused together in such a way as to form an overall cage-like
structure, which is a feature that has interesting applications in medicinal chemistry and
in materials science as the structure can serve to protect or capture a smaller molecule
on the inside, or be engineered to lengthy tubes that are very strong. Examples are the
fullerenes, cucurbiturils (named for their similarity to pumpkins), nanotubes, and small
regular compounds such as cubane. Such nanomaterials have recently shown promise in
the challenge of capturing highly volatile nerve agents and thereby preventing damage
in vivo [22]. Molecules with specific shapes are of interest in the development of molec-
ular machines, including the presence of stationary and movable parts, and the ability to
respond with controlled movements to the external environment. Molecules that are me-
chanically interlocked—such as bistable rotaxanes and catenanes are some of the most
intriguing systems in this area because of their capacity to respond to stimuli with con-
trolled mechanical movements of one part of the molecule (e.g. one interlocked ring
component) with respect to the other stationary part [10]. Similarly, molecules which
display unusual energetic properties by virtue of their overall shape, such as molecular
Mo¨bius strips and trefoil knots, are an active research area for many novel applications,
and in many cases mimic the extraordinary properties of biomolecular machinery such
as active sites within protein complexes [34,42].
We selected five individual molecule types for the first two classes (macrocyclic
molecules and cages). For the shape-characterised molecules, we were not able to find
as many representatives in public chemical databases (our main source was the ChEBI
database [15]), therefore we selected only four examples. Eight molecules that were not
members of any of the three target classes but which were highly similar to one of the
selected molecules (based on cheminformatics similarity scoring using Tanimoto over
the molecular fingerprint, as implemented in OrChem [33]). Molecules were selected
ranging from small to large, as measured in terms of counts of non-hydrogen atoms.
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A randomly selected subset of eight of those 22 molecules was then subjected to
diagrammatic distortion. Different distortion mechanisms were used. Firstly, the original
molecule was computationally assigned a 3D conformation, which was then projected
back onto a 2D diagram (a common outcome of computational processing of chemicals
originally drawn by human chemists). Secondly, computational procedures for ‘clean’
2D diagram generation were used. Finally, some of the diagrams were subjected to image
processing to obscure the standard chemical representation either through blurring or
shape-based transformation. The total number of diagrams was thus 30. The full set of
molecules is shown in Figure 2.
Figure 2. The molecule diagrams used in the experiment, including those showing distortions.
These diagrams were then displayed to the three experienced chemist participants in
a random sequence3. For each diagram, the chemist was asked to determine the chemi-
cal class of the molecule, presented with the three classes, a fourth option ‘none of the
above,’ and a final option ‘unable to tell from this diagram.’ Participants were timed as
they completed the task, and their accuracy and agreement were calculated. Figure 3
shows a screenshot of the interface we developed in order to complete the perceptual
task.
3There were three participants, each of whom had an academic background in chemistry and interacted with
chemical data on a daily basis. The participants were explained the purpose of the experiment and each gave
their informed consent. All data were stored anonymously and securely.
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Figure 3. The chemical perception task interface, showing the chemical diagram and class selection options.
2. Results
2.1. The effect of image distortion on performance
Image distortion had a significant effect on the accuracy of the chemical raters in choos-
ing the correct classification for the classes. Figure 4 (a)4 shows a boxplot of the classi-
fication task accuracy for the standard images as compared to the distorted images. The
time taken (Figure 4 (b)) shows less of an effect than the accuracy, with the means not
significantly different but the variance much larger in the case of the distorted images.
Ordinarily, chemists would look for additional information in case they encounter
a partially obscured image and needed to determine the chemical class. Therefore, we
do not restrict here our measure of accuracy to the percentage of correct classifications.
Agreement between chemists in a classification task is an alternative measure of accu-
racy, which is especially useful in case the correct classification is not known in advance,
but can supplement the known accuracy score used above with a clue as to the difficulty
of the task. It might, for example, have been the case that the chemists had all agreed on
incorrect classifications for the distorted images, leading to low accuracy but high agree-
ment. However, agreement also differed strongly between the non-distorted and the dis-
torted set of images, with the distorted images having a much lower agreement as mea-
sured by Cohen’s Kappa statistic for multiple raters [6]. For the non-distorted pictures,
the kappa was 0.88. For the distorted pictures, the kappa was 0.46%.
2.1.1. The effect of size on performance
The scatter plot in Figure 5 (a) shows that size did not have a large impact on the time
taken to perform the task. The red correlation line shows a weak positive correlation
4For space considerations, we do not present the full raw data result table here. However, this is available on
request.
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Figure 4. The display shows boxplots of (a) accuracy and (b) time taken (in ms), comparing the results for
good vs. obscured visual layouts of the chemicals
Figure 5. Scatter plot of average (a) time to complete task (ms), and (b) accuracy, against size of the molecule.
between size and time taken to complete the task. However, this correlation is largely
influenced by one data point, which itself depends on just one data point. The blue line
shows the much weaker correlation that results from excluding the single outlier from
the analysis.
Figure 5 (b) shows that accuracy was slightly anti-correlated with the size of the
molecule, but this effect is not significant, with the p-value of the correlation only 0.24,
and the 95% confidence interval for the correlation coefficient was from -0.54 to 0.15.
These results can be compared to algorithmic approaches and logic-based ap-
proaches for the relevant sort of feature detection that would be required to automati-
cally compute the same task, i.e. automatic classification into the correct class based on
chemical structures. Unfortunately, there is not yet any available generic system that is
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able to perform the classifications tasks that were used in this experiment with which we
may have compared the performance to our human experts. Indeed, as discussed in [18]
our research has the long-term objective of enabling the development of just such a sys-
tem, however, at this preliminary stage we do not have an available benchmark but must
instead look to the performance profiles of algorithms that are known to be relevant.
2.2. Algorithmic cheminformatics approaches
The relevant algorithms that would be required to detect the classes specified include
the detection of subgraph isomorphism and finding the smallest set of rings [18,43].
These algorithms are known to scale supralinearly in the number of atoms. For example,
subgraph isomorphism in the general case is known to be NP-complete [7], although
optimisations exist for various sub-classes of molecules, such as those that are planar [8].
For the particularly shape-defined classes, shape similarity algorithms on molecular
structures exist that use ray-tracing of the projected surfaces of molecules to estimate the
overall shape of the molecule and use that as a descriptor e.g. in virtual screening [2].
These methods depend on 3D conformer though, and for flexible molecules many con-
formers may result from the same 2D diagrammatic depiction, dramatically decreasing
the performance of the algorithm.
Furthermore, a separate algorithm implementing a check on the rules of class mem-
bership would need to be hand-written for each of the three class types used in this task
(macrocyclic, cage, shape-defined). This hampers the extensibility and flexibility of a
system that needs to classify molecules in the general case [18,25]. On the other hand,
logic-based systems address these objectives of being generic, extensible and flexible.
2.3. Logic-based approaches
The popular Web Ontology Language, OWL [11], is highly efficient in representing tree-
like structures, but is unable to correctly represent cyclic structures [16]. A first-order
logic programming based formalism has been proposed specifically for the case of rep-
resenting chemical structures [26,25]. These description graph logic programs (DGLP)
are able to represent objects whose parts are interconnected in arbitrary ways, includ-
ing cyclic structures. The decidability of logic programs do not rely on the tree-model
property that underlies the description logics behind OWL. However, representation of
classes with more advanced overall topological features such as polycyclic cages is be-
yond the expressivity of DGLP as it requires quantification over all atoms in a molecule
rather than specific atoms, parts or properties within the molecule.
Perhaps motivated by similar concerns on the limits of the logic-based approaches
underlying languages such as OWL, Maojo et al. propose a ‘morphospatial’ approach to
ontology with application in the nanomaterials domain [27]. Shape features are explicitly
encoded in their ontology alongside other features such as composition. However, this
approach merely pushes the problem onto those computational methods that are needed
to derive the shape features automatically from some representation of the input chem-
ical structure and thereby assign appropriate ontological categories to nanomolecular
structures.
An approach for the representation of the overall structure or topology of highly
symmetrical polycyclic molecules is described in [17,23]. There, the authors propose us-
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ing a combination of monadic second-order logic and ordinary OWL, with a heteroge-
neous logical connection framework used to bridge between the two formalisms. This
approach has not yet been implemented in practice, but shows promise for logical rea-
soning over features involving regularity in the overall structure of molecules. However,
arbitrary entailment in monadic second-order logic is known to be computationally ex-
pensive5.
Spatial logics and spatial axiomatizations have been advanced in which it is possible
to perform computational deductive reasoning [5,41]. However, it is not immediately
straightforward to represent the problem of determining from an arbitrary chemical graph
whether it is a member of the class of fullerenes (for example) as a spatial reasoning
problem. We will develop this research question further in future work.
3. Discussion and Conclusions
While this study is small and exploratory in nature only, our results provide tentative
support for a role for perception in human performance in the presented classification
decision task, in that observed performance appeared to decrease with the quality of the
diagrammatic representation rather than the size of the molecule. On the other hand, it is
known that the best algorithmic and logical approaches to solving these particular tasks
scale dramatically in the size of the molecule, rendering their habitual application to large
numbers of molecules in a database problematic.
Larkin and Simon [24] attribute observed efficiencies of diagrammatic reasoning
relative to non-diagrammatic reasoning to efficiencies in searching and inference in the
reprentation space compared to that of a non-diagrammatic representation space, e.g. ax-
ioms. This may indeed be the root explanation, but it doesn’t give guidance on how best
to expose the representational efficiency that humans have (the ability to perceive the
overall shape and connectivity in molecular diagrams) to computational processes. Tra-
ditional logical reasoning relies on linguistic or symbolic representation of the properties
of objects together with the rules for deriving inferences on those properties. By contrast,
diagrammatic representation can explicitly encode the relevant properties of objects and
their background constraints such that the needed inferences can be directly drawn from
the spatial constraints evident in the illustration [32], known as the “free ride” property.
Systems have been developed that enable the representation of logical axioms dia-
grammatically and the formalisation of accompanying reasoning systems to the extent
that diagrammatic and traditional syllogistic reasoning can be combined in order to serve
as an aid for human capability [29,28]. Such logical diagrammatic representations do not
correspond directly to portions of reality, as the diagrammatic representations of chem-
icals correspond to classes of chemicals, but the correspondence is still analogical, i.e.
by analogy. For example, Euler diagrams represent axioms such as All A are B as a
smaller circle A entirely enclosed in a larger circle B [35]. This is analogous to spatial
inclusion, as (for example) a smaller fullerene molecule can be fully enclosed in a larger
fullerene molecule [23], and we could make corresponding statements such as All atoms
in molecule A are INSPATIALLY molecule B.
5Automated theorem provers such as LEO-II (http://www.ags.uni-sb.de/˜leo/) are able to approximate some
aspects of entailment checking.
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Where perception is used as an aid to reasoning, care must be taken in the choice of
the visual representation. For example, when visual diagrams are used as an aid to human
logical reasoning, it has been found that Euler diagrams are more effective than Venn dia-
grams [28]. Irrelevant and distracting visual detail acts as a hindrance to reasoning rather
than as an aid [21]. In the chemistry domain, for the class of classification problems we
are interested in, this may be particularly important. Exposing the specifically visual in-
formation of a chemical diagram to computational processes would introduce additional
constraints on the representation of the chemicals that currently only obtain in case the
representation is intended for human consumption. Visual inference can sometimes be
much more expensive than normal inference in the corresonding axiomatization, espe-
cially when the visual information is incomplete or, as we have tested, perturbed [1].
Adherence to standards for clear and unambiguous diagrammatic representation such as
those put forward in [4] would go some way to address this concern in the chemistry
domain.
In chemical similarity searching and bioactivity predictive modelling, quantitative
shape-based 3D descriptors have met with mixed results stemming, on the one hand,
from their greater computational cost than their 2D counterparts, and on the other hand,
from the additional ‘noise’ that they can introduce in flexible molecules due to the vari-
ety of conformations [40]. One direction for our future research will be to evaluate the
performance of these shape-based descriptors in assigning shape classes to molecules,
such as ‘spherical’ and ‘cubic’. We are not aware of any existing work that applies this
type of descriptor to the problem of structure-based chemical classification.
Our result emphasises the need for hybrid reasoning systems in chemistry that are
able to combine features derived diagrammatically from visual representations of the
molecule with the now-standard logic-based and algorithmic reasoning over the graph-
based structure. Such hybrid systems have been advanced in other domains. For exam-
ple, the Vivid system offers some diagrammatic reasoning capability alongside logical
reasoning capability [1]. However, this system depends on algorithmic processes that
“observe” pre-defined features in the diagrams included in the system capability. In the
case of the chemical diagrams that form our case study here, some features are features
of the whole diagram for which computational “observation” algorithms do not (to the
best of our knowledge) yet exist. Research in machine vision may yield some methods
that can be harnessed in pursuit of this objective [38].
Sloman [37] speculates that the ability to integratively process different types of rep-
resentation with correspondingly different reasoning tasks might be a distinctive feature
of intelligence in general; it is certainly a feature of human intelligence.
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Shapes as property restrictions
and property-based similarity
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Abstract. In this work we look into the details of modeling shapes in an ontology
as property restrictions on classes. In this way shapes do not have to be categorized
in an exhaustive hierarchy and there is no need to take immediate decisions on how
to group the objects, it is rather possible to individualize some important character-
istics of shapes and use them as the basis for their categorization and comparison.
This approach also makes it possible to use the adequate similarity measure based
on properties which helps find similar shapes in di↵erent contexts, depending on
the relevance of the properties in the particular situation.
Keywords. ontology, OWL, shapes, properties, restrictions, similarity
Introduction
In many di↵erent areas, from virtual reality to architectural design, from biology to
medicine, from mathematics to computer science, the notion of shape plays a crucial
role. Finding patterns and forms in objects surrounding us, describing them and under-
standing their interaction is essential to human nature. Hence, varied approaches to the
categorization of shapes and forms, as well as their mutual similarity and connectedness,
are of great importance for the development of many scientific fields.
In various domains, there is a raising tendency to use ontologies as powerful for-
malisms for knowledge representation with associated reasoning mechanisms (inheri-
tance, subsumption, classification etc.). Ontologies provide explicit specifications of do-
main concepts and relationships that exist between them [1]. They guarantee exact se-
mantics for each statement and avoid semantic ambiguities. Their usage allows for ex-
tensibility and re-usability, since they are expressed with standard formats and technolo-
gies.
In the domain of shape, form and structure representation, there were some attempts
at modeling shapes ontologically, as an exhaustive hierarchy. In [9] the authors develop
a limited graphics ontology for natural language interfaces, covering the concepts like
“Shape”, “Action” and various features which describe shapes (size, color, position etc.).
In [5] two first-order ontologies for representing 2D and 3D shapes like surfaces and
boxes are introduced. They use only the notions such as part-of and connectedness, rather
than Euclidean geometric relations, such as alignment and length of segments, or the
1Corresponding Author: Silvia Likavec, Dipartimento di Informatica, Corso Svizzera 185, 10149 Torino,
Italy; E-mail: likavec@di.unito.it.
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notions of curvature or surface area. In the domain of architectural design, [8] presents
a conceptual “building shape ontology” which sorts building shapes and captures their
meaning and semantics.
In the realm of spatial design and reasoning, authors in [2] explore the role ontolog-
ical formalization plays in modeling of high-level conceptual requirement constraints.
They concentrate on ontological modeling of structural forms from di↵erent perspec-
tives. As for architectural design, information that is being used often originates from
various sources. In [6], the authors take a step towards integration of various aspects of
architectural domain (spatial constraints, relations among objects, abstract conceptual-
izations) designing modular ontologies based on the theory of "-connections. [13] de-
scribes a method for the retrieval of 3-dimensional shapes (in this case furniture models)
based on a mapping between low level features described by the shape descriptor and
ontology concepts. This furniture ontology is used in annotation and key word based
retrieval of furniture models.
As far as similarity among ontological concepts is concerned, three main approaches
can be distinguished. The first one [12] is based on information content of a class in
an IS-A taxonomy, given by the negative logarithm of the probability of occurrence of
the class in a text corpus. The second approach [11] uses the ontology graph structure,
by measuring directly the distance between nodes (usually, the number of edges or the
number of nodes that need to be traversed in order to reach one node from the other). Fi-
nally, the third approach combines the information content approach with edge counting
based approach (see for example [7]). Di↵erent notions of similarity and the relationships
among them are tackled in [3]. Starting form Leibnizian relative identity as the only local
form of similarity, they show that more sophisticated notions can be obtained by applying
transformations across heterogeneous logics. They also distinguish between ontological
and epistemic similarities. While ontological similarities stem from the structure of the
world itself, epistemic similarities are used to connect entities in di↵erent worlds.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1 provides a summary of the
treatment of properties in OWL and the definition of property restrictions on classes. In
Section 2 we discuss some issues concerning modeling of shapes as property restrictions
on classes, followed by some examples of shape definitions. Details of the approach to
calculating similarity of shapes based on properties can be found in Section 3. Section 4
concludes.
1. Properties and property restrictions in OWL
1.1. Properties in OWL
In di↵erent contexts, domain knowledge can be represented semantically using ontolo-
gies expressed in OWL2. In an ontology, domain concepts are organized hierarchically
and have their features defined as properties. Two kinds of properties can be distinguished
in OWL: (i) object properties relating individuals among themselves and (ii) data type
properties relating individuals to data type values.
Characteristics of a property are defined with a property axiom, most commonly
defining its domain and range. rdfs:domain links a property to a class description,
2http://www.w3.org/TR/owl-ref
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whereas rdfs:range links a property to either a class description or a data range. For
example:
<owl:ObjectProperty rdf:ID="has_curvature">
<rdfs:domain rdf:resource="#Shape"/>
<rdfs:range rdf:resource="#Curvature "/>
</owl:ObjectProperty>
defines the property has curvaturewhich ties the elements of Shape class to the elements
of Curvature class.
Equivalent properties are defined with owl:equivalentProperty.
In the following section we will see how properties are used in OWL to define classes
with property restrictions.
1.2. Defining classes with property restrictions
Properties are used in OWL for defining classes with property restrictions, by means of
local anonymous classes, which are collections of individuals all satisfying certain re-
strictions on certain properties. Two kinds of property restrictions exist: value constraints
and cardinality constraints. A value constraint concerns constraints on the range of the
property when applied to a particular class description. A cardinality constraint imposes
constraints on the number of values a property can take, in the context of a particular
class description.
We start with the brief description of value constraints. There are three ways of
defining value constraints:
• owl:allValuesFrom defines a class for which all the values of the given property
are either members of the specified class or data values within the specified data
range. It is possible not to have any values for the given property. For example:
<owl:Restriction>
<owl:onProperty rdf:resource="#has_angle" />
<owl:allValuesFrom rdf:resource="#RightAngle" />
</owl:Restriction>
describes an anonymous OWL class of all individuals for which the has angle
property only has values of the class RightAngle (for example square or rectan-
gle). In predicate logic, the counterpart of owl:allValuesFrom constraint is the
universal quantifier, i.e. for each instance of the class defined with the restric-
tion, every value for the property must fulfill the constraint and the constraint is
trivially satisfied for an instance that has no value for the specified property.
• owl:someValuesFrom specifies a class for which at least one of the values of the
given property is either a member of the specified class or a data value within the
specified data range (at least one must exist). There might be other values for the
given property. For example:
<owl:Restriction>
<owl:onProperty rdf:resource="#has_angle" />
<owl:someValuesFrom rdf:resource="#RightAngle" />
</owl:Restriction>
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describes an anonymous OWL class of all individuals which have at least one right
angle (for example right-angled triangle). In predicate logic, the counterpart of
owl:someValuesFrom constraint is the existential quantifier, i.e. for each instance
of the class defined with the restriction, there exists at least one value for the
property that fulfills the constraint.
• owl:hasValue defines a class for which the specified property has at least one
value semantically equal to the specified value, which can be either an individual
or a data value3. For example:
<owl:Restriction>
<owl:onProperty rdf:resource="#contains" />
<owl:hasValue rdf:resource="#Circle100" />
</owl:Restriction>
describes an anonymous OWL class which contains a specific circle.
On the other hand, cardinality constraints can be expressed by using one of the
following three constraints:
• owl:maxCardinality describes a class with at most max semantically distinct val-
ues for the specified property (max being the value of the cardinality constraint).
For example
<owl:Restriction>
<owl:onProperty rdf:resource="#has_number_of_edges" />
<owl:maxCardinality rdf:datatype="&xsd;nonNegativeInteger">5
</owl:maxCardinality>
</owl:Restriction>
describes an anonymous OWL class of individuals that have at most five edges
(for example polygons with 3 or 4 or 5 edges),.
• owl:minCardinality is defined analogously tomaxCardinality, where the class has
at least min semantically distinct values.
• owl:cardinality is defined analogously to maxCardinality, where the class has ex-
actly m semantically distinct values. It is actually a redundant concept, since it
can be defined with the combination of maxCardinality and minCardinality.
From the above we can see that we can consider each of the concepts in our ontology,
to have certain properties defined for it. These properties further describe the concepts in
the ontology and can be used to categorize them and to calculate their mutual similarity.
1.3. Instances and their properties
An instance in the ontology is defined with individual axioms called “facts” which de-
scribe its class membership, property values and individual identity. An instance is re-
lated to the class it belongs to directly with the rdfs:type relation and basically inherits
3For datatypes “semantically equal” means that the lexical representation of the literals maps to the same
value. For individuals it means that they either have the same URI reference or are defined as being the same
individual with owl:sameAs.
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the properties of the class it belongs to. Hence, in OWL the properties of the instances
are defined by associating to each property its specific value. For example, the following
describes a red circle with the radius equal to 3 and a dotted outline.
<Circle rdf:ID="Circle100">
<has_radius rdf:datatype="&xsd;positiveInteger">3</has_radius>
<has_outline rdf:resource="#Dotted"/>
<has_color rdf:resource="#Red"/>
</Circle>
2. Shapes defined as class restrictions
Categorization of the world around us is inherent to human perception and reasoning.
Many objects are internalized easier if they are reduced to simpler forms and shapes that
we are familiar with and that we can easily group with other similar objects.
We give some directions on how to model two-dimensional shapes, since they are
the easiest to comprehend and understand.4 The most common categorization of two-
dimensional shapes is according to the kind of edges the shapes contain to curved shapes
and straight line composed shapes (polygons). But another categorization could start
from convex and concave shapes. Or we might want to categorize the shapes based on
the number of edges they have. The possibilities are many.
So instead of forcing this somehow artificial categorization upon the shape world, we
would do the shapes more justice by defining them as property restrictions on classes. We
can start by defining many di↵erent properties which would help us precisely describe the
shapes we need. For example, the property has edge kind could be used to define as prop-
erty restrictions the classes CurvedShape and Polygon (shapes composed from straight
lines), whereas the property has curvature would be used to distinguish ConvexShape
class from ConcaveShape class (again defining them as restrictions). In this way, there
is no need to a-priori decide which categorization should happen higher up in the hier-
archy, they can peacefully co-exist together (and not be the only ones). Once the first
level is modeled, we can proceed to model their subclasses. At this point we can have
direct subclasses with additional properties or additional restrictions. So we can include
properties like number of edges, number of equal edges, number of parallel edges etc.
This would also help us compare the shapes having all these properties defined explicitly
for them.
In this light, let us have a look at two shape definitions, namely rhombus and rectan-
gle. A rhombus can be defined as a simple (non-self-intersecting) quadrilateral with four
equal edges, whereas a rectangle can be defined as quadrilateral with four right angles
(and they are both convex). So if we define the Quadrilateral class as a subclass of
Polygon class which has the property has number of sides restricted to 4, we can define
rhombus and rectangle as follows:
<owl:Class rdf:ID="Rectangle">
<rdfs:subClassOf rdf:resource="#Quadrilateral"/>
<rdfs:subClassOf rdf:resource="#ConvexShape"/>
4Three-dimensional and n-dimensional objects are treated similarly.
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<rdfs:subClassOf>
<owl:Restriction>
<owl:onProperty rdf:resource="#has_angle" />
<owl:allValuesFrom rdf:resource="#RightAngle" />
</owl:Restriction>
</rdfs:subClassOf>
<rdfs:subClassOf>
<owl:Restriction>
<owl:onProperty rdf:resource="#has_number_of_angles"/>
<owl:cardinality rdf:datatype="&xsd;nonNegativeInteger">4
</owl:cardinality>
</owl:Restriction>
</rdfs:subClassOf>
</owl:Class>
<owl:Class rdf:ID="Rhombus">
<rdfs:subClassOf rdf:resource="#Quadrilateral"/>
<rdfs:subClassOf rdf:resource="#Convex"/>
<rdfs:subClassOf>
<owl:Restriction>
<owl:onProperty rdf:resource="#has_number_of_equal_edges"/>
<owl:cardinality rdf:datatype="&xsd;nonNegativeInteger">4
</owl:cardinality>
</owl:Restriction>
</rdfs:subClassOf>
</owl:Class>
Obviously, these are not the only ways to define these two, or any other shape. The
process is versatile and applicable in many di↵erent contexts. Above all, it enables very
natural comparison of shapes and establishes their similarity based on properties, as we
will see in the following section.
3. Property-based similarity of shapes
If we define shapes as property restrictions (on values and cardinality), we can find sim-
ilar shapes by comparing their properties. The property-based similarity of two shapes
S 1 and S 2, can be calculated by starting from Tversky’s feature-based model of sim-
ilarity [14], where similarity between objects is a function of both their common and
distinctive features:
simT (S 1,S 2) =
↵( (S 1)\ (S 2))
 ( (S 1) \ (S 2))+ ( (S 2) \ (S 1))+↵( (S 1)\ (S 2)) . (1)
Here  (S ) is the function which describes all the relevant features of S , and ↵, ,  2 R
are parameters which permit us to treat di↵erently the various components. For ↵ = 1
maximal importance is assigned to the common features of the two shapes and for   =  
non-directional similarity measure is achieved. We will use ↵ =   =   = 1.
Hence, to be able to use Tversky’s model we need to calculate the following:
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• common features of S 1 and S 2: cf(S 1,S 2) =  (S 1)\ (S 2),
• distinctive features of S 1: df(S 1) =  (S 1) \ (S 2) and
• distinctive features of S 2: df(S 2) =  (S 2) \ (S 1).
Putting these values into the formula (1) and taking ↵ =   =   = 1 we obtain:
simT (S 1,S 2) =
cf(S 1,S 2)
df(S 1)+df(S 2)+ cf(S 1,S 2)
. (2)
In order to calculate common and distinctive features for S 1 and S 2, for each prop-
erty p, we calculate cfp, df1p and df2p, which denote how much the property p contributes
to common features of S 1 and S 2, distinctive features of S 1 and distinctive features of
S 2, respectively. In what follows we would see how di↵erent ways of defining proper-
ties in OWL influence the calculation of these values. We consider equal the properties
defined with owl:EquivalentProperty.
We start from three kinds of value restriction declarations: (i) owl:allValuesFrom;
(ii) owl:someValuesFrom; (iii) owl:hasValue. Based on how the restrictions on proper-
ties are defined for S 1 and S 2, we can distinguish the following six cases:
1. The property p is defined with owl:allValuesFrom for both S 1 and S 2. Let the
property p be defined for S 1 with
howl:allValuesFrom rdf:resource=”#A1”i
and for S 2 with
howl:allValuesFrom rdf:resource=”#A2”i.
Let a1 (resp. a2) be the number of sub-classes of A1 (resp. A2). If A1 and A2 are
equal classes or declared equivalent with owl:equivalentClass or A1 is a subclass
of A2, then cfp =
1
(a1+1)
. Otherwise df1p =
1
a1+1
and df2p =
1
a2+1
.
2. The property q is defined with owl:someValuesFrom both for S 1 and S 2. Let the
property q be defined for S 1 with
howl:someValuesFrom rdf:resource=”#B1”i
and for S 2 with
howl:someValuesFrom rdf:resource=”#B2”i.
Let b1 (resp. b2) be the number of sub-classes of B1 (resp. B2) and w be the
number of classes in the whole domain. If B1 and B2 are equal classes or
declared equivalent with owl:equivalentClass or B1 is a subclass of B2, then
cfq =
1
(b1+1)w
. Otherwise df1q =
1
(b1+1)w
and df2q =
1
(b2+1)w
.
3. Let property r be defined for S 1 with
howl:hasValue rdf:resource=”#V1”i
and for S 2 with
howl:hasValue rdf:resource=”#V2”i
If V1 and V2 are the same values or declared same with owl:sameAs, then
cfq = 1. Otherwise df1q = 1 and df
2
q = 1.
4. If the property t is defined for S 1 with
howl:hasValue rdf:resource=”#V3”i
and for S 2 with
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howl:allValuesFrom rdf:resource=”#A3”i,
and if V3 is an instance of A3 or one of its subclasses, then cft = 1. Otherwise, if
a3 is the number of sub-classes of A3, then df1t = 1 and df
2
t =
1
a3+1
.
5. If the property x is defined for S 1 with
howl:hasValue rdf:resource=”#V4”i
and for S 2 with
howl:someValuesFrom rdf:resource=”#B3”i
and if V4 is an instance of B3 or one of its subclasses, then cfx = 1. Otherwise,
if b3 is the number of sub-classes of B3 and if w is the number of classes in the
whole domain, then df1x = 1 and df
2
x =
1
(b3+1)w
.
6. If the property y is defined for S 1 with
howl:allValuesFrom rdf:resource=”#A4””i
and for S 2 with
howl:someValuesFrom rdf:resource=”#B4””i
and if a4 (resp. b4) is the number of sub-classes of A4 (resp. B4) and w is the num-
ber of classes in the whole domain, then cfy =
1
(a4+1)(b4+1)w
,df1y =
1
a4+1
and
df2y =
1
(b4+1)w
.
Next we consider three kinds of cardinality restriction declarations: (i)minCardinal-
ity; (ii) maxCardinality; (iii) cardinality. We can distinguish the following cases:
1. If the property f is defined with owl:maxCardinality for both S 1 and S 2, and it
has value m in S 1 and value n in S 2, where m  n, then cf f = 1n 1 ,df
1
f = 0 and
df2f = n m. The case when m   n is analogous.
2. If the property g is defined with owl:minCardinality for both S 1 and S 2, the values
for this restriction would not contribute to common and distinctive features, since
each of these restrictions can have infinitely many values. It only contributes to
similarity calculation if it is declared together with owl:maxCardinality restric-
tion, which is then the following case.
3. If the property h is defined with owl:cardinality for both S 1 and S 2, and it has
value m in S 1 and value n in S 2, then if m = n cf f = 1. Otherwise, if m < n then
df1f = 0 and df
2
f = n m. The case when m > n is analogous.
Of course, the subclass relation should be taken into account, hence providing each
class with the property definitions inherited from parent classes.
Finally, to calculate all common and distinctive features of S 1 and S 2 we repeat the
above process for each property defined for S 1 and S 2, obtaining:
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cf(S 1,S 2) = ⌃
np
ip=1
cfpip +⌃
nq
iq=1
cfqiq +⌃
nr
ir=1
cfrir +⌃
nt
it=1
cftit +⌃
nx
ix=1
cfxix +⌃
ny
iy=1
cfyiy
+ ⌃
n f
i f=1
cf fi f
+⌃
ng
ig=1
cfgig +⌃
nh
ih=1
cfhih
df(S 1) = ⌃
np
ip=1
df1pip +⌃
nq
iq=1
df1qiq +⌃
nr
ir=1
df1rir +⌃
nt
it=1
df1tit
+⌃nxix=1df
1
xix
+ ⌃
ny
iy=1
df1yiy +⌃
n f
i f=1
df1fi f
+⌃
ng
ig=1
df1gig +⌃
nh
ih=1
df1hih
df(S 2) = ⌃
np
ip=1
df2pip +⌃
nq
iq=1
df2qiq +⌃
nr
ir=1
df2rir +⌃
nt
it=1
df2tit
+⌃nxix=1df
2
xix
+ ⌃
ny
iy=1
df2yiy +⌃
n f
i f=1
df2fi f
+⌃
ng
ig=1
df2gig +⌃
nh
ih=1
df2hih
where np (resp. nq,nr,nt,nx,ny,n f ,ng,nh) is the number of properties defined in each
of the possible ways explained above. Finally, we calculate the similarity between two
entities S 1 and S 2 defined with restrictions using the formula (2):
sim(S 1,S 2) =
cf(S 1,S 2)
df(S 1)+df(S 2)+ cf(S 1,S 2)
.
Another feature we want to take into account is the presence of equivalent classes,
even though they are not defined as restrictions. We assume that two classes declared
equivalent with owl:equivalentClass have similarity based on properties equal to 1.
As far as individuals are concerned (instances of the classes) we simply compare
the property-value pairs for each instance. If the property p has h0 di↵erent values in S 1
and h00 di↵erent values in S 2, and we denote by k the number of times S 1 and S 2 have
the same value for p, then cfp =
k2
h0h00 ,df
1
p =
h0   k
h0 and df
2
p =
h00   k
h00 . We repeat this for
every property p1, . . . , pk used to describe the given instance. Finally, for instances of
classes we obtain:
cf(S 1,S 2) = ⌃
np1
ip1=1
cfpip1
+ . . .+⌃
npk
ipk=1
cfpipk
df1(S 1,S 2) = ⌃
np1
ip1=1
df1pip1
+ . . .+⌃
npk
ipk=1
df1pipk
df1(S 1,S 2) = ⌃
np1
ip1=1
df2pip1
+ . . .+⌃
npk
ipk=1
df2pipk
.
3.1. Relevance of properties
When defining a certain shape, not all the properties have the same importance in di↵er-
ent contexts. For example, in one context two shapes would be regarded similar if they
have similar number of angles and edges, in another one if they are of similar size or
if they are both concave or convex. In the above presented approach, it is possible to
account for relevance of properties by providing the relevance factors Rpip , ip = 1, . . . ,np,
for each property p. Relevance factors can be either given as a-priori expert values or
gathered as user preferences. In this way, some properties become more important than
the others and the formula for calculating the mutual similarity between shapes S 1 and
S 2 becomes:
simr(S 1,S 2) =
cfr(S 1,S 2)
dfr(S 1)+dfr(S 2)+ cfr(S 1,S 2)
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where cfr(S 1,S 2) = ⌃
np
ip=1
Ripcfpip + . . .+⌃
nh
ih=1
Rihcfhih and similarly for df
r(S 1) and
dfr(S 2).
4. Conclusions
When using ontologies to represent domain knowledge, not always it is convenient to
represent shapes in an exhaustive hierarchy. It might be desirable to single our certain
properties of shapes and then categorize them having these properties in mind. This is
possible if shapes are defined as property restrictions on classes, both on value and cardi-
nality. Representing shapes as property restrictions makes it possible to introduce a very
natural similarity measure based on properties. This measure changes depending on the
context in which it is being used, making it possible to give more relevance to certain
properties in di↵erent situations. Apart from modeling shapes as property restrictions
on classes, this approach would bring new insights into modeling forms and patterns as
well, as it avoids strict categorizations, providing a flexible environment for expressing
various features of complex forms.
The presented technique for calculating property-based similarity was first used
in [4], for propagation of user interests in ontology based user model. It was evaluated
in the context of PIEMONTE project [10]5 which developed a framework based on in-
telligent objects composed from a real and a virtual part coexisting at the same time,
in the context of gastronomy. Although this initial approach did not include cardinality
restrictions it showed satisfying performance w.r.t. to actual reasoning and computation
of similarity and helped improve the recommendation process. A future implementation
of this method would include the cardinality restrictions and show how it handles them,
providing feedback for any necessary adjustments.
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The Shape of Absolute Coincidences. 
Salmon's Interactive Fork Model as Shape 
of Coincidental Processes. 
Alessandra MELAS 
University of Sassari, Italy 
 
Abstract. According to a particular view, chance events are not uncaused but they 
are simply the result of intersecting causal lines. More precisely, the intersections 
between different processes that belong to independent causal chains are the 
origin of accidental events, called absolute coincidences.  
This paper provides a new account devoted to showing the strong relation 
between absolute coincidences and Salmon's interactive fork criterion, in an 
attempt to endorse the idea that coincidences can be shaped in terms of a causal 
model. 
Keywords. Absolute coincidences, causal, interactive forks, shape 
Introduction 
As for the word “chance”, the word “coincidence” is used to indicate many different 
things. The present study, however, considers only a particular type of coincidences, 
namely what is known as absolute coincidences. 
According to Jacques Monod, absolute coincidences are the result of intersections 
between different processes that belong to totally independent causal chains1: 
Mais dans d’autres situations, la notion de hasard prend une signification essentielle et non plus 
simplement opérationnelle. C’est le cas, par exemple, de ce que l’on peut appeler les “coïncidences 
absolues”, c’est-à-dire celles qui résultent de l’intersection de deux chaînes causales totalement 
indépendantes l’une de l’autre.2 
I will call that type of coincidences “causal absolute coincidences”. 
The first part of the present work provides a precise definition of causal absolute 
coincidences. The second one presents the strong relation between causal absolute 
coincidences and Salmon's common cause model. As we will see, causal absolute 
coincidences are events that can be divided into intersecting causal components, and 
                                                           
1 In Metaphysics, Aristotle already maintains the fact the existence of per accidence causes is a sign of the 
existence of per se causes. In commenting on Aristotle's Metaphysics, Saint Thomas also says that if we treat 
accidental beings as things produced by per se causes, many things may be by accident, such us the meeting 
of independent causal lines. Although very important for the philosophical historiography, I leave out from 
this discussion the Aristotelian-Thomistic notion of chance. For an extended enquiry see [1]. 
2 [2], p. 128. 
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that intersection gives origin to consequences. Equally, Salmon's interactive forks are 
characterized by two, or more, intersecting processes and two, or more, ensuing 
processes. It seems that causal absolute coincidences can be represented by an x-shape, 
as with Salmon's interactive forks. 
The core idea of this paper is that representing and reasoning with the shape of 
coincidental phenomena is essential to understand those phenomena.  
The fact that the DNA molecule has the shape of a double helix is crucial to 
understand how it functions. The same is true of coincidences: the fact that 
coincidences have a particular shape is crucial to understand how they work. 
1. Causal Absolute Coincidences: a Definition 
As we have already seen, causal absolute coincidences are not uncaused, but they are 
simply the effect of the intersection of independent causal processes. 
We can explain the independence between different processes, A and B, that belong 
to independent causal chains in the following terms:  
1) A and B are independent if they are statistically independent, so that: 
P(A/¬B) = P(A/B) = P(A)           (1) 
and  
P(B/¬A) = P(B/A) = P(B)           (2) 
2) The statistical independence between A and B is not due to a common cause in 
their past3.  
To clarify this point let us consider Monod's example as it is represented in Figure 
1. Doctor Dupont is going to visit a patient for the first time. In the meanwhile, Mr 
Dubois is fixing a roof in the same area. When doctor Dupont comes across Dubois' 
work site, Dubois' hammer falls inadvertently down and the trajectory of the hammer 
intersects the trajectory of doctor Dupont, who dies4. 
In Figure 1: 
P(A/¬B) = P(A/B) = P(A)           (1)  
and  
P(B/¬A) = P(B/A) = P(B)           (2) 
                                                           
3 I want to avoid the case in which an event X is a screening-off common cause of the two processes A and B. 
In that case, according to Reichenbach's screening-off condition, given X, A and B are independent of each 
other. For a more extended discussion on Reichenbach's screening-off condition see [3]. 
4 [2], p. 128. 
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Figure 1. Monod’s example of absolute coincidences 
 
 
That is, the fact that doctor Dupont goes to visit his patient is statistically 
independent of the fact that the hammer falls down, and the fact that the hammer falls 
down is statistically independent of the fact that doctor Dupont goes to visit his patient. 
The two dotted lines in Figure 1 represent the two independent causal histories of A 
and B. 
To sum up, causal absolute coincidences are events that can be divided into 
components independently produced by some causal factor and those components join 
together. 
Let us consider another example. Suppose I am watching a TV programme on 
Boris Pasternak. In the meanwhile my best friend, without knowing what I am doing 
and without knowing anything about that TV programme, is reading doctor Zhivago. 
We would say that it is a coincidence that at the same time (but in different places) 
my friend and I are doing something that concerns Boris Pasternak.  
However, since there is no physical direct interaction between the two coincidental 
processes, someone may conclude from this example that something is a coincidence 
only in the eye of the beholder. 
Hence, we need a more precise definition of what a causal absolute coincidence is: 
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We speak of a causal absolute coincidence whenever there is an intersection, which 
is also a physical interaction, of two or more statistically independent causal processes 
in exactly the same space and at exactly the same time. 
A good example could be Monod’s one: in that case the two independent causal 
processes intersect, and physically interact, in exactly the same space and at exactly the 
same time. No one may conclude that the intersection is a coincidence only in the eye 
of the beholder5.  
Moreover, in such cases the intersection gives origin to some consequence, as it is 
illustrated in Figure 2. 
2. The Connection Between Salmon's Interactive Fork Criterion and Causal 
Absolute Coincidences 
Causal absolute coincidences are events that can be divided into components which 
intersect (and also interact) in certain spaces and at certain times and, as we have 
already seen, that intersection gives origin to consequences.  
This section is devoted to showing the strong relation between causal absolute 
coincidences and Salmon's common cause model. More precisely, after an overview of 
Salmon's model, I will show that coincidences can be entirely described in terms of 
interactive forks6. 
2.1 Salmon's Interactive Fork Model 
As Salmon says: 
[...] Consider a simple example. Two pools balls, the cue ball and the 8-ball, lie upon a pool 
table. A relative novice attempts a shot that is intended to put the 8-ball into one of the far corner 
pockets, but given the positions of the balls, if the 8-ball falls into one corner pocket, the cue ball is 
almost certain to go into the other far corner pocket, resulting in a ``scratch''. Let A stand for the 8-
ball dropping into the one corner pocket, let B stand for the cue ball dropping into the other corner 
pocket, and let C stand for the collision between the cue ball and the 8-ball that occurs when the 
player executes the shot. We may reasonably assume that the probability of the 8-ball going into the 
pocket is also about 1/2 if the player tries the shot, and the probability of the cue ball going into the 
pocket is also about 1/2. It is immediately evident that A, B, and C do not constitute a conjunctive 
fork, for C does not screen off A and B from one another. Given that the shot is attempted, the 
probability that the cue ball will fall into the pocket (approximately 1/2) is not equal to the 
probability that the cue ball will go into the pocket, given that the shot has been attempted and that 
the 8-ball has dropped into the other far corner pocket (approximately 1).7  
                                                           
5 One may say that coincidences are also unexpected events, so that one could ask whether a non-unexpected 
intersection, between processes that belong to independent causal chains, is still a coincidence. I find this 
point very interesting, but I will leave it out of this discussion. 
6 Although a very similar work can be done using Bayesian networks, I will leave that discussion for another 
paper.  
7 [4], pp. 168-169. 
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Figure 2. Consequences of coincidences 
 
 
Salmon's interactive forks are considered as spatio-temporal intersections between 
two processes. The space-time diagram of the interactive forks has the shape of an x, as 
illustrated in Figure 3. 
In Figure 3, P1 and P2 are two processes which intersect in C. E1 and E2 are the two 
emerging processes from the intersection.  
The intersection produces an interaction and the interaction, according to 
Reichenbach's mark criterion8, has the capacity to produce changes in the properties of 
the two separate processes that come from the intersection. 
In order to characterize Salmon's forks we need the following condition:  
P(E1 ∧ E2/C) > P(E1/C) × P(E2/C)          (3) 
The intersection in C makes the two effects statistically dependent on each other. 
The interactive forks are considered as spatio-temporal intersections that in general 
violate Reichenbach's screening-off condition9. 
                                                           
8 For a more extended discussion on Reichenbach's mark criterion see [3]. 
9 For a more extended discussion on Reichenbach's screening-off condition see [3]. 
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Figure 3. Salmon’s interactive fork 
 
 
However, the screening-off condition may represent a limit case for interactive 
forks. There seems to be a kind of screening-off that is valid for some macroscopic 
interactive forks10 and it can be represented by the following condition: 
P(E1 ∧ E2/C) = P(E1/C) × P(E2/C) = 1          (4) 
which violates the relation (3). Salmon calls this sort of forks “perfect forks”.       
According to Salmon, we can say: 
The main point to be made concerning perfect forks is that when the probabilities take on the 
limiting values, it is impossible to tell from the statistical relationships alone whether the fork 
should be considered interactive or conjunctive. 11 
Which is, then, the most important difference between conjunctive12 and interactive 
forks? 
The answer is: the shape of the fork, as we can read from the following quotation: 
                                                           
10 [4], pp. 177-178. 
11 [4], p. 178. 
12 For a detailed discussion on conjunctive forks see [3]. 
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[…] For it seems essential to have two processes going in and two processes coming out in 
order to explain the idea of mutual modification. 13 
In recognizing interactive forks, the shape of the phenomena is more relevant then 
statistical relationships. 
Moreover, according to the conjunctive fork model, the common cause can produce 
one of its effects without producing the other one, and vice versa. According to the 
interactive fork model, the common cause (the intersection) cannot produce one of its 
effects without producing the other one, and vice versa. 
Furthermore, as a result of the physical interaction, in the case of interactive forks, 
the two emerging processes have something (a mark) of each other and this is not true 
for the case of conjunctive forks. 
2.2 The Coincidences x-Shape and Interactive Forks 
Interactive forks are characterized by two, or more, intersecting (and interacting) 
processes and two, or more, ensuing processes. Equally, absolute coincidences are 
events that can be divided into components which intersect (and interact) in certain 
spaces and at certain times and that intersection gives origin to consequences. It seems 
that causal absolute coincidences can be represented by an x-shape, like interactive 
forks. I will call this x-shape coincidences x-shape, and I will try to investigate its 
relation with x-shapes which characterize interactive forks. 
2.2.1 The First Part of the Coincidences x-Shape and Interactive Forks 
In Salmon we find some instances in which the two intersecting processes, P1 and P2, 
are statistically independent of each other, as in our definition of causal absolute 
coincidences. We can quote the following example: 
In every day life, when we talk about cause-effect relations, we think typically (though not 
necessarily invariably) of situations in which one event (which we call the cause) is linked to 
another event (which we call the effect) by means of a causal process. Each of the two events in this 
relation is an interaction between two (or more) intersecting processes. We say for example, that the 
window was broken by boys playing baseball. In this situation there is a collision of a bat with the 
ball (an interactive fork), the motion of the ball through space (a causal process), and a collision of 
the ball with the window (an interactive fork).14 
According to this example, the ball travelling towards the window and the window 
are two intersecting processes; the collision between them represents the intersection. 
In this case, the two intersecting processes belong to independent causal chains, since 
the fact that the window is there is statistically independent of the fact that the ball 
travels towards the window, and vice versa.  
Salmon does not care about the distinction between intersecting processes that 
belong to independent causal chains and intersecting processes that belong to non-
independent causal chains. This is not a relevant point for a good definition of 
interactive forks.  
Interactive forks are not a sufficient requirement to say that an interaction happens 
by coincidence, since a fork can always be found in which the interacting processes do 
                                                           
13 [4], p. 182. 
14 [4], p. 178. 
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not belong to independent causal chains15. However, cases of intersecting processes 
that belong to independent causal chains are not ruled out by Salmon's account, and 
Salmon's model can be used to describe such cases.  
The first part of the coincidences x-shape can be described with Salmon's model. 
2.2.2 The Second Part of the Coincidences x-Shape and Interactive Forks 
Let us consider again Monod's example, as it is represented in Figure 2. In that case we 
may reasonably assume that the probability of doctor Dupont dying D is of 1/2 if there 
is a collision between the hammer and doctor Dupont's head C, and that the probability 
of the hammer having some bits of brain E is also of about 1/2. In this case, it is 
evident that D and E, given C, are statistically dependent on each other: 
P(D ∧ E/C) > P(D/C) × P(E/C)          (5) 
Given that the hammer collides with doctor Dupont's head, the probability that the 
hammer will have some bits of brain (approximately 1/2) is not equal to the probability 
that the hammer will have bits of brain, given that the hammer has collided with doctor 
Dupont's head and doctor Dupont has died [P(E/C ∧ D) ≈ 1]. That is: 
P(E/C ∧ D) > P(E/C)            (6) 
Moreover, given the collision between the hammer and doctor Dupont's head, the 
probability that doctor Dupont will die (approximately 1/2) is not equal to the 
probability that the doctor will die, given that the hammer has collided with doctor 
Dupont's head and the hammer has some bits of brain [P(D/C ∧ E) ≈ 1]. That is: 
P(D/C ∧ E) > P(D/C)            (7) 
The intersection in C makes the two effects, D and E, statistically dependent, like in 
Salmon's example of the two billiard balls.  
However, as we have already seen, the condition of screening-off represents a limit 
case for interactive forks. There seems to be a kind of screening-off which is valid for 
some macroscopic interactive forks. That limit case is represented by the following 
condition: 
P(E1 ∧ E2/C) = P(E1/C) × P(E2/C) = 1               (4) 
Consider the two billiard balls example once more. Suppose that our novice returns 
to attempt another shot from time to time. Since practice helps improve one’s skills to 
perfection, the novice becomes so good that he can invariably make the cue ball and 
the 8-ball collide (C) in the manner that the 8-ball drops into one of the far corner 
pockets (E1) and the cue ball goes into the other far corner pocket (E2). We may 
reasonably assume that the probability of the 8-ball going into the pocket is about 1 if 
the player tries the shot, and the probability of the cue ball going into the pocket is also 
                                                           
15  The aim of this paper is to show that interactive forks are a necessary condition for coincidental 
phenomena. 
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about 1. It is immediately evident that C does screen E1 and E2 off from one another. 
Up until the moment when our player has perfected his technique, the results of his 
shots exemplified interactive forks, and it would be absurd to claim that when he 
achieves perfection, the collision of the two balls no longer constitutes a causal 
interaction, but it must now be considered as a conjunctive fork. It is an arithmetical 
accident that, when perfection occurs, the equation (4) is fulfilled while the inequality 
(3) must be violated. 
Let us go back to Monod's example once again. We may reasonably assume that 
the probability of doctor Dupont dying (D) is of about 1, if there is a collision between 
the hammer and doctor Dupont's head (C), and that the probability of the hammer 
having some bits of brain (E) is also of about 1. In this case, it is evident that C screens 
D and E off from one another: 
P(D ∧ E/C) = P(D/C) × P(E/C) = 1          (8) 
However, it would be absurd to claim that the collision between the hammer and 
doctor Dupont's head no longer constitutes a causal interaction, but must now be 
considered as a conjunctive fork. According to this last example, the common cause 
(C) cannot produce one of its effect without producing also the other one, and vice 
versa. Moreover, the two emerging processes (D and E) have something of each other. 
It is an arithmetical accident that, when perfection occurs, the equation (4) is fulfilled 
while the inequality (3) is violated. 
According to what I said in this section, even the last part of the coincidences x-
shape can be described using Salmon's interactive fork model.  
3. Conclusion 
To conclude, the primary reasons for saying that interactive forks can describe causal 
absolute coincidences are:  
1. Interactive forks are characterized by two, or more, intersecting (and interacting) 
processes and two, or more, ensuing processes. Equally, absolute coincidences are 
events that can be divided into components which intersect (and interact) in a given 
space and at a given time, and that intersection gives origin to consequences. Causal 
absolute coincidences can be represented by an x-shape, as with interactive forks.  
2. Cases of intersecting processes that belong to independent causal chains are not 
ruled out by Salmon's account and Salmon's model can be used to describe such cases. 
The first part of the coincidences x-shape can be described by Salmon's criterion. 
3. Salmon's interactive fork model can be easily used to describe the last part of the 
coincidences x-shape.  
Finally, we can conclude not only there is a connection between causal absolute 
coincidences and the Principle of Causality, according to which whatever begins to 
exist has a cause, but also the possibility to describe them in terms of some causal 
model.  
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Abstract. In our paper we will rely on research by Grosholz (2007) considering 
her thesis of the irreducibility of iconic representation in mathematics. Against this 
background,  our  aim  will  be  to  discuss  the  epistemic  value  of  “shape”  or  iconicity  
in diagrammatic representations in geometry. We show that iconic aspects of 
diagrams reveal structural relations underlying the method to solve quadrature 
problems developed by Leibniz (1675/76). As a concluding remark, we shall argue 
that in retrieving the information embedded in a diagram the reader must establish 
a meaningful relationship between the information supplied by the diagram and the 
relevant background knowledge which often remains implicit. 
Keywords. Iconic Representation, Diagrams, Visualization, Leibniz, General 
Method, Background Knowledge. 
Introduction  
In our paper we rely on research by Grosholz (2007) considering, in particular, her 
thesis of the irreducibility of iconic representation in mathematics. Against this 
background,   our   aim   is   to   discuss   the   epistemic   value   of   “shape”   or   iconicity   in   the  
representations of diagrams in the case of geometry. In order to illustrate our point, we 
bring in a case-study selected from Leibniz´s work with diagrams in problem-solving 
activities   in   connection  with   a   “master   problem,   the   Squaring   of   the   Circle   – or the 
precise determination  of  the  area  of  the  circle”,  a  problem  which  remains  insoluble  by  
ruler and compass construction within Euclidean geometry.3 Our main reason to focus 
on Leibniz is as follows. On the one hand, throughout his work as a mathematician, 
Leibniz relies on a variety of tools which display rich iconic aspects in the 
implementation of problem-solving activities. On the other hand, it is precisely in the 
case of geometry where Leibniz makes important contributions. Reasoning with 
diagrams plays a central role in this particular case. In order to solve certain 
geometrical problems which could not be solved within the framework of Euclidean 
geometry, Leibniz devises a method that proceeds by transforming a certain 
mathematically intractable curve into a more tractable curve which is amenable to 
                                                          
1 José Gustavo Morales, National University of Cordoba, School of Philosophy, Cordoba (5000), 
Argentina; E-mail: gust.914@gmail.com. 
2 Matías Saracho, National University of Cordoba, School of Philosophy, Cordoba (5000), Argentina; 
E-mail: matias.m00@gmail.com 
3 See [3, p. 36]. 
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calculation.   This   method   is   sometimes   called   the   method   of   “transmutation”   as   it   is  
based upon the transformation of one curvilinear figure into another. 
For Leibniz depending upon the context of research some methodological tools are 
more fruitful than others, moreover, simplicity and economy is also amongst the 
epistemic virtues guiding the design of methods for problem-solving activities. In our 
case-study, we show how Leibniz devises a method which allows him to re-conceive a 
given  curve  by  “transforming”  it   into  a  more  tractable  curve  as  part  of  his  strategy  to  
calculate the area of curves that may contain irrational numbers (the real number π  in  
the case of the circle). In particular, we aim to show that iconic aspects of diagrams 
reveal   structural   relations   underlying   the   process   of   “transformation”   developed   by  
Leibniz in Quadrature   arithmetique   du   circle,   de   la   ellipse   et   de   l’   hyperbole 
(1675/76).4 
1. The  Idea  of  “Shape”  As Iconic Representation 
Let  us  start  by  focusing  on  the  idea  of  “shape”  in  the  sense  of  “iconic  representation”.  
Representations may be iconic, symbolic and indexical depending upon their role in 
reasoning with signs in specific contexts of work.5 According to the traditional view 
representations are iconic when they resemble the things they represent. In many cases 
this characterization appears as doubtful because of its appeal to a vague idea of 
similarity which would seem untenable when representations of numbers are involved. 
But Grosholz argues that in mathematics iconicity is often an irreducible ingredient, as 
she writes, 
 
In many cases, the iconic representation is indispensable. This is often, though 
not always, because shape is irreducible; in many important cases, the 
canonical representation of a mathematical entity is or involves a basic 
geometrical  figure.  At  the  same  time,  representations  that  are  ‘faithful  to’  the  
things they represent may often be quite symbolic, and the likenesses they 
manifest may not be inherently visual or spatial, though the representations 
are, and articulate likeness by visual or spatial means [3, p. 262]. 
 
In order to determine whether a representation is iconic or symbolic, the context of 
research with its fundamental background knowledge needs to be taken into account in 
each particular case, in other words, iconicity cannot simply be read off the 
representation in isolation of the context of use. We find here a more subtle 
understanding   of   “iconicity”   than   the   traditional   view.   Let   us focus on the idea that 
representations  “articulate  likeness  by  visual  or  spatial  means”.  Grosholz  suggests  that  
even highly abstract symbolic reasoning goes hand in hand with certain forms of 
visualizations. 
Giardino (2010) offers a useful characterization of the cognitive activity of 
“visualizing”   in   the   formal   sciences.   In   visualizing,   she   explains,   we   are   decoding  
articulated information which is embedded in a representation, such articulation is a 
                                                          
4 In this paper, we shall be refereeing to the French translation (Parmentier 2004) of Leibniz original 
text De Quadratura Arithmetica (1675/76). 
5 The distinction goes back to Charles Peirce´s theory of signs. For a brief discussion of this distinction, 
see [3, p. 25]. 
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specific kind of spatial organization that lends unicity to a representation turning it 
intelligible. In other words, spatial organization is not just a matter of physical display 
on   the   surface   (paper   or   table)   but   “intelligible   spatiality”   which   may   require  
substantial background knowledge: 
(...) to give a visualization is to give a contribution to the organization of the 
available information (...) in visualizing, we are referring also to background 
knowledge with the aim of getting to a global and synoptic representation of 
the problem [1, p. 37]. 
 
According to this perspective, the ability to read off what is referred to in a 
representation depends on some background knowledge and expertise of the reader. 
Such cognitive act is successful only if the user is able to decode the encrypted 
information of a representation while establishing a meaningful relationship between 
the representation and the relevant background knowledge which often remains implicit. 
The starting point of this process is brought about by representations that are iconic in a 
rudimentary way, namely, they have spatial isolation and organize information by 
spatial and visual means; and they are indivisible things. In the next section we turn to 
our   case   study   taken   from   Leibniz’s   work   in   geometry which we hope will help to 
illustrate some of the above considerations.  
2. Our Case Study - Leibniz’s  De Quadratura Arithmetica (1675/76) 
In Quadrature arithmétique du cercle, de l'ellipse et de l'hyperbole [8] Leibniz 
provides a general method whereby “quadrature”  problems  for  curvilinear  figures  can  
be solved. The first seven propositions of this work form a unity and as Leibniz himself 
emphasizes, Proposition 7 is the "fruit" of all that has gone before [8, p. 35]. In this 
context of work, Leibniz presents the reader a diagram (Fig. 1). 
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Figure 1. Leibniz Quadrature  arithmetique  du  circle,  de  l’ellipse  et  de  l’huperbole 1675/76, [8, p. 65]. 
 
While for the untrained eye this diagram appears as a set of highly entangled 
shapes, for Leibniz, the diagram should offer the reader an overall assessment of the 
way  his  proposed  method  works.  In  order  to  show  the  most  salient  aspects  of  Leibniz’s  
method we shall try to make more explicit some of the features displayed in Figure 1. 
We proceed to put the original  diagram  “under  the  microscope”  dissecting  it  into  four  
diagrams (Figures 2-5). This will allow us to see some of the most relevant steps 
involved in the resolution of the problem under consideration. These visualizations 
together with the indications as to   how   to   “read”   Figures   2-5 may then be seen as 
offering a brief outline of Leibniz´s method. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Figure 2     Figure 3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Figure 4     Figure 5 
 
 
Leibniz aims to show that the area of a curvilinear figure C – which cannot be 
calculated - may be determined by constructing a second figure D, whose area can be 
calculated. A crucial step in Leibniz reasoning relies upon certain geometrical results 
known since Euclid which allow us to assume that the ratio between C and D is known 
to us. This step in the reasoning is represented in the diagram by two different shapes 
that we have highlighted in Figure 2. On the one hand, we see an enclosed area 
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delimited by segments A1C, A3C and the arc 1C2C3C – which represents the area C, 
unknown to us. On the other hand, we see another enclosed area delimited by segments 
1B1D, 1B3B, 3B3D and the curve 1D2D3D which represents the area of the second figure 
D. Finally, we can also see some specific lines that represent geometrical relations 
between both figures according to Euclidean geometry.6 
With a view to determine the area of curvilinear figure C we first need to find the 
area of figure D. Leibniz proceeds to decompose D into a finite number of elemental 
parts - the rectangles 1N1B2B1S and 2N2B3B2S - which are then added up. We have 
highlighted this procedure in Figure 3. As we can also see the sum of rectangles makes 
up a new shape or figure which Leibniz calls “espace  gradiforme”.7 At this stage of the 
reasoning,   the   construction   of   such   “space”   is   crucial   for   Leibniz’s   problem-solving 
strategy. Instead of an exact calculation of the area of D, Leibniz approximates the area 
of D by calculating the area of such “espace   gradiforme”, so that the difference 
between both figures will be less than any assignable number. 
Next,  the  newly  constructed  “espace  gradiforme”  is transposed upon figure C (See 
Figures 4 and 5). This procedure can be described in two steps. 
The   first   step   consists   in   decomposing   the   curvilinear   figure   C   into   “triangles”  
which we highlighted in Figure 4. Note that the number of triangles will be greater than 
any arbitrarily assignable number as it is possible to decompose the figure into 
arbitrarily many triangles where the whole set of triangles has the single vertex A. Here 
Leibniz takes distance from other techniques used at the time. While Cavalieri, for 
instance, often decomposed curvilinear figures into parallelograms, Leibniz proceeds to 
resolve the problem by decomposing curvilinear figures into triangles (for an 
illustration of this difference see Figure 6). Accordingly, instead of rectangles or 
parallelograms, the elemental parts in this case will be triangles, as Leibniz points out 
in Scholium 1 of the treatise: 
 
(...) on peut en effet également décomposer en triangles des figures 
curvilignes  qu’à   l’exemple  d’autres  grands   savants  Cavalieri  ne  décomposait  
souvent   qu’en   parallélogrammes,   sans   utiliser,   à   ma   connaissance,   une  
résolution générale en triangles [8, p. 39]. 
 
 
                                                          
6  Leibniz   relies   upon   a   generalization   of   Euclid’s   Elements   (Proposition   1,   Book   I)   to   justify   his  
reasoning  when  assuming  that  the  “triangle” A2C3C equals  one  half  of  the  “rectangle”  2B2N. 2B3B (A2C3C = 
1/2 2B2N. 2B3B). See [9]. 
7 The expression Leibniz used in the original Latin is "spatium gradiforme" [8, p. 69]. 
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Figure 6. Leibniz’s  method  as  opposed  to  Cavalieri’s  method. 
 
The second step consists in the construction of the “espace  gradiforme” upon C 
(See Figure 5). To this end, Leibniz uses the rectangle with sides 2B2N and 2N2S which 
can be constructed from a given triangle A2C3C relying on certain well-established 
geometrical relations which hold so that the ratio between the areas of figures C and D 
is ½. It is precisely in this context where Leibniz relies upon results already established 
by Euclid.8 
Let   us   now   return   to   Leibniz’s   original   diagram   corresponding to Proposition 7 
(See Figure  1).  With  Euclid’s  results  concerning  structural  relations  between  two  types  
of shapes - triangles and rectangles – in mind, we are justified to establish a correlation 
between triangles A1C2C, A2C3C,…   and   corresponding   rectangles   1B1N2B1S, 
2B2N3B2S,.... For instance, the triangle A2C3C corresponds to the rectangle 2D2B3B2S. 
Next, we recall that the area of figure D can be approximated by the sum of the (finite 
number of) elemental parts – rectangles – the original figure D was decomposed into. 
Finally, the area of the curvilinear figure C can be calculated by applying the ratio 
of ½ upon the area of figure D. According to Leibniz, the calculation obtained by this 
method is not exact but one may consider it is a precise determination of the area of the 
curvilinear figure C. To sum up, it is by recognizing certain geometrical relations 
holding between triangles and rectangles that one can see that the precise determination 
of the area of the curvilinear shape will depend upon the value of the approximation of 
the   area   of   D.   The   latter,   in   turn,   can   be   calculated   on   the   basis   of   the   “espace  
gradiforme”,  the  new  shape  designed  by  Leibniz  which is required to approximate the 
value of D.  
3. Concluding Remarks 
In this section we finally consider some of the requirements which are imposed upon 
the   reader   in  order   to  be   able   to  perform   the   relevant   “cognitive   act”  of   successfully  
decoding   a   visualization   that   includes   “shapes”   in   the   context   of   problem   solving  
activities in mathematics. Again, we shall focus on the diagram of our case-study 
(Figure 1). 
Diagrams are shapes that represent by spatial and visual means. Their intelligibility 
partly depends on their integrity and shape, features that make a diagram intrinsically 
iconic. But diagrams also often combine, as Grosholz argues, iconic aspects with 
                                                          
8 See footnote 6 (above). 
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symbolic ingredients. If diagrams were just iconic, they would be but a copy – a more 
or less faithful picture - of what we intent to refer to. However, diagrams are inherently 
general, a drawing of, say, curvilinear shape without being just a drawing of a 
particular curve on this particular page of a text. On the one hand, diagrams resemble a 
particular shape, on the other hand, they represent a whole set of (instances of) a certain 
shape and are in this sense general. To clarify this feature of diagrams we distinguish 
following  M.  Giaquinto  between  “discrete”  and  “indiscrete”  representations, 
 
(...) diagrams very frequently do represent their objects as having properties 
that, though not ruled out by the specification, are not demanded by it. In fact 
this is often unavoidable. Verbal descriptions can be discrete, in that they 
supply no more information than is needed. But visual representations are 
typically indiscrete, because for many properties or kinds F, a visual 
representation cannot represent something as being F without representing it 
as being F in a particular way [1, p. 28]. 
 
“Indiscrete   representations”   as   opposed   to   “discrete   representations”   are  
representations that represent by spatial and visual means including the combination of 
iconic aspects as well as symbolic ingredients. As a consequence of this important 
feature of diagrams, it follows that both particular instances and generality go hand in 
hand. Returning to our case-study and Leibniz’s  diagram,  we  may  offer  the  following  
three observations in this regard: 
 
 The diagram that goes with proposition 7 (Figure 1) exhibits a circular shape. 
We   may   consider   that   Leibniz’s   method   to   calculate   the   area   for   this  
curvilinear shape works only for this particular curve. But Leibniz intends to 
use his method as a general method so as to include any curvilinear shape, as 
he writes in the Schollium to proposition XI: 
 
La  proposition  7  m’a  fourni  le  moyen  de  construire  une  infinité  de  figures  
de longueur   infinie  égales  au  double  d’un  segment  ou  d’un  secteur   (…)  
d’une   courbe   donnée   quelconque,   et   ceci   d’une   infinité   de   manières  
(Leibniz 1676, p. 97).9 
 
 In the diagram (Figure 1) the curvilinear shape C is actually divided into only 
four points, namely, 1C2C3C4C. However, it is possible to divide the arc C into 
as many points as we want. 
 If the number of points is large enough, the diagram will be less faithful to the 
particular instance that it pretends to represent and when the magnitude of 
segment A1C is less than any assignable number, we have the limit-case. At 
this point, the space 1CA3C2C  (called  “triligne”  by  Leibniz)  can  be  assumed  as  
a space composed by curve 1C2C3C and the straight line A3C  (called  “secteur”  
by Leibniz)10. 
 
                                                          
9 Leibniz specifies the class of curves which fall under the domain of application of his method in 
Proposition 6 of Quadrature arithmetique. 
10 See [8, p. 97]. 
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Note that in our case-study, the reader has to select only part of the information 
furnished by the diagram; he/she has to be able to discern the relevant information 
contained in the diagram in the light of the problem under consideration. In particular, 
it is necessary to distinguish in the diagram between iconic ingredients and symbolic 
ingredients. What exactly is required of the reader to be able to decode the relevant 
information encrypted in the diagram? To answer this question we return here to 
Giardino’s   observation   that   “to   give   a   visualization   is   to   give   a   contribution   to   the  
organization   of   the   available   information”.   First   the   reader   needs   to   consider   the  
context in which the diagram is inserted.  As already noted, part of the context is made 
explicit by remarks written in natural language as it is the case in the written text 
accompanying the diagram [8, pp. 65, 67]. In the written text, Leibniz explains how to 
construct the diagram he shows together with Proposition 7 (our Figure 1). But such 
description is hardly enough, as the reader still needs to rely on substantial information 
– background knowledge concerning relevant chapters of the history of geometry – in 
order   to   get   “a   global   and   synoptic   representation   of   the   problem”.      However the 
relevant background knowledge  cannot  be  made  fully  explicit,  at  least  not  “all  at  once”.  
The expertise of the community of mathematicians which includes different traditions 
of  research and, in a broad sense, the history of mathematics, provides different tools 
and techniques which need to be acquired by teaching and learning. For instance, in our 
case-study  Leibniz’s  diagram  relies  heavily  on  procedures  and  techniques  whose  origin  
goes back to Euclid and Archimedes but also recalls the work of some of his 
contemporaries such as Cavalieri's "theorem of indivisibles" and Pascal's 
"characteristic  triangle",  which  is  used  by  Leibniz  in  order  to  “transform”  triangles  into  
rectangles. Finally, as we may divide the arc C into "as many points as we want", 
sometimes the diagram is meant to be read as an infinitesimal configuration and at this 
point the symbolic dimension of the diagram comes into play so that in each case the 
trained eye of the reader will be required to be able to recognize the roles of these 
different dimensions. 
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Shaping up: The Phenotypic Quality 
Ontology and Cross Sections 
Robert J. ROVETTO1 
Abstract. The Phenotypic Quality Ontology (PATO) uses the notion of a cross 
section to relate two- and three-dimensional shapes and to describe the shape of 
biological entities. What is a cross-section? What is a truthful ontological account 
of cross sections? In this communication I explore potential answers to these 
questions, approaching the task from philosophical and ontological perspectives, 
and provide a preliminary examination of the PATO shape hierarchy. Some 
critical observations, questions, and suggestions for the shape portion of PATO are 
presented. 
Keywords. Shape, ontology, applied ontology, philosophical ontology, biomedical 
ontology, artifacts, cross section, philosophy of mathematics, Phenotypic Quality 
Ontology, PATO, ontology of shape 
Introduction 
A preliminary examination of the shape hierarchy in the Phenotypic Quality Ontology 
(PATO) [1] was conducted. Herein I present some critical observations, questions and 
suggestions for the ontology. The developers of PATO employ the notion of a cross 
section in order to describe the shapes of biological entities. What is a cross section, 
and what is an ontological description of them? Potential answers to these questions are 
explored in the discussion on the ontology of cross sections. 
During my analysis of the shape taxonomy, I organized all PATO shape classes in 
a spreadsheet document, using temporary identifiers for each, and devised a simple 
comment-code system. Sibling classes were grouped according to the level they are 
subsumed under the root shape class, ‘shape’, with the groupings being called the 
subsumption or nesting level. That is, all siblings classes subsumed once by ‘shape’ 
(subsumption level 1) I labeled ‘Level 1 terms’ and so forth for all the sibling terms 
subsumed twice (or once under Level 1 terms). 
In what follows, key terms and phrases are italicized. Potential ontological 
categories are also emphasized in boldface, and PATO classes are enclosed in single 
quotes. Occasionally the latter are emphasized and prefixed with the name of the 
respective ontology as in: PATO:shape. “Category”, “class” and “universal” are 
considered interchangeable, each essentially reflecting general(izable) entities. 
Similarly for “particular”, “instance” and “individual”. In section 1 I introduce PATO, 
the has_cross_section relation, and present some critical observations thereof. In 
section 2 I provide an ontological discussion of cross sections. 
                                                            
1 Corresponding Author. University at Buffalo, The State University of New York, Department of 
Philosophy (2011 MA graduate), United States; Email: rrovetto@buffalo.edu. 
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 PATO: The Phenotypic Quality Ontology 1.
PATO is an applied ontology2 primarily intended to describe the phenotypic qualities 
(traits, more specifically) of organisms. Qualities are most commonly and broadly 
understood in their normal sense as properties, characteristics or attributes of things. 
For PATO, qualities are more formally understood in the sense of BFO:quality of the 
Basic Formal Ontology in [2] (version 1.1) or [3] (version 2.0). As such, they are a type 
of dependent entity 3 . Qualities can also be formally described in the sense of 
DOLCE:quality of the Descriptive Ontology for Linguistic and Cognitive Engineering 
[4], which interestingly differentiates qualities from properties by making them 
particulars and universals, respectively. 
PATO is designed to be used with ontologies of quality-bearing entities [5]. By 
explicitly mentioning this (type of entity) PATO can be seen as taking a particular 
stance on what and how things exist, that is, a metaphysical stance on the world. Since 
the ontology commonly uses [2] as its top-level ontology4, one can argue that the 
former essentially adopts the metaphysical assumptions and theory of the latter. If true, 
this is an important point to remember for any implicit or explicit, contested or 
controversial, ontological assertions in the top-level. It is significant for persons and 
theories that hold the ontology of the world to be different. This point would appear to 
apply to any ontology using an upper-level with a thoroughly worked-out metaphysical, 
ontological or philosophical theory. 
PATO is included in the Open Biological and Biomedical Ontologies Foundry 
(OBO Foundry) [6]. It is intended to be used with other biomedical ontologies, such as 
the Gene Ontology [7], and is used for phenotype annotation. According to [8], the 
Neuroscience Information Framework [9] and the Influenza Ontology [10], among 
others, use PATO. Examples of PATO classes include ‘shape’, ‘size’, ‘texture’, 
‘structure’, ‘physical object quality’, ‘cellular quality’, ‘functionality’, ‘process quality’, 
and ‘intensity’ to name a few. PATO encompasses a broad range of so-called qualities 
from the highly general to the more domain-specific, and is ambitious in that respect.5 
Figure 1 displays a sample of the shape taxonomy in PATO as it was structured at the 
time of this examination. Indentation indicates subsumption (the is_a relation). The 
first two shape classes, for example, can be read as “aliform is a type of 2-D shape”. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
2 An applied ontology is an ontology used in or for a field of inquiry or domain science, such as biology 
or physics. It has a computer-readable format to foster, among other things, automated reasoning, and 
semantic annotation and interoperability. A (scientific) ontology is ideally a philosophically well-founded 
theory of the kinds of entities and relationships in the world. Domain ontologies reflect an aspect or portion 
of the world that is the focus of study for a domain science. For more see [2], [4] and [22]. 
3 A dependent entity is an entity that depends on others for its existence. Qualities/properties, being 
commonly-held examples, are described as being existentially dependent on their material bearer. 
4 A top-level ontology is one whose ontological categories are of the highest generality possible to 
accurately describe the world or some field of inquiry. Each lower-level category of a lower-level or domain-
ontology that uses a top- or upper-level has some upper-level category subsuming it. 
5 With classes such as ‘physical object quality’ and ‘process quality’, both highly general and 
applicable to different types of entities, the subject matter of PATO is clearly broader than the domain of 
biology. The abiotic is represented in the ontology as well. 
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2-D shape 
aliform 
3-D shape 
convex 3-D shape 
concave 3-D shape 
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arrow-shaped 
auriculate 
bent 
branchiness 
Figure 1. A portion of PATO’s shape taxonomy. 
Shapes are generally held to be examples of qualities of things. This is intuitively 
accepted when considering the shape of material objects, but not so obvious when 
considering the abstract or ideal shapes of geometry. The shapes of material objects 
(physical/material shapes) do not typically exhibit the flawless symmetry of geometric 
shapes. The distinction between the two, discussed in [11], may help (I) specialize a 
shape category for applied ontologies such as PATO, and (II) form a correct ontology 
of shape. PATO shape qualities, at least in the sense of [2, 3], are essentially equivalent 
to the former: the shape of material entities in the world. 
1.1.  Some Initial Observations 
An initial observation of PATO’s shape hierarchy is that of a largely flat one that could 
benefit from more structuring and category assessment. This includes determining 
whether the categories are representative of shapes (qualities). For example, two 
superclasses of PATO:shape are ‘Morphology’ and ‘physical object quality’, a 
classification that is not entirely correct. Strictly speaking, morphology is a field or 
subject of study, not the shape quality of a physical object. The intended reading and 
meaning is likely “Morphological quality”. If so, then an appropriate change in the 
class name or definition to reflect this would better afford semantic transparency. That 
is, grasping the meaning of the class from its name will be more apparent. 
Although there are similar concerns with other PATO classes and definitions, 
including those that do not appear to denote shapes (PATO:robust for example), I will 
focus on observations and implications related PATO:has_cross_section. Before 
discussing this relation, I will briefly present two potential strategies for organizing the 
shape categories. 
There are a number of classes whose names end with “-shaped” or “-like”, as in 
PATO:hourglass-shaped, ‘snowman-shaped’, ‘spoon-shaped’ and ‘brush-like shape’. 
Some of them can undoubtedly be removed, renamed or substituted. If two things are 
accomplished—a distinction between artifactual and non-artifactual shapes, and an 
unproblematic general account of artifactuality—then these classes can arguably be 
grouped accordingly under (Non-)Artifactual shape classes.  
PATO does not have a class for spheres, and perhaps justly so. Spheres are 
geometric shapes and seemingly outside the scope of an ontology whose primary 
domain is that of phenotypic qualities of biological entities. A Sphere class would not 
fit because (a) geometric shapes are purportedly abstract in nature, (b) their instances 
are not exhibited by material objects, and (c) the shape qualities of PATO require a 
material bearer. 
Spheres are mentioned, however, in the definitions of PATO:spheroid, the parent 
class (the immediate superclass) of PATO:spherical. Now if it were possible for some 
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material entity to exhibit a perfectly spherical shape—giving credence to the idea of 
perfect material instances of geometric shape universals—then these classes are general 
enough to encompass those shape qualities in addition to approximate spheres or 
sphere-like shapes, such as the oblate spheroidal shape quality of the Earth.  
Proceeding with the understanding that any given physical object does not, in fact, 
have a perfect geometric shape quality, we have the following. Assuming the 
distinction between geometric and physical shapes is both ontologically correct and 
viable for an applied ontology, differentiating between Sphere and Spherical categories 
would reflect the distinction and may prove useful. Instances of a Sphere class have the 
precise geometric properties of a geometric sphere while allowing for variation in scale. 
For PATO, instances are physical shapes, shape qualities approximating a geometric 
sphere. A spherical biological cell can be formally related to the geometric sphere via 
some two-place approximation or resemblance relation. 
In noun-based adjectives6 [12], such as “spheroidal” and “rectangular”, the suffixes 
“-oidal” (or “-oid”), “-ical”, and “-ar” indicate resemblance (and thus deviation from 
the ideal). The definition of PATO:spherical is in line with, stating “…the bearer's 
resembling a ball”7 (italics added). In terms of class names, those with the above 
suffixes can be defined as indicating this similarity or approximation. They mark 
imperfect physical object shape qualities, rather than ideal geometric shapes. This 
approach would require geometric shape categories in a separate ontology, however. 
1.2.  The PATO cross section relation 
To better structure the shape hierarchy, the developers of PATO utilize the notion of a 
cross section to relate three- and two-dimensional (3-D and 2-D for short) shapes [13]. 
More specifically, the has_cross_section relation, a binary predicate, was introduced to 
relate 2-D and 3-D shape classes. A description of the 3-D shape of a biological cell, 
for example, would have a 2-D counterpart marking the cross section of that 3-D cell 
shape. This ontologically commits PATO to cross sections, yet there is no class or 
corresponding definiton. Below is the definition of PATO:has_cross_section with an 
arbitrary label to the left. I have emphasized the likely unique entity- and category-
referring words. 
 
(HCS-Def) s3 has_cross_section s3 if and only if : there exists some 2d plane 
that intersects the bearer of s3, and the impression of s3 upon that 
plane has shape quality s2. 
 
Example: a spherical object has the quality of being spherical, and the spherical 
quality has_cross_section round [13] 
 
According to both the definition and the example, the domain and range are 3-D 
and 2-D shape qualities, respectively, each a subtype of top-level class BFO:quality. 
Table 1 displays the form and a sample subject-predicate-object expression (the row in 
grey). Based on the phrasing of the relation the range is cross sections, more 
                                                            
6 Personal communication with Dr. John Corcoran, University at Buffalo,State University of New York. 
7 The use of the word “ball” is ambiguous, but seems to connote material objects, e.g., a soccer ball, 
rather than a geometric shape. The definition says that a ball is a sphere, but it is the soccer ball that 
resembles a sphere, not vice versa.  
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specifically. The implication is that there is some equivalency between cross sections 
and 2-D shapes. For PATO, it would appear that 2-D shapes are cross-sections. The 
definition of PATO:2-D shape classifies cross-sections as 2-D entities, more generally. 
For both geometric and physical shapes we can ask, Q1: Are cross sections 2-D shapes 
(or vice versa)? 
 
Table 1. The PATO has_cross_section relation with domain, range, and working example (grey row) 
Domain Binary Relation Range 
3-D shape quality has_cross_section 2-D shape quality 
Spherical has_cross_section Round 
 
Observe that translating HCS-Def completely into first-order predicate logic may 
require an intersection relation, as well as some relation reflecting the usage of “upon”. 
In the next subsection I present three critical observations of HCS-Def, while 
attempting to address them. Each is labeled with the prefix “HCS-O” and a number.  
1.3.  The has_cross_section definition – Observations and Questions 
(HCS-O1) Assuming there is no typographic error, the definition may be better served 
if the second instance of “s3”, located on the left side of the bi-conditional, is 
substituted with “s2”. “S2” is also found at the end of the definition, and likely stands 
for “2-D shape”. Using the corresponding full PATO class name in the definition is 
arguably preferable. There are at least two reasons for the substitution, reiterating a 
point made in subsection 1.1. 
The first is that since the range is 2-D shape qualities, the substitution will more 
easily reflect this, making for a more readable and transparent definition to ontology 
editors and users. Similar minor changes will make formal definitions more consistent 
with any informal natural language description, and perhaps encourage the promotion 
of standards and best practices for applied ontology development and curation. 
The second reason is that if both instances of “s3” signify distinct entities of the 
same type—either 3-D or 2-D shapes—then the relation cannot apply to geometric 
shapes, nor to the bearer of the shape, mind-external 3-D material objects. A sphere 
does not have a 3-D cross section, nor does, say, a particular orange. A cross section is 
commonly, if not always, of a lower-dimensionality than the cross-sectioned entity. 
(HCS-O2) 2-D planes are mentioned in HCS-Def, signaling an ontological 
commitment to planes. In what sense do 2-D planes exist and what kind of entity are 
they? Do they interact with the bearer of the shape quality, as the definition suggests, 
and if so, how? The two are clearly of different types.  
The 2-D plane is a geometric or mathematical entity, entities not explicitly 
represented in PATO’s top-level, [2], and thus beyond the scope of PATO. Depending 
on the nature of geometric/mathematical entities, planes may be a type abstract entity, 
more generally, or a cognitive entity. [4], and much philosophical literature, supports 
geometric shapes and mathematical entities as abstract. By contrast, and according to 
PATO, the bearer of a shape quality is a BFO:material entity.  
Assuming planes are mathematical entities, how exactly do they interact with 
material objects? With these questions we find ourselves in the sphere of the 
philosophy of mathematics in which a central concern is the ontological status of 
mathematical entities. Are they mind-internal constructions, mind-external spatio-
temporal entities, abstract (non-spatio-temporal and non-mental), or otherwise? Is a 
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mathematical entity class to be introduced to subsume a 2-D plane class? If so, then in 
what ontology are they to be a part (a mathematical entity ontology, perhaps)? How 
would this ontology be used with PATO and its top-level? 
Consider the following approach. If planes interact with 3-D material bearers, or if 
cross sections are only created by an intersection (a form of interaction) of distinct 
entities, then introduce an intersection relation, a binary predicate with 2-D planes and 
3-D material objects (or shapes qualities) as domain and range. The problem is that we 
would be hard-pressed to explain how they interact in this way. We do not literally find 
2-D planes in the mind-external world, except perhaps in a representational sense.  
Within a computational or mathematical system, a 3-D model of a real-world 
object can be intersected (in whatever equivalent sense) with a 2-D plane. This would 
be a computational representation of an otherwise abstract geometric entity. It makes 
more sense to ontologically describe the interaction of these entities in a cognitive, 
mathematical, or computational setting or context. 
I am therefore inclined to suggest that only geometric shapes can be intersected in 
this sense. That is, a geometric intersection relation would relate geometric entities. 
Physical shapes are only subject to intersection with a plane when they are abstracted 
from the mind-external 3-D material bearer, idealized or represented in a cognitive, 
mathematical, or computational form. Perhaps the physical shape, so abstracted, can be 
modeled as a geometric shape. 
(HCS-O3) Although we intuitively understand the meaning of “impression” from 
HCS-Def, it is not described and marks an ontological commitment to impressions. Is 
an impression class, and corresponding logical definition, to be added to PATO? Is it a 
primitive, the meaning of which comes from our natural-language comprehension of its 
usage in context? Is the impression identical to the cross-section? Let us examine this 
and the intersection process implied by HSC-Def a bit further. 
The intersection of a 2-D plane with a 3-D shape quality results in a 2-D 
impression of the latter on the former. So how does the impression relate to the 2-D 
plane? It is not clear whether the impression is on the plane as a book can be on a table, 
or whether the impression is a quality of the plane. Both appear implausible. 
To say either the shape or the cross section is on the plane is to suggest that the 
cross section is independent of both the plane and sphere, just as a table and a book are 
independent, but interacting, entities. Ontologically, there is no independent cross 
section standing in an on relation (in this sense) to the plane. The cross section appears 
to form by the intersection. 
A mereological theory can be used to assert that the sphere and plane partially 
overlap, and define the cross-section as the region of overlap. This would support the 
idea that the cross section is not an independently existing entity. Provided a theory of 
location, part of the 2-D plane can also be described as being co-located with part of 
the 3-D shape. These formal accounts would more accurately apply to cross sections in 
a geometric context as types of immaterial, abstract or mathematic entities.  
If impressions have 2-D shape qualities, then impressions are quality-bearers. Are 
we to gather that the 3-D material object is the bearer of the 3-D shape quality, the 
plane a bearer of the impression, and finally the impression a bearer of the 2-D shape 
quality? This may be problematic.  
According to PATO, shape qualities, not the bearer, have cross sections. Yet 
according to [2], PATO’s adopted top-level ontology, qualities do not themselves have 
qualities. At best, any asserted high-order quality is a quality of the bearer. Given this, 
and assuming cross sections are 2-D shape qualities, the material bearer would have the 
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cross-section as a quality, not the 3-D shape quality of the bearer as PATO holds (see 
1.2 and Table 1). Unless planes and impressions play some role in avoiding this 
apparent dilemma, a contradiction exists. This is a potential, if not actual, conflict 
between the ontological theory of the top-level and the lower-level ontology.  
From the preceding, we observe that PATO is ontologically committed to cross 
sections, shape qualities and their bearers, and arguably 2-D planes and impressions 
upon the planes. We can partially address HCS-O3 by being ontologically 
parsimonious and avoid commitment to impressions. Rephrasing the definition to avoid 
use of “impression”, or (perhaps) explicitly stating that the word be understood in an 
informal manner are possible solutions. HCS-O3 introduces the question, Q2: Do/can 
both shapes and material objects have cross sections? It appears so.  
The next section discusses the ontology of cross sections. I identify some of their 
general properties, labeling them with the prefix “CS-P” and a number as they appear. 
Potential definitions/descriptions are marked with “CS-D”. I also present 
interpretations of cross sections as types of (a) mind-external artifacts, (b) mind-
internal entities, (c) mind-external portions of objects, and (d) spatio-temporal regions. 
 The Ontology of Cross Sections 2.
What are cross sections, and what is an accurate ontological description of them? We 
generally conceive of cross sections as either two-dimensional slices/sections of things, 
or geometric description of things. The former are purportedly parts or types of 
material entities, and the latter types of representational artifacts in the sense of [14, 15]. 
In short, cross-sections are 2-D sections or descriptions of 3-D entities. We also 
understand the notion of cross-sections by an action or process: cutting/slicing or 
intersecting an entity to expose some internal structure, surface or shape. 
Generally speaking, we can section something mind-internally by imagining the 
cross section of some entity; mind-externally, by performing actual dissections of 
biological specimens; or virtually/computationally by producing computational 
representations and simulations. These are three modes of cross-sectioning, the last two 
of which involve the first. Relevant definitions from both [16] and [17] reflect the idea 
that a cross section can be an actual cut/cutting of something, or a representation of it. 
In medicine, 3-D sections of biological entities—cells, tissue, organs, organisms—
are obtained by actual dissections or other cutting/sectioning processes. By contrast, 2-
D slices are virtually obtained or simulated with technology such as Computed Axial 
Tomography in which X-rays scan a biological subject. This scanning process, in effect, 
produces 2-D slices in a computational or graphical form in order to visually convey 
information about the interior of the subject. 
Numerous slices taken from varying angles and positions are combined to form a 
3-D mosaic: a 3-D computational representation of, say, the human brain. A particular 
brain is virtually sliced or sectioned based on, or by the gathering of, information that is 
(i) received and subsequently processed by the scanner and associated software, and (ii) 
transmitted via X-rays. Ultimately, 2- and 3-D images and simulations representing the 
subject are produced for the medical practitioner to examine. Thus, medical imaging 
provides us with an example of (representational) cross sections.  
Other fields, such as architecture and engineering, use cross sections (or variations 
thereof) with the aid of software applications such as AutoCad [18] and Photoshop [19]. 
These applications permit similar constructions and comparable simulated dimensional 
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(de)compositions to communicate internal and structural information. It is evident that 
these cross sections have a descriptive power that is highly useful for industry and 
education. Consider blueprints, floor plans, scientific illustrations, computer 
simulations, and modeling and manufacturing techniques. Whether in medicine or 
engineering, from computational cross-sectioning processes—types of artifactual 
processes—representational artifacts are created. 
(CS-P1) A cross section is always a cross section of something, just as a 
physical/material shape as opposed to a geometric shape, is always a shape of the 
object [11]. Cross sections are always cross sections of some entity. They reflect some 
aspect of what is sectioned. An individual cross section of a particular brain depends at 
least on that brain, the persons engaging in the sectioning, and the technology involved. 
The notion of a cross section presupposes that of something to be sectioned (CS-P2). 
We consider, cognize, imagine and seek the cross section of an object for a 
purpose. We consider it to satisfy a particular function. Functions, like qualities, are 
often ontologically classified as a type of dependent entity. Medical Cross Sections, a 
potential domain-level subcategory of a Cross Section category arguably have the 
function of communicating structural or internal information about the biological 
subject. These considerations support the idea that (CS-P3) cross sections are a type of 
dependent entity. It remains to be seen precisely what type of dependent entity. 
When we imagine the cross section of some real or fictional object we are 
abstracting from the object. We selectively focus on certain parts, properties or aspects 
of the object, while ignoring others. This is common to any abstraction process. The 
mind-internal abstraction yields to our mind’s eye a figure—the cross section—whose 
boundaries are that of the representation of the mind-external object. With no mind-
external manifestation of the abstraction—artifacts such as images of the brain—the 
cross section will remain a mental construction. We can ask Q3: Are cross sections 
types of artifacts, or do these artifacts represent cross sections?  
If we take the position that an image from a medical scan represents a cross section 
of the brain, rather than being a computational cross section of the brain, then we 
ontologically commit to two types of entities. One is the representation and the other is 
the represented. The images surely represent some physical part, some collection of 
properties, some snapshot of an ongoing biological process, or some aspect of the brain, 
more generally. That aspect is of the internal structure (and goings-on) of the scanned 
portion of the brain (1) viewed two-dimensionally or in a 2-D form, and (2) relative to 
some axis (of rotation, of symmetry) or some pre-defined coordinate system.  
In short, the cross section could be described as CS-D1: a 2-D 
representation/description of the internal structure (and contents) of the subject at a 
moment of time and relative to a given axis or coordinate system. If cross sections are 
created by persons to serve the function of conveying this information, then it is 
obvious that there is an artifactual element to their nature. Similar to representational 
artifacts, they could be declared as types of information artifacts. Accordingly one may 
wish to categorize cross sections as information content entities in the sense of [20]. 
Whatever the case, a particular cross section is a dependent entity that conveys and 
reflects some information, some reality, about what is sectioned.  
To cross-section or to section something is to divide or cut it into one or more N-
dimensional slices/sections. For 3-D material objects, any actual slices are always of 
the same dimensionality. There are no 2-D material slices of a brain, for example. 
Therefore, unless understood as 2-D descriptions or representations of (portions of) 
things, and unless a cross section category is specialized, it may not be appropriate for 
132
material entities. For geometric shapes, by contrast, the slices are indeed of a lower 
dimensionality. 
The sectioned entity is either actually of a higher dimensionality, or is conceived in 
the imagination as an entity having a higher dimensionality (CS-P4). Implicit in the 
notion of a cross section is the distinction between (entities of) differing dimensionality 
(CS-P5). For material objects this entails material extension along those dimensions. 
CS-P4 implies CS-P6: Cross sections are of a lower dimensionality than that which is 
cross-sectioned. Considerations of dimensions provides an interpretation of cross 
sections as a 3-D entity viewed from the perspective of a 2-D entity. 
2.1.  Geometry and Cross sections 
There is a distinct geometrical nature to cross-sections. One reason for the dimensional 
difference between the cross-section(ed) is that a 2-D geometric entity, such as a plane, 
is used to produce or exhibit the cross section. From the perspective of a plane, 3-D 
geometric shapes and 3-D material objects are viewed two-dimensionally. They 
become or are seen as 2-D. Since material objects are not actually cut into 2-D slices, 
whatever slice is produced is more along the lines of CS-D1, a 2-D view, 
representation or description of the object. Whether the sectioned entity is geometric or 
material, there is always a conscious involvement or focus (CS-P7). 
In geometry, the cross section of a 3-D geometric shape (or figure more generally) 
is the shape produced by the intersection of the 3-D shape with a 2-D plane. A cross 
section of a sphere is a circle, for example. From the vantage point of a plane, a sphere 
appears as a circle. For more complex or irregular figures the cross section varies 
significantly depending on its position and angle through the figure. The position and 
angle are identifiable by specifying an axis (or coordinate system) through or relative to 
the geometric object.  
Imagine a 2-D plane intersecting a representation of an aircraft. A plane 
perpendicular to an axis that runs from nose-to-tail will produce a different cross 
section if it were perpendicular to an axis running from wing-tip to wing-tip. Each will 
therefore communicate and represent different properties and information about the 
aircraft. By specifying a rotational axis or coordinate system for the sectioned entity, 
the orientation of the 2-D plane and resultant varying cross sections can be precisely 
identified. With this in mind, perhaps PATO:has_cross_section is not simply a binary 
predicate but ternary such that: X has_cross_section Y at/relative to Z, where Z is some 
axis, coordinate system or set of coordinates.  
The cone and the conic sections are examples of this cross-sectional variation for 
geometric shapes. A plane intersecting a cone at different positions and angles 
produces different curves: the parabola, the hyperbola and the ellipse (a closed curve), 
of which the circle is one type. Cross sections would appear to have the same 
dimensionality as the plane or figure used to geometrically intersect the sectioned 
shape (CS-P8). 
One exception to this idea involves planes that are tangential to higher dimensional 
shapes. Consider the effect on PATO:has_cross_section. Assuming cross sections of 
geometric shapes are themselves shapes, and assuming the point (a 0-D entity) is 
asserted as a type of shape, the following holds. When a plane tangentially touches or 
intersects any shape—at the apex of a cone or at the pole of a sphere, for example—the 
cross section at that region is a point. The intersection yields a shape of lower 
dimensions than the plane. Therefore, if points are accepted as proper cross sections, 
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then the range of the has_cross_section relation must change to cover not only 2-D 
shapes, but shapes of lower dimensions as well. 
Thus far we have observed that from the perspective of a 2-D plane 3-D shapes 
often vary depending on the orientation of the plane through the entity. In other words, 
the cross section depends on certain relationships obtaining between specific entities. 
With this we now explore cross sections and processes further. 
2.2. Cross-sectioning Processes 
As mentioned in section 1, we can describe cross sections in a processual manner. That 
is, we can formulate an account of intersecting figures as a process. The geometric 
intersection process of a plane with a sphere yields a circular cross section. In an 
ontology that has state as a category, the state of being intersected results from that 
process. This particular cross section exists when the sphere and the plane stand in one 
or more specific relations to each other.8 It exists when shapes are participating or 
engaging in certain processes manifesting those relations. Although it appears 
timelessly true that the cross section of a sphere is a circle9, one may distinguish 
between particular and universal cross sections, holding that the former only (come to) 
exist during an intersection process. 
If so, then given the discussion in preceding sections the individual cross section is 
neither a property of the individual sphere nor of the plane. These (CS-P9) instances of 
geometric cross sections can be ontologically described as relationally-dependent 
entities, perhaps more specifically as relationally-dependent shapes. ‘Relational 
quality’ from [3] is a class that reflects this idea in certain respects, but diverges from 
the conception by concerning material, not geometric, objects. 
Some plane participates in a geometric intersection process with some sphere, the 
intersection of which is a circle. We call this the cross section. The individual circle is 
not an independent entity in this context. It is exhibited by the intersection, reflecting 
some information or properties about the sphere. The information may include the 
radius, circumference, chord length or area (the cross-sectional area) of the sphere at, or 
relative to, certain reference points or axes. In this way, we can understand geometric 
cross sections as intersections in a sense (CS-P10). 
Accepting CS-P10, we describe geometric cross sections as, CS-D2A: the 
geometric intersection of some N-dimensional shape, in an N-dimensional space, with 
a 2-D plane. If one wishes to allow for intersections involving figures other than planes, 
such as the intersection of a sphere with a hyperbola or a cube, we can more generally 
hold CS-D2B: Geometric cross sections are the intersection, or the figure exhibited by 
the intersection, of some N-dimensional shape with another. What if we wish to 
analyze the intersection in terms of points or lines? 
Descending to a lower geometric granular level, that which is intersected more 
discretely than the unities that are the sphere and the plane, is that which they have in 
common: points or lines. They can be described as sharing or having overlapping 
points when they intersect. Along these lines, geometric cross sections are CS-D3: the 
set of points shared by a 3-D shape and a 2-D plane when the two intersect. Connecting 
those points forms a continuous figure that is the cross section in question.  
                                                            
8 Some may wish to call this amalgam a geometric context. 
9 Is this equivalent to saying that the cross section, itself, has a circular quality? Is it a property of 
spheres that they have circular cross sections? 
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Finally, observe that a plane continuously moving through a sphere and 
perpendicular to one of the spheres axes results in a geometrical cross section changing 
through time. The circle continuously changes its size, diameter and area while 
essentially preserving its identity as a (relationally-dependent) circle. Imagine the same 
continuous motion for the aircraft example. At each temporal moment, or at each point 
along the axis, one can identify either a changing cross section or distinct cross sections. 
We can therefore describe a cross section at a single moment of time and diachronically. 
2.3. Cross sections as Spatio-Temporal Entities 
Some applied ontologies, such as [2], include two-dimensional spatial regions as an 
ontological category. With [2] as it’s top-level, one can easily hold that PATO 
implicitly accepts these types of entities as well. Using a spatial region category we 
can form an alternative characterization of a cross section. A cross section is the 2-D 
portion of space-time, or the 2-D spatial region, whose boundaries are defined by the 
spatial or material extent of some part of the 3-D material object.  
In short, we may be tempted to assert CS-D4: cross sections are 2-D portions of 
space occupied by the sectioned entity. Similarly one may equate cross sections with 2-
D material portions/sections of things (CS-D5). These would imply that any portion of 
2-D space or of the 3-D material object is a cross section. Both CS-D4 and CS-D5 are 
most likely incorrect characterizations of cross sections.  
Cross sections are not literally 2-D material slices of things because, again, 2-D 
material slices of 3-D material objects are never created. Matter being 3-D, there is 
always some depth to a material slice. If cross sections are 2-D slices of 3-D material 
objects, and space(-time) is at least 3- or 4-D, then 2-D material slices or spatial regions 
will not be found in the ontology of the world: they do not (and cannot?) exist.10 
At best, an actual physical/material cross-section (as with a dissected brain) could 
be construed as the surface of the section. In this case, if surfaces of material objects 
are included in an ontology as types of 2-D entities, then perhaps these 2-D material 
surfaces can be equated to 2-D material cross sections. One may propose CS-D6: A 
cross section of a material object is the surface of an internal section (part) of the object, 
a surface that is orthogonal to a predefined axis or coordinate system, and that is 
exposed by some sectioning process. This conception is in line with [21], which defines 
a cross section as the surface or shape that is or would be exposed by cutting something 
orthogonal to an axis. 
We do not observe cross sections of things outside of, and unrelated to human 
cognition or activity, and thus outside of some artifactual context. They appear to be, in 
large part, our creations, but creations intentionally reflecting some aspects of other 
entities. They are often born as mental artifacts that are mind-externally concretized 
using information about, or acquired from, the entities that are cross-sectioned. 
 Closing Remarks 3.
The Phenotypic Quality Ontology uses shape quality categories and the notion of a 
cross section to describe the shape of biological entities. Drawing from a preliminary 
                                                            
10 If the universe is at least 3-D, then it may be true that all 2-D entities—2-D shapes, 2-D spatial 
regions, etc.—are all dependent entities, perhaps mental constructions or mathematical tools. 
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analysis of the shape hierarchy of PATO, I first presented some critical observations, 
questions and suggestions, focusing on the has_cross_section relation. Second, I 
discussed the ontology of cross sections, identifying general properties, and presenting 
potential definitions and interpretations of cross sections. 
Finer distinctions and greater clarity is needed, specifically with regard to (1) the 
ontology of geometric/mathematical entities, how they relate to artifacts and material 
objects, and (2) the relationship between the universal-particular and geometric-
physical shape distinctions. With these in place a more accurate ontology of shape may 
better structure and organize existing applied ontologies that use shape categories. 
A point worth reiterating concerning theoretical/philosophical and applied 
ontology development in general is the comparison of the top- and lower-level 
ontological theories. For any domain-ontology using a philosophically rigorous top-
level it is beneficial for the developers of the former to assess whether they agree with 
the ontological/metaphysical account of the latter, or whether theirs is consistent with it. 
Cross sections have a descriptive power in that they convey information about an 
entity of a greater dimensionality. They simultaneously reflect properties of the 
sectioned entity, and have artifactual and relationally-dependent aspects.  
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Abstract. An exploratory, qualitative experiment sheds light on the depictive the-
ory of mental imagery. The study analyzes the very operations subjects undertake
when solving visuospatial tasks. Preliminary results indicate that subjects do not
make use of stable mental images: instead, they continuously assemble and re-
assemble different perspectives through the guidance of heuristics and prototypes.
These observations allow a reinterpretation of mental imagery. We want to forward
the hypotheses that a) the assembly process itself is of much higher importance than
usually acknowledged; b) that an assembled perspective (or figure) is defined by
one’s orientation towards certain operations; and c), that heuristics and prototypes
are instantiated by a heterarchical organization of mental operations.
Keywords.mental imagery, visual synthesis, model construction, spatial orientation
Introduction
What characteristics does the cognitive representation of a shape have? How do humans
reason about and with shapes? Besides from subjective reports of the appearance and
the usage of mental images, the existence of a faculty of imagery – however it may be
conceptualized – has been proven to be functionally involved in cognitive processes. Ev-
idence is for example presented from studies showing that humans can mentally syn-
thesize and subsequently recognize figures. In the paradigmatic experiment of Finke et
al. [1], subjects were asked to compose objects following verbal instructions like the
following:
Imagine the letter . Put a small circle at the bottom of it. Add a horizontal line halfway up.
Now rotate the figure 180 degrees. ([1, p. 62])
Two opposed conceptualizations of mental imagery are established: the depiction
theory and the description theory. These have been forwarded by Kosslyn [2] and
Pylyshyn [3] respectively, who strongly opposed the other’s account; the dispute is
known as the imagery debate. Despite substantial doubts whether the depictive approach
is computationally feasible and cognitively plausible [3], the intuitive apprehension that
in imagery we operate with images of some sort, has become a hardened paradigm and
thereby obstructs alternative conceptualizations. In the following we will present such an
1Corresponding Author: Stefan Schneider, Institute of Cognitive Science, University of Osnabrück,
Germany. E-mail: stefschn@uni-osnabrueck.de.
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Figure 1. A figure that can be easily mentally synthesized and recognized. Re-drawn from Finke et al. [1].
attempt. First, we introduce the depictive approach, and then confront it with hypothe-
ses derived from a reinvestigation of the very operations subjects execute when solving
visuospatial tasks.
1. Stable images at your disposal?
In the experiments of [1], the idea to test for possible reinterpretation is cleverly chosen:
One cannot argue that recognition of the figure rests upon semantic information in the
given description (e.g. as in “Imagine two legs on a torso, add two arms and a head: what
have you got?”), but has to rely on cognitive operations with visuospatial information.
Figure 1 illustrates the intended assembly of a stick-figure. The reader probably has made
his/her own interpretation, possibly similar, by now. It is important to note that subjects
in the experiment only received the verbal instruction and did not use any external aids.
The visual presence of the depiction in Figure 1 might therefore be misleading, and this,
so we want to suggest, shaped the folk-psychological intuition about mental images as
pictures in the head, and laid the foundation of the dominant depictive theory of imagery.
According to Tversky “[t]here are two basic tenets of the approach, one regarding
representations and the other regarding operations on representations: that mental im-
ages resemble percepts, and that mental transformations on images resemble observable
changes in things in the world, as in mental rotation, or perceptual processes performed
on things in the world, as in mental scanning” [4, p. 211]. In a nutshell, the depictive
account says that in solving visuospatial problems, one can distinguish two types of op-
erations: (a) image-construction operations, and (b) subsequent inspection of the image,
analogous to visual perception.
So far the theory. There is something in disorder, though. Apart from transforma-
tions of the image, Kosslyn highlights that images fade – ”they are transient and begin
to decay as soon as they are activated” [2, p. 50]. A frequent reconstruction is neces-
sary, which eventually brings about transformations of the imagined objects or a new
perspective. The fading of images stands in opposition to their asserted analogue nature
to external images (or scenes). This seems to be a flaw in what otherwise could be a
pretty useful imagery faculty. We suggest that shifting the research focus away from a
supposed presence of images, and towards the process of reconstructing these will be of
great value.
2. Operations in imagery. Current research
In an exploratory protocol study, six subjects had to solve visuospatial tasks like the
above with a slightly higher level of complexity. Interviews lasted for about one hour,
and were guided according to an interview protocol devised by Petitmengin [5]. In the
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analysis, reports about the fleetingness of the images became overly present (which sub-
jects often experienced as a nuisance), and accordingly the necessity to continuously as-
semble and re-assemble the intended figure. This becomes evident if the reader considers
the following task:
Imagine a square. Imagine its vertical lines being separated each into three parts of equal
length. Now connect the resulting division marks by two horizontal lines, such that the square
is divided into three identical rectangles. Now add the two diagonals to the square. How many
triangles does the pattern contain? (Adapted from Wiener [6, p. 82f].)
Even though the elements of the figure are easy to imagine, and the whole figure is
not more complicated than the stick-figure, it is very difficult to find all the triangles in
this task (there are much more then one initially might think). Interestingly, constructing
the figure seemed feasible. A typical report of the resulting image reads like this:
Well . . . I have to . . . juggle a bit to keep the components in focus. Everything is there. But I
successively imagine how the horizontal lines join the square, and how the diagonals cross
these lines, that’s all a bit waggly.
But when asked to count the triangles, the picture changes. A typical report is:
I lose the whole image. It isn’t as clear as before any more. (Can you still examine it?) Yes,
but I have to build it up anew. And in considering a detail of the image I . . . somehow have to
retrace the constituents, for example putting in the diagonal again.
This change of the subject’s representation of the figure suggests that the task – in
this case, constructing the image versus finding triangles – guides the process. In the
latter case, for example, subjects rely on the given elements of the figure and assemble
subsets of these in order to construct triangles. That is, instead of looking at the image and
recognizing triangles, subjects actively try to construct triangles from the given material.
The following transcript illustrates such an attempt; the subject has the idea that there
could be another type of triangle and actively tries to assemble it:
There is another idea - to search for another line with which the diagonal can form a triangle -
there have to be more, because the diagonals cross the lines of the two horizontal lines. I begin
in the upper left corner and . . . trace the diagonal . . . and it it goes a level deeper, and forms
a triangle where it crosses the second horizontal line. I didn’t really search for the horizontal
line, but looked how the diagonal runs, whether it could form a triangle somewhere. . . . I never
have the whole image, but only - well, I often lose the whole image. I trace lines, of which I
should already know how it runs. . . . Then I felt reminded of the symmetry, and the thought
comes up that there have to be four of them.
The subject has an idea – we want to call it a prototype – of a certain type of triangle
which only half of the subjects found. It is being formed by one of the vertical sides, an
adjacent diagonal, and the horizontal line which is further away from it; this description
would already suffice to deduce a triangle. But for the subject, this is only a hypotheses
so far which he tries to instantiate: he traces the diagonal and tries to coordinate it with
the horizontal line. But he cannot simply see this line and the intersection. Instead, he
makes the horizontal line up again from the initial figure, and coordinates the intersection
with the diagonal. Another interesting aspect about his description is the intuition of
symmetry, which provides a heuristic to look out for more triangles.
We want to briefly paraphrase our findings. Focusing on the assemble operations,
we can see that different perspectives are being assembled over and over. This process
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Figure 2. Another figure that can be easily synthesized. The task though consists in (mentally!) recognizing
how many triangles the figure contains. This should be easy! Is it?. From Wiener [6].
is guided in a very fine-grained manner by a scaffolding of the task structure (triangles)
and on-the-fly produced prototypes and heuristics. We consider these to be ontologically
equivalent, because all guide the assembly of elements of the initial figure and thereby
provide a tightly meshed, heterarchical organization of mental operations. Because all of
these guides path the way to assemble components, we suggest that an assembled per-
spective (or figure) is defined by one’s orientation towards certain operations. Eventually,
an assembled perspective confirms the instantiation of a certain property or relation.
3. Summary and hypotheses
Based on our exploration of visuospatial reasoning we want to propose a renewed inter-
pretation of mental imagery. In imagery, one actively attempts to assemble an intended
structure; but one does not simply see it. One can indeed think of the whole process as
being constituted through operations of type (a) and (b) from above, but with a reversed
order. We do not make up an image to see something, but we want to see something, and
in the absence of a visual stimulus we have to construct an orientation that fits.
Is the visual metaphor of depictive theory – imagery as internalized perception –
therefore invalid? This only holds if we think of seeing as a one-way, passive uptake
of input. But in an account of active perception, like that of Rensink, he states that one
looks at scenes in a structural manner: “scene representations are no [. . . ] structures built
up from eye movements and attentional shifts, but rather, are structures that guide such
activities [7, p. 36]”.
With regard to the top-down guidance that we found in imagery we are sympathetic
to such a conceptualization of vision. But do we therefore have to rephrase and say,
somewhat awkward, perception is externalized imagery? Based on our observations there
would be a missing piece, which are the overly present dynamic processes of assembling
figures. We think it holds that imagery has its ontogenetic foundation in intentionally
guided visual operations, and go with Piaget [8] who envisages that based on ones repre-
sentation of actions, one eventually develops the capability to substitute external through
internal processes. The dynamic assembly of figures might be just the organism’s way
around the lack of available sensor stimulation.
Our results are preliminary. In order to further our understanding of assembly pro-
cesses, we are currently executing a study on the development of spatial orientation in
familiar environments. Our approach also shows promising relations to a recent study,
where [9] investigated assembly processes in the apparently unrelated faculty of mathe-
matic cognition.
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Abstract.
We present a preliminary concept and a prototypical implementation of a declara-
tive computing framework that is capable of reasoning about 3D physical entities,
and the shadows that they cast in open or uniformly lit environments. For this pa-
per, we restrict our scope of ‘uniform lighting’ to sunlight, and its incidence on a
given geospatially and temporally referenced location.
The model extends traditional techniques from computational geometry and com-
puter graphics that are primarily motivated by simulation or visualisation. In par-
ticular, our declarative framework is capable of deriving and reasoning about the
objects and their cast shadows in a knowledge processing sense, e.g., involving
qualitative abstraction and semantic specification of requirements, query capability,
ensuring conceptual consistency of design requirements. Our ontology of objects
and shadows, and the resulting computational framework serves as a foundational
engine for high-level conceptual (spatial) design assistance technology.
The capabilities demonstrated in this paper are aimed at applications in spatial de-
sign, chiefly encompassing Computer-Aided Architecture Design (CAAD), Urban
Planning, and Interior Design.
Keywords. declarative languages, knowledge representation and reasoning,
geometric and spatial representation and reasoning, computational geometry,
shadows, CAAD, design
1. Introduction
The way in which direct sunlight falls on surfaces in the built environment has a tremen-
dous impact on its atmosphere, character, and affordances. Consider the role of sunlight
in fostering a golden autumnal scene, the mood established by acutely angled sun rays
in the early morning, or headache-inducing glare in a work place.
The absence of direct sunlight is shadow. Shadows and sunlight partition empty space;
they are not objects in the sense of having a material extension in the way that walls,
doors, and other physical objects do. Yet architects are centrally concerned with the play
between shadows and sunlight, and reason about the physical geometric forms and ar-
rangements of shadows and sunlight, for example, to achieve a visual balance, to focus
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or accentuate aspects of the design, or to create a visual flow through a hierarchy of
illumination.
Questions surrounding the behaviour of sunlight come to the fore in urban-scale designs.
Architects need to determine how the orientation, shape, and positioning of buildings and
large environment features influence the geometric forms of shadows. How can we ma-
nipulate the objects in the environment to achieve a desired atmosphere through shadows
and sunlight? Would it be possible to manipulate shadows directly in our design?
Various numerical techniques have been developed for computing the effects of lighting
in an environment. One method is detailed ray tracing where a large number of simu-
lation rays are emitted from the light source and reflected from intercepting surfaces.1
While being very accurate and precise, there are significant limitations with these de-
tailed numerical approaches.
Firstly, they require an enormous amount of computational resources, and may take hours
or even days to produce a lighting model for large-scale urban designs. This makes it
infeasible to repeatedly re-run the simulation after making minor changes to the design.
Secondly, the results do not emphasise the essential form of shadows as objects. For
example, they may produce a complex point cloud of luminance values that requires yet
further complex calculations to answer basic questions about sunlight and shadow. By
applying a uniformly high degree of numerical precision to every aspect of the building
design, these methods hide those critical qualitative aspects of the design that play the
most important role in natural lighting.
Thirdly, these methods require a detailed numerical building design before the lighting
model can be generated. But very often, particularly in the early stages of a design, many
numerical details are simply not available, such as the exact lengths of certain walls or
the precise orientation of certain buildings.
We present a qualitative approach for generating shadows and sunlight regions as first-
class objects using appropriate abstractions of building information models and natural
lighting. Our objective is to extend and enrich standing design information models with
different types of natural lighting space. We accomplish this within the paradigm of
constraint logic programming so as to support declarative queries and high-level analysis
about sunlight and shadows.
2. The Shape of Shadows
Seen as mathematical objects, shadows are a product of the interaction between opaque
geometric forms and light. The placing and orienting of walls and windows is sculpting
the forms of shadows and sunlight, and thus shaping yet another layer of experience from
the environment, beyond the material objects and the perceived empty space [Bhatt et al.,
2012]. Figure 1 comparatively illustrates these three layers of a scene.
1Each ray might have a maximum number of allowable reflections before the simulation of the ray is termi-
nated. Properties of the ray are recorded, such as the complete path or just the intersection points, and this data
is used to generate a detailed surface lighting model.
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Figure 1. A design represented as the material, perceived empty space, and resulting shadows.
2.1. Spatial Patterns and the Subjective Experience
Within each layer the designer can specify spatial patterns that they deem to evoke salient
user experiences or induce certain behaviours. Consider the following brief extracts from
Seidler’s opening statements about the role of sunlight and shadow in architecture [Sei-
dler, 1959]:
“Solid form is accentuated and added to by the shadow it casts which recalls design
form.”
“Spidery elements, adjuncts to buildings and sculpture increase the interest of their
own forms by the complex pattern of their shadows which must be considered as an
integral part of the elements that cast them.”
“The oscillation between light and shade gives richness to building in contrast [..]”
In these excerpts the architect identifies a number of relationships: shadows accentuate
the experience of material forms; complex patterns of shadow increase interest in archi-
tectural forms; oscillation patterns add richness to the experience of the environment.
For example, a small patch of sunlight can be accentuated by a much larger region of
surrounding shadow. Such a pattern may function as a visual attractor for user wayfind-
ing, and the visual emphasis and focus may provide a heightened sense of excitment and
drama. We argue that these patterns are qualitative, rather than metric, in nature, and that
they can be successfully formalised within first-order logic expressions over semantically
rich building information models.
2.2. The dynamic nature of shadows and sunlight
There is an inherent dynamism in the nature of sunlight that operates at numerous levels.
The location of the sun in relation to the environment clearly has an immediate impact on
the forms of shadows. Although this relationship is constantly changing throughout the
day, the induced patterns of sunlight and shadow can appear fixed at a given moment,
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especially at an urban scale. Thus, an environment can exhibit distinct visual states from
sunlight at various times of the day.
The seasonal variations of the sun’s trajectory across the sky also has a clear impact
in many countries: the low arc of the sun’s path during winter can cast long shadows
throughout a day and may leave some parts of the environment without any direct sun-
light for months.2
This dynamism gives rise to two basic questions: what are the shapes of shadows and
sunlight at a given moment, and what are those shapes across periods of time? For ex-
ample, the designer may need to know whether a given room ever has direct sunlight
during the day, or whether a certain cafe zone has direct sunlight at each midday period
throughout the year.
Computationally answering each one of these questions requires the capability to han-
dle conceptual, spatial, and temporal concepts in an expressive knowledge processing
and inferencing environment. From an application viewpoint, this is the objective of the
ongoin work reported in this paper.
3. A Qualitative Model of Sunlight and Shadows
In this section we describe the abstractions of our sun model. Our model provides the
necessary information for determining the regions of space covered in shadow, it is flex-
ible enough to work with both highly under-specified early designs and detailed numeri-
cal designs, and generates shadows in real-time. Thus, our model allows the designer to
quickly experiment with a large number of designs to determine how shadows broadly
behave.
In this model we focus explicitly on direct sunlight (and ignore ambient illumination
[Schultz et al., 2009]), i.e. regions of space in which there is an uninterrupted straight
line from the sun to every point in the region; shadows are the absence of direct sunlight.
3.1. Modelling Outdoor Sunlight
When modelling sunlight on an urban scale we only take large objects into account such
as buildings, large trees, and billboards.3 We use a highly abstracted model of buildings
to determine how they cast outdoor shadows: while buildings can consist of thousands of
objects, the single most informative features are the geometries, elevations, and heights
of slabs (i.e. rooves and floors).
Shadows are generated from slabs by making the qualitative generalisation that walls
and other objects holding up slabs are effectively opaque. This provides a rapid approx-
imation of the building envelope. Other large outdoor objects are modelled using very
abstract geometries such as bounding boxes. Thus, the designer only needs to provide a
very rough outline of buildings and amenities to begin experimenting with shadows.
2The interference of other objects such as clouds can also influence the form of shadows, but these external
conditions are not relevant for our qualitative model.
3Modelling the shadows of an outdoor park bench is too fine-grained and will not contribute to an under-
standing of how shadows influence and shape the environment on a large scale.
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(a) Sun modelled as a point
source and placed on a celes-
tial sphere. The sun traces a path
around the building design.
(b) Buildings abstracted using
slabs.
(c) Slabs projected and
“stretched” based on the
location of the sun.
(d) 3D shadow volumes. (e) 2D shadow footprints.
Figure 2. Generating shadows with a qualitative sun model.
As is typical for planetary models [Roderick, 1992], we model the sun as a point source
placed on a celestial sphere centred on the design. The sun is positioned using altitude
and azimuth angles.4 We generate a model of shadows by “stretching” each vertex of
each slab polygon according to the elevation and height of the slab, and location of the
sun. This results in 2D shadow footprints (useful for top-down plan analysis) and 3D
shadow volumes. The process is illustrated in Figure 2.
If the sun’s altitude is within a certain range then indoor direct sunlight can be approxi-
mated using the isovist of a point derived from the sun’s location,5 as illustrate in Figure
3. This abstracts from the height information of the windows, and other precise design
parameters, to provide the designer with information on the rooms that are exposed to
direct sunlight.
4Standard formulae for converting latitude, longitude, calendar date, and time of day into approximate sun
coordinates are usable; for details, refer to [Ast, 1996] page C24.
5More specifically, the sun point is projected onto a plane that is parallel to the ground and set to the elevation
of the relevant building floor. The isovist is then taken from this projected point in that plane.
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Figure 3. Direct sunlight in the building interior (the sun is located in the upper left area of the plan).
4. Declarative High-level Design Specifications for Shadows
In this section we present an assortment of declarative programming logic specifications
in the domain of urban and indoor design for art galleries, academic sites, and other
public spaces. These example rules are processed using our general purpose spatial rea-
soning framework CLP(QS) [Bhatt et al., 2011]; CLP(QS) provides domain-independent
geometric and qualitative spatial and temporal reasoning functionality within a Constrain
Logic Programming (CLP) setting .
Sunlight and Shadow predicates. The location of the sun is defined by altitude and
azimuth, which in turn can be computed from a calendar date and time. We can determine
the sun location based on a given time, or the time that corresponds to a given location,
by using the predicate:
sun(DateTime, Azi, Alt).
Painting damage. There may be a risk that paintings are damaged if they are exposed
to direct sunlight. This occurs if there is some period in which the sunlight overlaps the
painting.
riskOfSunDamage(Painting) :-
physical space(Painting, ,PPolygon),
sunlight(sun(DateTime, , ), ,SPolygon),
topology(SPolygon,PPolygon,overlaps).
Rooms with sunlight. We can determine whether particular rooms in our design get
direct sunlight during winter.
sunRoom(Room) :-
movement space( ,Room,MPolygon),
winter(DateTime),
sunlight(sun(DateTime, , ), ,SPolygon),
topology(SPolygon,MPolygon,overlaps).
148
Summer Winter
Figure 4. Regions of space that are always in shadow (brown), and always in sunlight (orange), throughout
the entire day, during summer and winter.
Morning Evening
Figure 5. Regions of space that are always in shadow (brown) and always in sunlight (orange) for every
morning (left) and evening (right) across the entire year.
Uncomfortable cafe garden. At around midday throughout the year, the area where
people relax and enjoy lunch should not be completely covered in shadow.
uncomfortableCafeArea(CafeOutdoorArea) :-
movement space(CafeOutdoorArea, ,MPolygon),
midday(DateTime),
shadow(sun(DateTime, , ), ,SPolygon),
topology(SPolygon,MPolygon,contains).
Shadow forms across periods of time. The dynamism of shadows as a product of the
changing relationship between environment and sun results in patterns and forms that
can be captured and analysed. For example, as in the uncomfortable cafe example, the
architect may need to study the topology of regions that are always in shadow over a
period of time.
Figure 4 shows the areas throughout summer (left) and winter (right) that are always in
sunlight (orange), and always in shadow (brown). We can observe that, during winter,
certain areas of sunlight in the central portion of the design grow and become discon-
nected from the larger sunlit region to the right. This “island” of sunlight is highlighted
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by the surrounding colder shadowed regions, and thus could be utilised as an area for
outdoor winter activities such as winter markets, events, or a shared cafe area.
The periods of time do not need to be temporally contiguous. Figure 5 shows the areas
of sunlight and shadow from every morning and evening throughout the entire year.
5. Discussion and Future work
In our current prototypical implementation, we compute dynamic forms of sunlight and
shadow regions by sampling sun locations within the specified period, generating the
sunlight or shadow regions for each sample, and combining the results. One future re-
search aim is to fully encode the relationship between calendar date, sun location, and
sunlight and shadow regions within the framework of Constraint Logic Programming.
Furthermore, based on our preliminary foundations in [Schultz et al., 2009], we are also
investigating the incorporation of non-uniformly lit ambient lighting conditions, which
are more suited for interior design scenarios, and in cases where the internal composure
of a building is controlled via artificial light sources.
This leads into the next core future research aim of generating metric instantiations from
qualitative (spatial) relational specifications – that is, automatically adjusting designs in
order to satisfy certain high-level qualitative properties. Given certain shadow proper-
ties that must be satisfied in the design such as “the painting must not be exposed to
direct sunlight”, our reasoning system (i.e., underlying constraint solver) will find solu-
tions by rotating and translating the objects on the ground-plane in a manner that the de-
rived transformation satisfies the desired topological relationships between the physical
entities and their cast shadows.
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Mental “structures” in the Berlin school of 
Gestalt Psychology: can sensation be 
described as “structural”? 
Eric TREMAULT 
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Abstract. It is not exaggerated to affirm that the modern notion of structure arises 
in Koffka’s Growth of the Mind and in his following article, “Perception : An 
introduction to the Gestalt-theorie” (1922). The importance of the notion of 
structure as Koffka uses it lies in the fact that it is designed to replace the old 
empiricist notion of “sensation” as a real and separable element of the phenomenal 
field, corresponding to a definite stimulus. But, yielding to many suggestions by 
Köhler, Koffka does not only understand the interdependency of sensations in a 
structure as a causal one: in fact, he decidedly understands it as a logical one. Thus 
he defines structures as “very elementary reactions, which phenomenally are not 
composed of constituent elements, their members being what they are by virtue of 
their ‘member-character,’ their place in the whole; their essential nature being 
derived from the whole whose members they are” (“Perception”, p.543). I mean to 
show that the parts in such structures can only be what it is classical to name 
“relational attributes” or “relational predicates”. In other words, structures are now 
internal relations between their terms, and more precisely still “directly 
constitutive internal relations”, not internal relations reducing to the existence of 
their terms as were the internal relations against which Russell struggled, but 
relations to which their terms reduce. But the real importance of this notion of 
structure is that it rests and is built upon a truly impressive amount of empirical 
data. Nevertheless, I want to show that Koffka’s conception of sensation is 
fundamentally impossible to conceive, and that the belief that it is empirically 
grounded rests mainly on a confusion between abstraction of a sense-datum and 
real separation of the stimuli underlying such a datum. As a consequence, 
phenomenal structures, if they exist, can only be external to their terms, as they are 
in Köhler’s view, in spite of many ambiguities in his formulations. However, I will 
end by showing that, correctly understood, the notion of structure can still be of 
great help in phenomenology and psychology since it provides a naturalistic means 
to understand how a non-intentional “meaning” can be passively present at a 
sensory level. 
Keywords: Structure ; Internal relations ; Sensation ; Gestalt psychology ; 
Phenomenology 
Introduction 
My main aim in this paper is to object to any kind of “structural” theory concerning 
sensation, meaning by this any theory which claims that one cannot attribute a relation 
to a sensorial content without intrinsically altering it. In philosophical terms, such a 
theory would refuse to acknowledge a distinction between “knowledge by 
acquaintance” and “knowledge about”: it would argue that all so-called “knowledge by 
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acquaintance” is only knowledge so far as it is knowledge of the relations of a sensorial 
content, and that this content itself is ultimately reducible to those relations. Thus, a 
“structural theory of sensation” is essentially emphasizing the primacy of relations over 
sensations. Such was the neo-Hegelian approach to sensation at the end of the 
Nineteenth Century, whose most famous representatives were T.H. Green and 
F.H. Bradley. As William James put it in his Principles of Psychology ([1],[2]), quoting 
T.H. Green:   
“The only reals for the neo-Hegelian writers appear to be relations, 
relations without terms, or whose terms are speciously such and really 
consist in knots, or gnarls relations finer still in infinitum. ‘Exclude from 
what we have considered real all qualities constituted by relation, we find 
that none are left’ ‘Abstract the many relations from the one thing and 
there is nothing … Without relations it would not exist at all.’ 
[T. H. Green, Prolegomena to Ethics, §§ 20, 28.] ‘The single feeling is 
nothing real.’ ‘On the recognition of relations as constituting the nature 
of ideas, rests the possibility of any tenable theory of their reality.’ 
[Introduction to Hume, §§ 146, 188.]” ([2], p. 10). 
Thus, it is T.H. Green who first developed most clearly a “structural theory” 
concerning sensation. Bradley’s point of view is more complex (as was particularly 
well shown by Peter Hylton [3]), since he also tried to reduce all external relations to 
internal relations, but then wanted to prove the unreality of internal relations 
themselves: for what he really tried to demonstrate was the unreality of all kinds of 
relations. Following the path of Russell and William James most notoriously, I shall 
then reject Bradley’s first move, and defend externals relations against their reduction 
to internal ones; but then I shall nonetheless take over the arguments Bradley uses in 
his second move, against certain kinds of internal relations.  
However, it is less known, and more directly interesting to us here, that the Berlin 
school of Gestalt psychology, when it first introduced the notion of “structure” in its 
contemporary meaning in psychology and philosophy, was itself mainly concerned 
with developing such a structural theory of sensation, in the neo-Hegelian sense just 
used. But it seems nevertheless that Gestalt psychologists never had any kind of a 
priori bias or leaning towards neo-Hegelian thinking when developing this notion of 
“structure” as it is still used today, and on the contrary always showed public disdain 
for what they called “romantic” theories of nature1. Even this disdain itself was only 
formulated as an answer to psychologists who precisely read Gestalt psychology as a 
new kind of neo-Hegelianism. Hence, there is no reason to think that this disdain was 
simulated, and more reason to think that Gestalt psychologists only discovered the 
possibility of tracing their theories back to neo-Hegelianism when reading the 
commentaries of others. Indeed, it is mainly Kurt Koffka who, among Berlin Gestalt 
psychologists, clearly developed a structural theory of sensations in Die Grundlagen 
der psychischen Entwicklung (1921, translated as [7] in 1924, first edition), and in his 
following article in English, “Perception : An introduction to the Gestalt-theorie” (1922, 
[8]), but this structural theory almost entirely disappeared in his late master work, 
Principles of Gestalt Psychology (1935, [9]), which largely explains why this aspect of 
Gestalt psychology seems to be widely ignored today, even though it remains as one of 
the central reasons for the influence of this school, especially among philosophers such 
                                                            
1 See Köhler [4], pp. 153 f. ([5], p. 30), and especially his detailed answer to G.E. 
Müller on this question in [6] ([5], pp. 379 f.).  
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as Merleau-Ponty, Cassirer and Scheler. Now, as far as I know, Koffka never clearly 
explained why he had to abandon his initial theory, but the fact that it finally appeared 
to him linked with neo-Hegelianism may very well be one of the reasons for this 
disappearance. Nevertheless, I want to show that there are other reasons which go 
much deeper than this one. But what I wanted first to emphasize is that, not being 
interested at all in neo-Hegelian thought, the only reason why Gestalttheory ended up 
formulating a new kind of structural theory of sensation is that such a theory seems at 
first glance to rest on facts. This is what makes it so difficult to untangle the intellectual 
situation surrounding such structural theories even today: for a great number of 
psychological facts seem to support them, even though, as I intend to show, those 
theories will prove to be logically impossible to conceive. In this paper, I want to focus 
on this theoretical and logical impossibility of the notion of “structure” as Koffka first 
introduced it, and as it is still used today when precisely employed. But, as it seems to 
me that the real importance of this notion is that it rests and is built upon a truly 
impressive amount of empirical data, I need to begin with a paradigmatic example that 
will reveal its prima facie legitimacy.  
1. Empirical data in favor of a “structural theory of sensation” 
For this purpose, I will quickly present the phenomenon known since Jaensch as the 
phenomenon of “colour-transformation”, a phenomenon that Koffka lays great stress 
on since he uses it to interpret the chromatic constancy phenomena as well2. Koffka 
thus shows that all colours appear and are qualitatively determined upon a general 
“chromatic level” which may correspond to any objective colour stimulus but always 
appears as a neutral white, while the phenomenal colour of the other stimuli (which 
generally appear as “figures” upon this “ground”) depends upon their difference or 
“gradient” from the “level” stimuli. As a matter of fact, these level stimuli generally 
correspond approximately to the center of the chromatic scale of the present stimuli, 
and it is the relation of the surrounding stimuli to this chromatic center that determines 
the phenomenal colour those stimuli will appear with. Most of the time, the chromatic 
center is the chromatic value of the general lighting, so that the colour of this lighting 
will tend to phenomenally disappear, while the phenomenal colour of all stimuli will 
depend on their objective difference from the lighting stimuli. This explains why the 
figures we actually see always tend to appear with the same colour they “truly” have, 
even when seen under coloured lightings: inasmuch as the lighting covers both figure 
and ground, the “gradient” between them remains constant, whatever the objective 
colour of the lighting may be. But the “colour-transformation” phenomenon is most 
striking when the light on the figure is isolated, while the lighting on the ground is 
slowly changed. For, this time, the objective difference between the stimuli 
corresponding to figure and ground is accordingly modified, and the result is that the 
ground remains phenomenally constant while the colour of the figure changes under 
our eyes. For instance, if a “white” figure seen under neutral light is isolated from its 
“white” ground seen under a yellow light, the eye gets a neutral stimulus upon a 
“yellow” level, but the objective difference between figure and level will then seem to 
be “translated” so that what will actually appear is a “blue” figure upon a white 
“normal” ground. Thus, this phenomenon is extremely paradoxical if one still believes 
                                                            
2 See Koffka, [8], pp. 567-570; [10], pp. 334 f.; and [9], pp. 254 f. 
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in what Köhler called “the constancy hypothesis” [10], i.e. the hypothesis that what 
really appears to us is in a continuous relation with the outside stimuli, so that it should 
be isomorphic to them. For here, the phenomenal figure changes from white to blue 
while its underlying stimuli remain constant, whereas the phenomenal ground remains 
white while its underlying stimuli change from white to yellow. The facts upon which 
Koffka built his first structural theory are thus generally facts that contradict the 
constancy hypothesis, and in which the phenomenal changes seem grounded on a 
change in the relations between the stimuli. Some of those facts, such as “contrast” 
phenomena, in which two adjacent colours in space or time tend to tinge with the 
complementary colour of each other, were known long before Gestalt psychology. But 
most of the empirical data used by Koffka to legitimate his structural conception of 
sensation is gathered from child and animal psychology. Koffka thus tries to show at 
great length in The Growth of the Mind [7] that children have to learn to differentiate 
colours and that only when they have began to do so, do colours indeed appear to them. 
According to the detailed interpretation Koffka makes of the facts available at the time, 
even “things” or “figures” do not at first appear as such to children or animals, but only 
as members in more comprehensive “structures” which are more immediate or 
instinctive to children and animals than the “thing-structure” is. But let us now turn to 
those structures from a theoretical point of view, and begin our examination by clearly 
stating the way Koffka defines them.  
2. Koffka’s definition of “structures” 
The notion of mental structure first appears in Gestalt psychology in Köhler’s book on 
Physical Gestalten [4] but it is mainly developed by Koffka in Die Grundlagen der 
psychischen Entwicklung (1921), though in the English version of this book (The 
Growth of the Mind [7]), “Struktur” is translated as “configuration”, so that it won’t be 
confused with the notion of “structure” as used by Titchener at the same time3. But 
Titchener’s use of the word is no longer predominant, and as a matter of fact 
“structuralism” as we mean it today is largely based on the notion of structure as 
Koffka developed it4. So that it is not exaggerated to affirm that the modern notion of 
structure arises in Koffka’s Growth of the Mind and in his following article, 
“Perception : An introduction to the Gestalt-theorie” (1922, [8]), by which Koffka first 
                                                            
3  “The translation of the book … was a difficult task because of the new 
terminology employed, for which English equivalents had to be coined. The difficulty 
was increased by the fact that one of the chief terms employed, namely, Struktur, could 
not be retained as ‘structure’, since, as a result of the controversy between 
structuralism and functionalism, this term has a very definite and quite different 
meaning in English and American psychology. For want of a better term, we have 
chosen to follow a suggestion originally made by Professor E. B. Titchener, and have 
translated Struktur as ‘configuration,’ although I can not say that it has completely 
satisfied me” ([7], pp. xv-xvi). 
4 Of course this is not the place to trace the history of “structuralism”. For 
converging views, see for instance Merleau-Ponty [12], pp. 102 f.; and [13], pp. 142 f. 
Jakobson himself ([14], p. 715) reminded “the assiduous attention which linguists of 
the two hemispheres paid to the progress of Gestalt psychology” during the 
development of structural linguistics.  
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introduced Gestalt-theorie in English, and where Struktur was still translated as 
“structure”. 
The importance of the notion of structure as Koffka uses it lies in the fact that it is 
clearly designed to replace the old empiricist notion of “sensation” as a real and 
separable element of the phenomenal field, corresponding to a definite stimulus. In that 
sense, as Merleau-Ponty put it in La structure du comportement, “the theory of form … 
tends to develop in a philosophy of form which would substitute itself to the 
philosophy of substances” ([15], pp. 142-143). In Physical Gestalten ([4], p. 55; [5], 
p. 27), Köhler distinguished “structure” and “Gestalt” by admitting that “structures” are 
interdependent elements, thus revealing properties which they would not have, were 
they simply added one to another as in a pure “distribution”. But those properties are 
not only whole properties, and “structures” are not only wholes distinct from the sum 
of their parts, as Ehrenfels’ Gestaltqualitäten were ([4], pp. 35-27; [5], pp. 24-25): their 
very parts themselves are transformed by the structural nature of the whole. This 
amounts to saying that the whole which unites the parts is not only “formal”: it is a 
causal, dynamic whole, which is what a “Gestalt” means for the Berlin school of 
Gestalt Psychology. In other words, a mental “structure” between sensations reveals 
that there is a physiological “Gestalt” between their physiological correlates in the 
cortex. This is what the “isomorphism” hypothesis introduced by Gestalt psychologists 
means: each mental “form” (or “Gestalt quality”) is a “structure”, thus corresponding to 
a dynamic system in the brain. To talk about “structure” is to talk about the 
interdependent parts of this system, whether psychological or physiological; to talk 
about “Gestalt” for the Berlin school is to talk about the causal and dynamic whole 
which makes them qualitatively interdependent. But, yielding to many suggestions by 
Köhler, Koffka does not only understand the interdependency of sensations in a 
structure as a causal one: in fact, he decidedly understands it as a logical one. Here is 
how he defines “structures” in “Perception”: 
“Structures, then, are very elementary reactions, which phenomenally are 
not composed of constituent elements, their members being what they are 
by virtue of their ‘member-character,’ their place in the whole; their 
essential nature being derived from the whole whose members they are” 
([8], p.543). 
Thus, Koffka wants to show that there are no absolute sensorial contents in our 
perception, but only structures. He takes the example of two squares of gray cardboard 
lying side by side, which we perceive to be of different grayness: can we describe this 
experience, as Ehrenfels and the Graz school would have done ([8], p. 536), as 
grounded on a comparison between two sets of otherwise atomic and independent 
sensations? In reality, Koffka says, what appears in this case is at once a differential 
structure, with a “steep or moderate ascent” ([8], p. 540), in one way or another, 
between the two squares. Hence, those do not appear for themselves, in isolation from 
each other, as two sets of sensations should, but they only appear as “steps” in a 
brightness scale: 
“This must be rightly understood. If I say a real stair has two steps, I do 
not say there is one plank below and another plank above. I may find out 
later that the steps are planks, but originally I saw no planks, but only 
steps. Just so in my brightness steps: I see the darker left and the brighter 
right not as separate and independent pieces of color, but as steps, and as 
steps ascending from left to right. What does this mean? A plank is a 
plank anywhere and in any position; a step is a step only in its proper 
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position in a scale. Again, a sensation of gray, for traditional psychology, 
may be a sensation of gray anywhere, but a gray step is a gray step only 
in a series of brightnesses.” ([8], p. 540) 
What we see, according to Koffka, is again a “‘crescendo’ or ‘diminuendo’”, which is 
“an undivided whole” ([8], p. 546), though it may be articulated into two different 
moments or “steps”. The main point is thus that those steps are really inseparable from 
the crescendo itself, which does not hold between them. On the contrary, the steps only 
hold within the crescendo: 
“For, speaking of ‘steps’ I mean not only two different levels, but the rise 
itself, the upward trend and direction, which is not a separate, flighty, 
transitional sensation, but a central property of this whole undivided 
experience. Undivided does not mean uniform, for an undivided 
experience may be articulated and it may involve an immense richness of 
detail, yet this detail does not make of it a sum of many experiences. The 
direction upward or downward under certain conditions, e. g., under brief 
exposure, may be the chief moment of the total experience; in extreme 
cases, this direction may be present and nothing else, the plank-character 
of the steps having entirely vanished.” ([8], p. 541) 
Defined as they are by Koffka, it seems to me that “structures” must then be 
understood as networks of internal relations, and that is what Koffka himself 
sometimes writes:  
“Two colours adjacent to each other are not perceived as two 
independent things, but as having an inner connection which is at the 
same time a factor determining the special qualities A and B 
themselves.” ([7], p. 221)  
But one must be very careful here to understand those structural internal relations in 
their very precise meaning. To talk about internal relations logically means that the 
terms of this relation would be different, were they not in this relation. Thus, a change 
in internal relation logically “implies” a change in the terms. But, as François Clementz 
most notably has clearly shown ([16], [17]), this can have two different ontological 
meanings: either the relation is grounded on its terms; or the terms are grounded on 
their relation. In the first case, the change in the relation “supposes” a change in the 
terms; in the second case, the change in the relation “determines” a change in the terms. 
The first type of internal relation is the most commonly discussed. “Similarity” for 
example, is generally admitted as an internal relation inasmuch as two white things 
cannot cease to be “similar” unless at least one of the things ceases to be white. But 
such is precisely not the way Koffka understands similarity in the case of two similar 
sensations: it is then the “inner connection” between the two colours that determines 
“the special qualities A and B themselves”. In this case, we are then dealing, not with a 
“grounded” internal relation (which are the only kind of internal relations discussed by 
Russell in his debate with Bradley), but with a holistic type of relation, that François 
Clementz (and also John Bacon [18]) calls “directly constitutive” internal relations. 
Clementz interestingly points out that the question whether “there really are internal 
relations in this sense – which seems to be what the British Idealists had in mind when 
they claimed that all relations are internal – is open to dispute” ([17], p. 172), but he 
adds in a note that, even today:  
“Many philosophers would probably accept that there might well be 
relations of that kind – notably ‘structural’ relations – holding betweeen 
such varieties of abstract, formal or intensional entities as space points, 
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numbers, concepts or meanings, phenomenal colours, social institutions, 
artworks and so on. Whether there are constitutive relations beyond this 
abstract domain is much more controversial. A widespread argument to 
the effect that they are no such relations obtaining between concrete 
particulars is that this would violate Hume’s principle that there cannot 
be any kind of logical link between ‘distinct existences’.” ([17], p. 172 
note 7) 
It is worth noting here that, according to Clementz, phenomenal colours today only 
appear reducible to their relations on the condition that they are understood as “abstract, 
formal or intensional entities”: but the question is precisely whether they are such, and 
I now want to show that they are not, beginning with “the widespread argument” that 
Clementz talks about.  
3. Objections against Koffka’s “structural programme” 
Once Koffka’s “structures” are understood as networks of “directly constitutive 
internal relations”, it appears that some classical objections have been formulated 
against them, of which Koffka takes no account.  
3.1. “Structural relations” as inauthentic relations 
The “widespread argument” Clementz refers to is indeed Bradley’s classical objection 
against internal relations in Appearance and Reality, an argument very well summed up 
by Hylton: 
“If a is internally related to b, then the relation to b is part of a’s internal 
nature. Since ‘a’s internal nature’ is just what a essentially is, it follows 
that a is not independent, but is what it is only because of its relation to b. 
Internal relations are thus unstable: as relations they set up their objects 
as independent entities; as internal they make it clear that their objects 
are not independent, but can be considered only as part of a larger totality 
… By their internality, internal relations make it manifest that they are 
destined to be transcended in a higher unity in which the separateness of 
the relata, and thus the relational nature of the whole, has disappeared.” 
([3], p. 55). 
Interpreted most faithfully, this argument by Bradley seems to lead to the conclusion 
that internal relations cannot be authentic “relations”, since they simply cannot have 
any term. Indeed, the ultimate goal of neo-Hegelian Idealism seems to be the reduction 
of all separate substances in traditional ontology to knots of “relational predicates”, as a 
premise to demonstrate that only the “whole” uniting those “pseudo-substances” can be 
real. Thus, admitting that it is the definition of a relation to have terms, the pseudo-
reality of internal relations is “destined to be transcended in a higher unity in which the 
separateness of the relata, and thus the relational nature of the whole, has disappeared”. 
However, this argument thus formulated does not really bear against Koffka, since this 
“transcendence” of relations with terms actually seems to be what “structures” are 
destined to accomplish as well for Koffka, at least concerning sensations. The left 
square appears as the “less bright”, the right one as “the brighter” of the two, and this 
difference in brightness is supposed to be constitutive of the brightness itself of both 
squares. But, if this is true, one important conclusion has to be drawn from the rejection 
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of Bradley’s argument: the “steps” by which Koffka is trying to replace the old-
fashioned separate sensations are nothing but what it is more traditional to call 
“relational predicates” – I shall rather say here “structural predicates”. As such, those 
steps truly cannot be separated from the relations in which they are involved, since, as 
Russell said in his Principles of Mathematics ([19], § 214, p. 222), they are nothing but 
“cumbrous ways” of talking about relations (or structures) themselves.  
3.2. The need of an absolute ground for structures  
Nevertheless, it seems at first glance quite difficult to admit, and to conceive, that a 
brightness difference might be constitutive of two brightnesses. As a matter of fact, this 
is the central point around which this whole discussion revolves. A first obvious 
objection is anticipated by Koffka: isn’t it obvious that a brightness difference has to be 
grounded on two different brightnesses? But the “isomorphism” hypothesis introduced 
by Gestalt psychology actually provides Koffka with a very easy and interesting 
answer to this objection: according to this hypothesis, phenomenal “structures” are 
supposed to be the immediate correlates of causal relations in the brain, those causal 
relations being supposed to hold between physiological processes linearly issued from 
stimuli. Thus, phenomenal “structures” are ultimately grounded on non phenomenal 
stimuli, and not on sensations: 
“Here the argument may be anticipated that, in the analysis, parts must 
determine the whole; you lay the lighter gray at the left and you have a 
different brightness gradation than when you lay it at the right! But what 
does this argument really prove? Remember, you must not substitute 
your sensations for your stimuli. If you are careful not to do this, your 
argument must be that the arrangement of the single stimuli determines 
the whole structure. But you have not proved that the part phenomena 
have determined the whole phenomenon.” ([8], pp. 543-544) 
Therefore, there seems to be no contradiction in the psychological possibility that 
structures might appear without visible grounds. However, we still have to understand 
how plain “steps” inside those structures can finally appear, or seem to appear, as 
absolute qualities.  
3.3. Empirical refutation 
Now, the most radical idea in Koffka’s “structural” programme (and probably the most 
radical idea in the Gestalt programme in general) is that to see a figure on a ground 
(and, hence, to see a “sensation” in the classical sense of the “mosaic” theory), is still to 
see a “structure” in Koffka’s sense. This particular structure, of which figure and 
ground are thus only “steps”, is called a “segregation” structure by the Gestalt 
psychologists. Thereby, Koffka writes in The Growth of the Mind, that “it is … a part 
of the nature of a quality that it should lie upon a ground, or, as we may also say, that it 
should rise upon a level” ([7], p. 131). All “things” or “figures” we see are thus reduced 
to steps in segregation structures by Koffka. And he conversely maintains another very 
strong claim, according to which the ground itself phenomenologically depends upon 
such a “segregation” structure: therefore “mere ground would be equivalent to no 
consciousness at all” ([8], p. 566), so that “the most primitive phenomenon of 
consciousness is not the inarticulate ground-work, but the [structure (configuration)] or 
quality, which arises from this uniform background” ([7], p. 136). Merleau-Ponty in 
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particular has presented this claim as the center of the whole Gestalt theory in his 
Introduction to Phénoménologie de la perception, when he wrote that “the 
Gestalttheorie tells us that a figure on a ground is the most simple datum we can get”, 
so that “no point can be seen except as a figure on a ground”, and that “a truly 
homogeneous area, offering nothing to perceive, can be given to no perception at all” 
([20], p. 26). 
But it has to be stressed that meanwhile this last claim had been purely and simply 
refuted by Wolfgang Metzger, in a series of experiments published in 1930 [21], to 
which Koffka later devoted a central position in his Principles of Gestalt Psychology 
[9]. Indeed, Metzger managed to produce homogeneous stimulus conditions and 
observed that something could be perceived in those conditions: namely, “a mist of 
light which becomes more condensed at an indefinite distance” ([21], p. 13; quoted in 
[9], p. 111), and the whiteness of which is a function of the intensity of the light 
received. Although Koffka does not precisely state the problem, it is thus surely no 
coincidence that his initial claim that “the most primitive phenomenon of 
consciousness” is a segregation structure, is nowhere to be found in the Principles: it 
would clearly be in direct contradiction to Metzger’s results, since the correlate of this 
claim is that “mere ground would be equivalent to no consciousness at all”. On the 
contrary, it is now Metzger’s “mist of light” that Koffka establishes as “the simplest 
case” of perception (though this simplicity does not imply, it is true, any genetic 
primitivity, but only means a dynamic privilege, as the most “balanced” distribution): 
“If perception is organization, i.e., a psychophysical process in extension 
depending upon the total stimulus distribution, then homogeneity of this 
distribution must be the simplest case and not the traditional one which 
contains a discontinuity.” ([9], p. 110) 
By excluding here that any discontinuity in the stimulus distribution might produce a 
dynamically “simple” perception, it is not only the “traditional” case of a single 
sensation that Koffka henceforth considered as complex, but also any case of figure 
seen upon a ground. More importantly, by admitting, as he had to, that a pure ground 
can appear as a phenomenon, Koffka ipso facto ceased to consider this ground as a 
plain “step” in a segregation structure, which means he had to abandon his initial 
structural programme. 
3.4. The “transposibility” of structures 
Finally, at least two other de jure arguments can be objected to structural theories of 
sensation such as the one Koffka initially formalized. The first argument was precisely 
formulated by William James in his Principles of Psychology against the neo-Hegelian 
attempts to reduce sensation to relations. It was also directed against certain 
“sensationalist writers” such as Alexander Bain, who, on the basis of empirical data 
very similar to the ones later used by Koffka (e.g. the “contrast” phenomena mentioned 
above), “believe in a so-called ‘Relativity of Knowledge,’ which, if they only 
understood it, they would see to be identical with Professor Green’s doctrine. They tell 
us that the relation of sensations to each other is something belonging to their essence, 
and that no one of them has an absolute content” ([2], p. 11). James’ objection is 
particularly simple and effective: if all that was experienced, when listening to music, 
for instance, was the relations between the notes, one could not make any difference 
between two identical melodies played in different scales, since the relations between 
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the notes would be the same in both. Actually, one could not even tell the difference 
between any two pairs of notes: 
“So far are we from not knowing (in the words of Professor Bain) ‘any 
one thing by itself, but only the difference between it and another thing,’ 
that if this were true the whole edifice of our knowledge would collapse. 
If all we felt were the difference between the C and D, or c and d, on the 
musical scale, that being the same in the pairs of notes, the pairs 
themselves would be the same, and language could get along without 
substantives.” ([2], p. 12) 
I think it is fair to say that this argument anticipates the argument known as the 
“transposibility” of Gestalt qualities, that Ehrenfels used the same year in his famous 
article [22]: since the relations between the sensorial contents can be transposed from 
one set of contents to another one, qualitatively different from the first, it is obvious 
that relations are something “more” than those contents. Ehrenfels used this argument 
against the reducibility of Gestalt qualities to their terms; James uses it against the 
reducibility of the terms to their relations. Of course, Koffka and Merleau-Ponty knew 
this argument by Ehrenfels: but they only referred to it through Köhler [4], who 
insisted on the necessity to admit that physical systems were Gestalt qualities too, since 
their whole properties could also be transposed from one set of physical substances to 
another. As a consequence, Koffka and Merleau-Ponty only spoke of the possibility to 
transpose structures from one set of stimuli or physiological processes to another, with 
the effect that the resulting phenomenal structure and its phenomenal terms remained 
the same despite the transposition. But if one insists on the fact that the transposition 
Ehrenfels himself talked about, as a criterion for Gestalt qualities, was a transposition 
from one set of sensations to another; then one immediately sees that this property of 
phenomenal Gestalt qualities as such is enough to refute Koffka’s initial structural 
programme. 
3.5. Abstraction and real separation 
I will only add one last argument against such a programme, which will help us 
understand why the facts so much seem to corroborate a structural theory of sensation. 
I will borrow this argument from Husserl’s mereology in his Logical Investigations, 
though one could also find the same general idea in James’ writings. This general idea 
is again quite simple: it very well might be that in fact no single stimulus can ever 
produce the same sensorial content in another context; it may even be that in fact no 
single sensorial content is ever the same for it constantly changes with the context in 
which it appears, which is itself in constant change. But the fact remains that de jure, it 
is always possible to consider such content for itself (a colour, for instance) and to 
abstract it from its context5:   
                                                            
5 By this Husserl means that the content is “isolable in idea”, which precisely does 
not mean that “the actually experienced contents of the phenomenological sphere … 
can be freed from all blending with coexistent contents”, but “means only that we can 
keep some content constant in idea despite boundless variation – variation that is free, 
though not excluded by a law rooted in the content’s essence – of the contents 
associated with it, and, in general, given with it. This means that it is unaffected by the 
elimination of any given arrangement of compresent contents whatsoever. This self-
evidently entails: that the existence of this content, to the extent that this depends on 
160
“In the ‘nature’ of the content itself, in its ideal essence, no dependence 
on other contents is rooted; the essence that makes it what it is, also 
leaves it unconcerned with all other contents. It may as a matter of fact 
be that, with the existence of this content, other contents are given, and in 
accordance with empirical rules. In its ideally graspable essence, 
however, the content is independent; this essence by itself, i.e. 
considered in a priori fashion, requires no other essence to be interwoven 
with it.” ([23] p. 9; see also pp. 6-7) 
On the contrary, Husserl adds, it is de jure impossible to abstract a structural predicate, 
or what Husserl calls a “moment of unity” in an intuitive content, from the whole or 
form-quality of which it is a moment ([23], p. 8). Indeed, as we already said with 
Russell, such structural predicates are only “cumbrous” ways of talking about the 
structure itself. Thus, it seems to me that Husserl’s argument can be summed up this 
way: one must not confuse the abstraction that can always be made of a sensorial 
content whatsoever, with the real separation from its context of the stimulus beneath it. 
It is this confusion that made it seem possible to think that facts could support a 
structural theory of sensation. That the phenomenal effects of stimuli may depend on 
the context of their presentation does not imply that those effects are in themselves 
dependent on their phenomenal context. Even if those effects only existed for an instant, 
they would exist as absolute beings, whereas structural predicates can only be relative 
beings: therefore, the possibility to abstract colours can only be conceived if they are 
not relational predicates, and this proves that they have to be admitted as irreducible 
absolutes in our ontology. As a consequence, phenomenal structures or form-qualities 
must be conceived as external to their terms, even though they might still be accepted 
as immediate phenomena, according to the “isomorphism” hypothesis.  
As a matter of fact, this last hypothesis makes it very easy to conceive why, de 
facto, almost no phenomenal change in the relations can ever occur without 
concomitant change in the quality of the phenomenal terms. If those absolute terms are 
themselves correlates of absolute physiological processes, the “isomorphism” 
hypothesis entails that those processes are causally interdependent, since they are 
phenomenally structured. Now, it is a truism to say that causal relations can modify 
their terms. It may very well be for instance that, in the “colour-tranformation” 
phenomena, the effect of those causal relations on the “level” processes is always to 
transform them into objectively “white” processes, and that those same causal relations 
actually accordingly affect the surrounding colour processes, in such a way that the 
objective difference between the colour stimuli might be preserved and translated 
between the colour processes in the brain. Actually, such is the way Koffka finally 
understood those phenomena in his later works ([10], [9]; see also [24], pp. 232-234). 
The resultant phenomenal colours would immediately appear as “steps” in “difference” 
or “segregation” structures, so they would immediately be felt as having the meaning 
of being different from each other, but they would nevertheless be absolute in 
themselves, and those structures would remain external to them.  
 
                                                                                                                                                
itself and its essence, is not at all conditioned by the existence of other contents, that it 
could exist as it is, through an a priori necessity of essence, even if nothing were there 
outside of it, even if all around were altered at will, i.e. without principle.” ([23], p. 9). 
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Statistical Invariants of Spatial Form:
From Local AND to Numerosity
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Abstract Theories of the processing and representation of spatial form have to take
into account recent results on the importance of holistic properties. Numerous ex-
periments showed the importance of “set properties”, “ensemble representations”
and “summary statistics”, ranging from the “gist of a scene” to something like “nu-
merosity”. These results are sometimes difficult to interpret, since we do not ex-
actly know how and on which level they can be computed by the neural machinery
of the cortex. According to the standard model of a local-to-global neural hierarchy
with a gradual increase of scale and complexity, the ensemble properties have to
be regarded as high-level features. But empirical results indicate that many of them
are primary perceptual properties and may thus be attributed to earlier processing
stages. Here we investigate the prerequisites and the neurobiological plausibility
for the computation of ensemble properties. We show that the cortex can easily
compute common statistical functions, like a probability distribution function or an
autocorrelation function, and that it can also compute abstract invariants, like the
number of items in a set. These computations can be performed on fairly early lev-
els and require only two well-accepted properties of cortical neurons, linear sum-
mation of afferent inputs and variants of nonlinear cortical gain control.
Keywords. shape invariants, peripheral vision, ensemble statistics, numerosity
Introduction
Recent evidence shows that our representation of the world is essentially determined by
holistic properties [1,2,3,4,5,6]. These properties are described as “set properties”, “en-
semble properties”, or they are characterized as “summary statistics”. They reach from
the average orientation of elements in a display [1] over the “gist of a scene”[7,8], to the
“numerosity” of objects in a scene [9]. For many of these properties we do not exactly
know by which kind of neural mechanisms and on which level of the cortex they are
computed. According to the standard view of the cortical representation of shape, these
properties have to be considered as high-level features because the cortex is organized in
form of a local-to-global processing hierarchy in which features with increasing order of
abstraction are computed in a progression of levels [10]. At the bottom, simple and lo-
cally restricted geometrical features are computed, whereas global and complex proper-
ties are represented at the top levels of the hierarchy. Across levels, invariance is system-
1Corresponding Author: Christoph Zetzsche, Cognitive Neuroinformatics, FB3, University of Bremen, P.O.
Box 330 440, 28334 Bremen, Germany; E-mail: zetzsche@informatik.uni-bremen.de
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atically increased such that the final stages are independent of translations, rotations, size
changes, and other transformations of the input. However convincing this view seems on
first sight, it creates some conceptual difficulties.
The major difficulty concerns the question of what exactly is a low-level and a high-
level property. Gestalt theorists already claimed that features considered high-level ac-
cording to a structuralistic view are primary and basic in terms of perception. Further
doubts have been raised by global precedence effects [11]. Similar problems arise with
the recently discovered ensemble properties. The gist of a scene, a high-level feature
according to the classical view, can be recognized in 150 msec [7,12,13,14] and can be
modeled using low-level visual features [8]. In addition, categories can be shown to be
faster processed than basic objects, contrary to the established view of the latter as entry-
level representations [15]. A summary statistics approach, also based on low-level visual
features, can explain the holistic processing properties in the periphery of the visual field
[4,16,17]. What is additionally required in these models are statistical measures, like
probability distributions and autocorrelation functions, from which it is not known how
and on which level of the cortical hierarchy they can be realized.
One of the most abstract ensemble properties seems to be the number of elements
in a spatial configuration. However, the ability to recognize this number is not restricted
to humans with mature cognitive abilities but has also been found in infants and animals
[9,18], recently even in invertebrates [19]. Neural reactions to numerosity are fast (100
msecs in macaques [20]). And finally there is evidence for a “direct visual sense for
number” since number seems to be a primary visual property like color, orientation or
motion, to which the visual system can be adapted by prolonged viewing [21].
The above observations on ensemble properties raise a number of questions, from
which the following are addressed in this paper: Sect. 1: Can the cortex compute a prob-
ability distribution? Sect. 2: And also an autocorrelation function? By which kind of
neural hardware can this be achieved? Sect.3: Can the shape of individual objects also
be characterized by such mechanisms? Sect. 4: What is necessary to compute such an
abstract property like the number of elements in a spatial configuration? Can this be
achieved in early sensory stages?
1. Neural Computation of a Probability Distribution
Formally, the probability density function pe(e) of a random variable e is defined via the
cumulative distribution function: pe(e) , dPe(e)de with Pe(e) = Pr[e  e]. Their empirical
counterparts, the histogram and the cumulative histogram, are defined by use of indicator
functions. For this we divide the real line into m bins (e(i),e(i+1)] with bin size De =
e(i+1)  e(i). For each bin i, an indicator function is defined as
Qi(e) = 1i(e) =
⇢
1, if e(i) < e e(i+1)
0, else (1)
An illustration of such a function is shown in Fig. 1a. From N samples ek of the ran-
dom variable e we then obtain the histogram as h(i) = 1N Â
N
k=1Qi(ek). The cumulative
histogram He(e) can be computed by changing the bins to (e(1),e(i+1)] (cf. Fig. 1b), and
by performing the same summation as for the normal histogram. The reverse cumulative
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(a) (b) (c)
Figure 1. Indicator functions. Basic types are: (a) indicator function for computation of a classical histogram.
(b) indicator function for a cumulative histogram. (c) indicator function for a reverse cumulative histogram.
histogram H¯(i) is simply the reversed version of the cumulative histogram. The corre-
sponding bins are Dei = (e(i),e(m+1)] and the indicator functions are defined as (Fig. 1c)
Qi(e) = 1i(e) =
⇢
1, if e  e(i)
0, else (2)
The corresponding system is shown in Fig. 2.
The three types of histograms have identical information content since they are re-
lated to each other as
h(i) = H((i+1)) H(i) = H¯(i)  H¯(i+1) and H(i) = 1  H¯(i) =
i
Â
j=1
h( j). (3)
e1
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(a)
Albrecht and Hamilton (1982)
(b)
Figure 2. Computation of the reverse cumulative histogram. (a) shows the set of input variables e1 to en over
which the histogram should be computed. Each of these variables is input to a set of indicator functions Qi(ek).
For each bin of the histogram there is a summation unit Si which sums over all indicator function outputs with
index i, i.e. over all Qi(ek).
(b) The response functions of three neurons in the visual cortex [22]. They show a remarkable similarity to the
indicator functions for the reverse cumulative histogram. First, they come with different sensitivities. Second,
they exhibit an independence on the input strength: once the threshold and the following transition range is
exceeded the output remains constant and does no longer increase when the input level is increased.
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Figure 3. Neurobiological computation of a reverse cumulative histogram. The upper row shows several ex-
amples of input probability distributions. The second row shows the corresponding reverse cumulative his-
tograms computed by a dense set of simulated neurons. The third row shows the estimated probability distri-
butions as derived from the neural representation by use of Eq. (3).
How does all this relate to visual cortex? Has the architecture shown in Fig. 2a any
neurobiological plausibility? The final summation stage is no problem since the most
basic capability of neurons is computation of a linear sum of their inputs. But how about
the indicator functions? They have two special properties: First, the indicator functions
come with different sensitivities. An individual function does only generate a non-zero
output if the input e exceeds a certain level, a kind of threshold, which determines the
sensitivity of the element e(i) in Eq. (2) and Fig. 1c. To cover the complete range of
values, different functions with different sensitivities are needed (Fig. 2a). Second, the
indicator functions exhibit a certain independence of the input level. Once the input is
clearly larger than the threshold, the output remains constant (Fig. 1c).
Do we know of neurons which have such properties, a range of different sensitivi-
ties, and a certain independence of the input strength? Indeed, cortical gain control (or
normalization), as first described in early visual cortex (e.g. [22]) but now believed to
exist throughout the brain [23], yields exactly these properties. Gain-controlled neurons
(Fig. 2b) exhibit a remarkable similarity to the indicator functions used to compute the
reverse cumulative histogram, since they (i) come with different sensitivities, and (ii) pro-
vide an independence of the input strength in certain response ranges.
The computation of a reverse cumulative histogram thus is well in reach of the cor-
tex. We only have to modify the architecture of Fig. 2a by the smoother response func-
tions of cortical neurons. The information about a probability distribution available to the
visual cortex is illustrated in Fig. 3. The reconstructed distributions, as estimated from the
neural reverse cumulative histograms, are a kind of Parzen-windowed (lowpass-filtered)
versions of the original distributions.
2. Neural Implementation of Auto- and Cross-Correlation Functions
A key feature of the recent statistical summary approach to peripheral vision [4,6,24,16]
is the usage of auto- and cross-correlation functions. These functions are defined as
h(i) =
1
N
N/2
Â
k= N/2+1
e(k) g(i+ k), (4)
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Figure 4. Different types of AND-like functions. Each function is of the type gk = g(si,s j), i.e. assigns
an output value to each combination of the two input values. The upper row shows the functions as surface
plots, the lower row as iso-response curves. Left: Mathematical multiplication of two inputs. Center: AND-like
combinations that can be obtained by use of cortical gain control (normalization). The upper left figure shows
the classical gain control without additional threshold. The upper right figure shows the same mechanism with
an additional threshold. This results in a full-fledged AND with a definite zero response in case that only one
of the two inputs is active. Right: The linear sum of the two input values for comparison purposes.
where autocorrelation results if e(k) = g(k) and where   indicates multiplication. With
respect to their neural computation, the outer summation is no problem, but the cru-
cial function is the nonlinear multiplicative interaction between two variables. A neu-
ral implementation could make use of the Babylonian trick ab = 14 [(a+ b)
2  (a  b)2]
[25,26,27], but this requires two or more neurons for the computation and thus far there
is neither evidence for such a systematic pairing of neurons nor for actual multiplicative
interactions in the visual cortex. However, exact multiplication is not the key factor: a
reasonable statistical measure merely requires provision of a matching function such that
e(k) and g(i+ k) generate a large contribution to the autocorrelation function if they are
similar, and a small contribution if they are dissimilar. For this, it is sufficient to provide
a neural operation which is AND-like [27,28]. Surprisingly, such an AND-like operation
can be achieved by the very same neural hardware as used before, the cortical gain con-
trol mechanism, as shown in [28]. Cortical gain control [22,29] applied to two different
features si(x,y) and s j(x,y) can be written as
gk(x,y) = g(si(x,y),s j(x,y)) :=max
0@0, si+ s j
(
q
s2i + s
2
j + e)
p
2
 Q
1A (5)
where k = k(i, j), e is a constant which controls the steepness of the response and Q is a
threshold. The resulting nonlinear combination is comparable with an AND-like opera-
tion of two features and causes a substantial nonlinear increase of the neural selectivity,
as illustrated in Fig. 4.
Of course there will be differences between a formal autocorrelation function and
the neurobiological version, but the essential feature, the signaling of good matches in
dependence of the relative shifts will be preserved (Fig. 5).
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(a) (b)
Figure 5. Mathematical and neurobiological autocorrelation functions. (a) shows a test input and (b) the cor-
responding mathematical (red dotted) and neurobiological (blue) autocorrelation function.
Figure 6. Different shapes and the corresponding integral features. We used parameter combinations of six
different orientations qi = (i  1)p/6, i = 1, . . . ,6, and four different scales ri = 2 i, i = 1, . . . ,4. The radial
half-bandwidth was set to fr,h = 13 r and the angular half-bandwidth was constant with fq ,h = p/12. Each
parameter combination creates pairs of variables for each x,y-position which are AND-combined by the gain
control mechanism described in Eq. (5) as gk(x,y) = g(si(x,y),s j(x,y)).
3. Figural Properties from Integrals
We extracted different features sr,q from the image luminance function l = l(x,y) by
applying a Gabor-like filter operation sr,q (x,y) = (l ⇤F 1(Hr,q ))(x,y) where F 1 de-
notes the inverse Fourier transformation and the filter kernel Hr,q is defined in the spec-
tral space. We distinguish two cases (even and odd) which can be seen in the following
definition in polar coordinates:
Hevenr,q ( fr, fq ) :=
(
cos2
⇣
p
2
fr r
2 fr,h
⌘
cos2
⇣
p
2
fq q
2 fq ,h
⌘
,( fr, fq ) 2Wr,q
0 ,else,
with Wr,q := {( fr, fq )| fr 2 [r  2 fr,h,r+ 2 fr,h]^ fq 2 [q   2 fq ,h,q + 2 fq ,h]\ [q + p  
2 fq ,h,q +p+2 fq ,h]}, where fr,h denotes the half-bandwidth in radial direction and fq ,h
denotes the half-bandwidth in angular direction. Hoddr,q is defined as the Hilbert trans-
formed even symmetric filter kernel.
Various AND combinations of these oriented features (see caption Fig. 6) are ob-
tained by the gain-control mechanism described in Eq. (5). The integration over the
whole domain results in global features Fk :=
R
R2 gk(x,y) d(x,y) which capture basic
shape properties (Fig. 6).
4. Numerosity and Topology
One of the most fundamental and abstract ensemble properties is the number of elements
of a set. Recent evidence (see Introduction) raised the question at which cortical level
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the underlying computations are performed. In this processing, a high degree of invari-
ance has to be achieved, since numerosity can be recognized largely independent of other
properties like size, shape and positioning of elements. Models which address this ques-
tion in a neurobiologically plausible fashion, starting from individual pixels or neural re-
ceptors instead of an abstract type of input, are rare. To our knowledge, the first approach
in this direction has been made in [30]. A widely known model [31] has a shape-invariant
mapping to number which is based on linear DOG filters of different sizes, which sub-
stantially limits the invariance properties. A more recent model is based on unsupervised
learning but has only employed moderate shape variations [32]. In [30] we suggested
that the necessary invariance properties may be obtained by use of a theorem which con-
nects local measurements of the differential geometry of the image surface with global
topological properties [30,33]. In the following we will build upon this concept.
The key factor of our approach is a relation between surface properties and a topo-
logical invariant as described by the famous Gauss-Bonnet theorem. In order to apply
this to the image luminance function l = l(x,y) we interpret this function as a surface
S := {(x,y,z)2R3|(x,y)2W,z= l(x,y)} in three-dimensional real space. We then apply
the formula for the Gaussian curvature
K(x,y) =
lxx(x,y)lyy(x,y)  lxy(x,y)2
(1+ lx(x,y)2+ ly(x,y)2)2
, (6)
where subscript denotes the differentiation in the respective direction (e.g. lxy = ∂
2l
∂x∂y ).
The numerator of (6) can also be written as D = l1l2 where l1,2 are the eigenvalues of
the Hessian matrix of the luminance function l(x,y) which represent the partial second
derivatives in the principal directions. The values and signs of the eigenvalues give us
the information about the shape of the luminance surface S in each point, whether it
is elliptic, hyperbolic, parabolic, or planar. Since Gaussian curvature results from the
multiplication of the second derivatives l1,2 it is zero for the latter two cases. It has been
shown that this measure can be generalized in various ways, in particular towards the use
of neurophysiologically realistic Gabor-like filters instead of the derivatives [27,30]. The
crucial point, however, is the need for AND combinations of oriented features [27,30]
which can be obtained as before by the neural mechanism of cortical gain control [28].
The following corollary from the Gauss-Bonnet theorem is the basis for the invari-
ance properties in the context of numerosity.
Corollary 4.1 Let S⇢ R3 be a closed two-dimensional Riemannian manifold. ThenZ
S
K dA= 4p(1 g) (7)
where K is the Gaussian curvature and g is the genus of the surface S.
We consider the special case where the luminance function consists of multiple objects
(polyhedra with orthogonal corners) with constant luminance level. We compare the sur-
face of this luminance function to the surface of a cuboid with holes that are shaped like
the polyhedra. The trick is that the latter surface has a genus which is determined by the
number of holes in the cuboid and which can be determined by the integration of the
local curvature according to Eq. (7). If we can find the corresponding contributions of
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the integral on the image surface, we can use this integral to count the number of ob-
jects. We assume the corners to be locally sufficiently smooth such that the surfaces are
Riemannian manifolds. The Gaussian curvature K then is zero almost everywhere except
on the corners. We hence have to consider only the contributions of the corners. It turns
out that these contributions can be computed from the elliptic regions only if we use dif-
ferent signs for upwards and downwards oriented elliptic regions. We thus introduce the
following operator which distinguishes the different types of ellipticity in the luminance
function. Let l1   l2, then the operator N(x,y) := |min(0,l1(x,y))|  |max(0,l2(x,y))|
is always zero if the surface is hyperbolic and has a positive sign for positive elliptic-
ity and a negative one for negative ellipticity. We thus can calculate the numerosity fea-
ture which has the ability of counting objects in an image by counting the holes in an
imaginary cuboid as follows:
F =
Z
W
N(x,y)
(1+ lx(x,y)2+ ly(x,y)2)
3
2
d(x,y). (8)
The crucial feature of this measure are contributions of fixed size and with appropriate
signs from the corners. The denominator can thus be replaced by a neural gain control
mechanism and an appropriate renormalization. For the implementation here we use a
shortcut which gives us straight access to the eigenvalues. The numerator D(x,y) of (6)
can be rewritten as
D(x,y)= lxxlyy  14 (luu lvv)
2 =
1
4
[(lxx+lyy)2 ((lxx  lyy)2+(luu  lvv)2)| {z }
=:e2
] =
1
4
(Dl2 e2)
(9)
with u := xcos(p/4)+ ysin(p/4) and v :=  xsin(p/4)+ ycos(p/4). The eigenvalues
then are l1,2 = 12 (Dl±|e|) and we can directly use them to compute N(x,y). Application
of this computation to a number of test images is shown in Fig. 7.
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Figure 7. Based on a close relation to topological invariants the spatial integration of local curvature fea-
tures can yield highly invariant numerosity estimates. The numerical values in the last row are the normalized
integrals of the filter outputs (middle row).
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5. Conclusion
Recent evidence shows that ensemble properties play an important role in perception and
cognition. In this paper, we have investigated by which neural operations and on which
processing level statistical ensemble properties can be computed by the cortex. Compu-
tation of a probability distribution requires indicator functions with different sensitivi-
ties, and our reinterpretation of cortical gain control suggests that this could be a basic
function of this neural mechanism. The second potential of cortical gain control is the
computation of AND-like feature combinations. Together with the linear summation ca-
pabilities of neurons this enables the computation of powerful invariants and summary
features. We have repeatedly argued that AND-like feature combinations are essential
for our understanding of the visual system [27,30,34,35,36,28]. The increased selectivity
of nonlinear AND operators, as compared to their linear counterparts, is a prerequisite
for the usefulness of integrals over the respective responses [30,28]. We have shown that
such integrals of AND features are relevant for the understanding of texture perception
[37], of numerosity estimation [30], and of invariance in general [28]. Recently, integrals
over AND-like feature combinations in form of auto- and cross-correlation functions
have been suggested for the understanding of peripheral vision [4,16,17].
A somewhat surprising point is that linear summation and cortical gain control, two
widely accepted properties of cortical neurons, are the only requirements for the com-
putation of ensemble properties. These functions are already available at early stages of
the cortex, but also in other cortical areas [23]. The computation of ensemble properties
may thus be an ubiquitous phenomenon in the cortex.
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